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to	defer	prosecutions	 in	their	 favour.	 	By	establishing	a	framework	against	which	 ICC	
trials	 and	 AJMs	 can	 be	 evaluated,	 the	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 and	 aims	 to	
provide	an	element	of	consistency	in	an	area	which	is	dominated	by	creative	ambiguity.		
	
Arguing	 that	 criminal	 prosecutions	 have	 a	 limited	 impact	 on	 ICJ	 aims,	 the	 thesis	
considers	 AJMs	 generally	 before	 undertaking	 an	 in-depth	 historical	 and	 comparative	







Finally,	 the	 thesis	 examines	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 ICC	 judges	 in	 previous	 admissibility	
challenges	 and	 argues	 that	 they	 must	 demonstrate	 a	 broader	 and	 more	 flexible	
























states	 for	 investigation,	 through	 tensions	 over	 the	 selection	 of	 cases	 to	 prosecute,	






































For	 centuries,	 criminal	 justice	 ethics	 have	 been	 dominated	 by	 retributivism	 and	
consequentialism	 and	 although	 their	 justifications	 differ,	 both	 hold	 that	 punishment	
should	be	the	main	response	to	crime.13	 	At	the	 international	 level,	demands	for	the	


















respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law.14	 	 The	 ten	 years	 after	 1993,	 for	 example,	 saw	 the	
establishment	of	ad	hoc	international	tribunals	for	the	former	Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda,	
the	ICC	in	The	Hague	and	hybrid	tribunals	in	Kosovo,	Sierra	Leone,	Timor-Leste,	Bosnia-




model	 of	 restorative	 justice	 (RJ)	 also	 became	 ‘immensely	 popular	 from	 the	 1990s	
onwards	[…]	viewed	by	many	as	a	social	movement	of	global	dimensions.’16	RJ	offered	
fresh	hope	for	‘progressive	change	in	criminal	justice,	despite	a	continuing	conservative	
landscape.’17	 Interest	 in	 RJ	 had	 first	 emerged	 in	 the	 1970s,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 ‘major	
development	in	criminological	thinking’.18	Social	change	in	the	1960s	and	1970s19	had	









‘Restorative	 justice	 is	 a	 process	 whereby	 all	 the	 parties	 with	 a	 stake	 in	 a	 particular	



















others)	 together	 in	 a	process	 in	which	both	 lay	 and	 legal	 actors	make	decisions	 and	
whose	 (stated)	 aim	 is	 to	 repair	 the	 harm	 for	 victims,	 offenders,	 and	 perhaps	 other	
members	 of	 ‘the	 community’	 in	 ways	 that	 matter	 to	 them.’24	 	 In	 the	 context	 of	
international	crimes	involving	gross	breaches	of	human	rights,	RJ	may	involve	recourse	
to	 alternative	 justice	 mechanisms	 (AJMs)	 as	 a	 means	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	 past	 and	
effecting	reconciliation	between	former	enemies.	 	Although	 it	dealt	only	with	abuses	
that	were	 crimes	under	 its	domestic	 law,	 the	South	African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	
Commission	(SATRC)	 is	an	example	of	how	restorative	 justice	can	be	used	to	address	
system-wide	offences	that	affect	a	major	section	of	society.		It	demonstrates	that	a	Truth	





acknowledgment	 of	 wrong-doing	 may	 be	 expedient	 if	 the	 outcome	 is	 a	 peaceful	















for	 the	Ethics	of	War	and	Peace	and	 the	University	of	 Johannesburg	Stellenbosch	 Institute	 for	Advanced	Studies,	
South	Africa,	8th-9th	April	2016		
28	See,	for	example,	Amnesty	International	(2010)	‘Commissioning	Justice:	Truth	Commissions	and	Criminal	Justice’;	










argue	that	the	appropriate	response	 is	 international	trials	and	there	 is	no	doubt	that	
criminal	 prosecutions	 are	 strong	 weapon	 against	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 international	












Fambul	 Tok	 in	 Sierra	 Leone.	 	 These	 AJMs	 demonstrate	 a	 more	 culturally	 specific	
















engagement	 with	 other	 disciplines	 beyond	 the	 law	 itself	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 justice	






amid	 hopes	 for	 global	 respect	 for	 humanitarianism,	 human	 rights	 and	 international	





the	 last	 two	 decades,	 engaging	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 disciplines	 and	 professions	
encompassing	aspects	of	law,	policy,	ethics	and	social	science.36		Within	the	debate	on	
the	 theoretical	 and	 ethical	 issues	 surrounding	 TJ	 norms	 and	 its	 institutions,	 there	 is	
concern	 over	 whether	 TJ	 structures	 other	 than	 criminal	 trials	 are	 merely	 political	
compromises,	‘second	best’	options	where	‘[j]ustice	becomes	the	casualty	of	a	political	
calculation’,37	whether	they	have	a	consistent	set	of	goals	and	whether	they	fulfil	the	














37	 Allen,	 J.	 (2001)	 ‘Balancing	 Justice	 and	 Social	Unity:	 Political	 Theory	 and	 the	 Idea	of	 a	 Truth	 and	Reconciliation	
Commission’	49	U.	Toronto	LJ	pp315-353	at	p315	
	 7	




domestic	 criminal	 trials	 can	 result	 from	 the	 states’	 justice	 systems	 being	 weakened	
and/or	corrupt,	the	destruction	of	evidence	by	the	previous	regime	and	the	scarcity	of	
resources	which	are	needed	 for	 immediate	 social	needs	 such	as	housing,	health	and	
education	 rather	 than	 costly	 prosecutions.	 	 The	 fundamental	 issue,	 however,	 is	 the	




and	 acknowledging	 violations	 of	 their	 human	 rights	 and	 ensuring	 their	 future	
prevention.39	 	Additional	TJ	aims,	which	vary	according	to	context,	 include	promoting	
respect	for	the	rule	of	law,	facilitating	peace	processes	and	durable	conflict	resolution	
and	 advancing	 reconciliation.40	 	Whereas	 TJ	 scholars	 envisage	holistic	 approaches	 to	
justice	 which	 promote	 possibilities	 for	 peace,	 reconciliation	 and	 democracy	 for	
countries	 emerging	 from	 periods	 of	 conflict	 or	 repression,	 advocates	 for	 the	 ICC	
promote	it	as	having	a	central	role	in	achieving	TJ	through	a	fixed,	judicial	response	to	




appears	 to	 be	 intra-disciplinary	 with	 political	 scientists	 seeing	 TJ	 as	 a	 conceptually	
separate	 discipline	 from	 law,	 the	 two	developing	mutually-exclusively	 as	 either	 non-
judicial	 (flexible)	 or	 judicial	 (rigid)	 responses	 to	 HR	 violations.42	 	 The	 fundamental	





















distanced	 both	 geographically	 and	 contextually	 from	 those	 for	 whom	 it	 is	 seeking	
justice.44		Furthermore,	detractors	argue,	trials	at	the	ICC	undermine	state	and/or	local	
justice	systems	and	are	subject	to	the	vagaries	of	international	political	influence	as	can	
be	seen,	 for	example,	 in	the	contrasting	approaches	of	 the	UNSC	to	the	situations	 in	
Libya	and	Syria.45		Clearly,	the	ICC	is	the	primary	‘global’	institution	for	achieving	justice	
in	situations	of	transition	but	in	this	thesis,	the	ICC	will	be	examined	not	specifically	from	
































In	considering	when	and	 in	what	circumstances	 the	 ICC	should	defer	 to	an	AJM,	 this	




attains	 the	 goals	 of	 ICJ	 that	 are	 attributed	 to	 criminal	 trials	 should	 make	 the	 case	
inadmissible	to	the	ICC.		Whether	the	admissibility	provisions	of	Article	17	as	currently	
drafted	and	interpreted	by	the	ICC	Judges	would	enable	an	AJM	to	satisfy	the	Court’s	

















directly	 relates	 to	 the	 issues	 of	 peace,	 governance	 and	 pluralism	 that	 African	 states	
stressed	at	 the	ASP	open	bureau	meeting	 in	November	2016	as	being	of	 concern	 to	














court	 based	 on	 western	 notions	 of	 ‘justice’	 rather	 than	 another	 means	 of	
accountability	for	international	crimes?	
2. What	are	the	ICJ	aims	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC?	





clearly	 illustrate	 the	 factors	 it	 is	 argued	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 Court’s	



















traditional	method	of	 conflict	 resolution.	 The	Prosecutor	 refused	 to	 accede	 to	 these	
requests	which	 led	 to	 the	 failure	of	peace	 talks	between	 the	government	of	Uganda	
(GoU)	and	the	LRA.		As	a	result,	Uganda’s	President	Museveni	became	a	vocal	critic	of	
the	Court,	calling	it	a	‘useless	institution’	and	encouraging	support	in	the	African	Union	
for	 a	 mass	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 RSt.	 54	 	 Third,	 is	 the	 nature	 of	Mato	 Oput	 itself,	 a	
traditional	Acholi	justice	mechanism	said	by	their	Elders	to	have	cultural	relevance	for	
the	 Acholi	 people.55	 The	 GoU	 has	 not	 suggested	 Mato	 Oput	 as	 the	 appropriate	
accountability	mechanism,	the	suggestion	has	come	from	the	Acholi	Elders	who	insist	








54	 Buchanan,	 E.	 (2016)	 ‘Ugandan	 President	Museveni	 praises	 African	 nations	 for	withdrawing	 from	 ‘useless’	 ICC’	










have	 been	 several	 truth	 commissions	 in	 Africa	 but	 none	 are	 as	 well-known	 and	
internationally	praised	as	the	SATRC,	which	has	been	credited	with	helping	to	facilitate	
a	smooth	transition	from	the	repressive	apartheid	regime	to	democracy	and	to	create	a	
culture	 of	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 in	 South	Africa.57	 	One	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 the	
SATRC	is	the	conditional	amnesty	that	was	offered	to	the	individual	perpetrators	of	gross	
violations	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 return	 for	 their	 full	 and	 frank	 admissions	 before	 the	
Commission.58		This	is	clearly	the	antithesis	of	the	ICC’s	principle	that	such	crimes	‘must	

























deterrence,	 expressivism	 and	 rehabilitation,	 the	 ICC	 has	 been	 over-burdened	 with	
additional	 transitional	 justice	 goals	 including,	 for	 example,	 attaining	 peace,	 effecting	







northern	 Uganda’s	 Mato	 Oput,	 an	 AJM	 used	 by	 the	 Acholi	 people.	 	 This	 chapter	
examines	Mato	 Oput	 processes	 to	 establish	 whether	 it	 does	 achieve	 ICJ	 aims	 and	
therefore	could	potentially	make	a	successful	admissibility	challenge	at	the	ICC.		It	finds	
that	despite	the	assertions	of	Acholi	Elders	to	the	contrary,	the	traditional	Mato	Oput	
ceremony	 is	no	 longer	 in	common	usage.	 	Further,	 the	modern	(abridged)	version	of	















Chapter	 Seven	 examines	 the	 likelihood	 of	 an	 AJM	 being	 accepted	 by	 the	 ICC	 as	 an	
alternative	 to	 prosecutions	 at	 the	 Court	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Court’s	 principle	 of	





interpretation	of	 the	provisions	of	 the	RSt	 and	 the	Rules	of	Procedure	and	Evidence	
(RPE).			
	
All	 the	 admissibility	 challenges	 to	 date	 have	 been	 based	 on	 proposed	 domestic	
prosecutions	 but	 the	 judges’	 findings	 are	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 thesis	 as	 they	 give	 an	
indication	of	the	potential	for	success	of	a	challenge	based	on	an	AJM	rather	than	trials.	

















Conference	 that	 the	 ambiguity	 of	 some	 of	 the	 RSt’s	 provisions	 permit	 their	 flexible	








It	will	be	suggested	 in	this	thesis	that	the	history	of	 international	criminal	 justice	has	
been	driven	forward	by	ideas	of	legal	rationality	that	are	almost	exclusively	European.		
Thus,	it	cannot	be	argued	with	any	conviction	that	the	ICC	is	a	truly	global	legal	process	
with	 universal	 relevance	 and	 authority.	 	 This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 ICC	 does	 not	
represent	 a	 valuable	 and	 paradigmatic	 justice	 system,	 developed	 in	 Europe	 over	 an	
extended	period	and	influenced	by	important	and	universal	values	of	due	process	and	





There	 is,	 of	 course,	 extensive	 literature	on	African	AJMs	and	on	 the	 ICC,	particularly	
regarding	the	principle	of	complementarity.61		The	question	of	amnesties	and	ICJ	is	also	
well-rehearsed,62	 as	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 transitional	 justice	 mechanism	 could	
persuade	 the	 ICC	 to	defer	 prosecutions,	 both	often	within	 the	 ‘peace	 versus	 justice’	
debate.	 For	 example,	 Linda	 Keller’s	 article	 on	 western	 retributive	 justice	 versus	
traditional	 restorative	 justice	 based	 on	Mato	Oput	and	 her	 proposal	 that	 these	 two	
conceptions	of	justice	should	be	harmonised	in	the	context	of	ICC	deferrals	to	traditional	
justice	mechanisms	was	the	initial	catalyst	for	the	research	in	this	thesis.63		However,	
the	 ‘interests	of	 justice’	debate	 is	not	 the	 focus	of	 this	 thesis	which	seeks	 instead	 to	












































20th	 century,	 its	 establishment	 in	 2002	 was	 ‘a	 cultural	 achievement	 of	 historic	
importance	in	the	realisation	of	common	and	long-held	aspirations’1	to	bring	an	end	to	
impunity	 for	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 ‘unimaginable	 atrocities	 that	 deeply	 shock	 the	
conscience	of	humanity.’2		The	consciousness	that	some	crimes	are	so	serious	that	they	
concern	‘the	international	community	as	a	whole’3	had	advanced	gradually	during	the	
20th	 Century,	 described	 as	 ‘the	 bloodiest	 era	 in	 history.’4	 	 ‘Mindful	 that	 during	 this	
century	 millions	 of	 children,	 women	 and	 men	 have	 been	 victims’5	 the	 collective	
conscience	of	 the	 international	 community	was	pricked	 into	action	and	 the	 idealistic	
notion	of	states	coming	together	to	call	to	account	and	punish	the	guilty	seemingly	came	
to	 fruition	 at	 the	 Rome	 Conference	 in	 1998.	 	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 Court	 was	



























to	 greater	 co-operation	 between	 world	 powers,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	
establishment	of	ad	hoc	international	tribunals	in	the	aftermath	of	genocidal	conflicts	in	
the	 1990s.	 	 Also	 significant	was	 the	 transition	 from	 authoritarian	 rule	 or	 intra-state	
conflict	to	peace	and	democracy	of	a	number	of	states	in	South	America,	Africa	and	the	







intellectual	 and	 institutional	 development	 in	 the	 field	 of	 ICL	 was	 dominated	 by	 the	
western	powers	which	promulgated	their	values	to	the	exclusion	of	other	approaches	
to	 justice.	 	To	establish	that	no	 justice	mechanisms	other	 than	a	criminal	court	were	
considered	as	a	potential	global	means	of	accountability,	the	records	of	the	meetings	of	














In	 the	 first	 section	 and	 in	order	 to	 explain	 Europe’s	 global	 dominance,	 the	medieval	
origins	of	ICL	will	be	considered.		Often	described	as	‘euro-centric’,	they	arose	from	the	






































this	 classically-based,	 medieval	 legal	 order.15	 	 The	 authority	 of	 the	 church	 and	 its	
teachings	 waned	 as,	 conversely,	 the	 independent	 and	 autonomous	 communities	 in	
Christendom	 increasingly	 became	 more	 distinct,	 well-organised	 and	 monarchical.16	
Although	 Christianity	 remained	 the	 common	 faith,	 the	 ‘unity’	 of	 Christendom	 was	
irreparably	 damaged	 by	 both	 the	 Protestant	 Reformation	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 powerful	
European	nations	which	continually	pitted	themselves	against	each	other,	pursuing	their	





credited	 with	 originating	 modern	 international	 law.18	 	 The	 treaties	 incorporated	
principles	promulgated	by	Grotius,19	which	are	recognised	as	providing	the	foundation	
of	the	modern	state	system,	as	they	articulated	the	concept	of	state	sovereignty	and	the	






















corresponding	 spread	 of	 European	 influence	 over	 their	 colonies	 in	 several	 areas,	
including	the	administration	of	 law	and	‘justice’.	 	Grotius’	view	that	 international	 law	
was	universal	and	that	secular	natural	law	applied	to	all	states	was	not	reflected	in	the	
expansionist	 ambitions	 of	 European	 states,	 however.23	 Bowden	 argues	 that	 the	
foundation	of	the	Westphalian	states	system	prompted	the	European	‘classical	standard	




It	 is	 arguable	 that	 the	 ‘classical	 standard	 of	 civilisation’	 that	 emerged	 and	 took	 root	




did	 not	 share	 the	 laws	 and	 customs	 of	 Europe	 was	 automatically	 excluded	 from	
international	society	and	it	was	assumed	that	it	was	the	task	of	the	civilised	nations	of	
Europe	 to	 assist	 with	 the	 training	 of	 the	 uncivilised	 (i.e.	 non-European)	 in	 their	
aspirations	to	enter	the	civilised	world	should	they	demonstrate	the	propensity	to	do	
so.26	 	 Furthermore,	 he	 argues	 that	 such	 attitudes	 have	 been	 ‘deployed	 “by	western	
powers	 in	 their	 suppression	 of	 the	 non-western	 world	 and	 […]	 are	 still	 regularly	






















that	 natural	 rights	 did	 not	 rely	 on	 citizenship	 or	 on	 any	 state	 law,	 nor	 were	 they	
necessarily	limited	to	one	particular	ethnic,	cultural	or	religious	group.28	Immanuel	Kant	
suggested	 that	every	 individual	has	 ‘citizenship	of	 the	world’29	and	 that	world	peace	
could	 be	 attained	 ‘as	 a	 consequence	 of	 increased	 communication	 among	 human	
beings’.30	 	 Kant’s	 view,	 however,	 that	 Europeans	 were	 the	 only	 mature	 species	 of	
humanity31	 	helped	to	 reinforce	 the	Enlightenment’s	 link	with	colonial	expansionism.		
Hegemonic	notions	of	global	unity	were	 justifications	for	Europe’s	Christian,	civilising	
and	 modernising	 missions	 from	 the	 conquest	 of	 the	 Americas	 in	 the	 16th	 and	 17th	
centuries	 to	the	colonisation	of	Asia	and	Africa	 in	 the	19th	and	early	20th	centuries.32		
Arguing	 the	 universality	 of	 their	 ideas,	 Enlightenment	 thinkers	 denied	 cultural	
differences	 and	 moral	 and	 social	 relativity.	 	 Using	 its	 doctrine	 of	 progress,	 colonial	
conquest	was	legitimated	under	the	guise	of	the	civilising	mission	and	Enlightenment’s	




























the	 uniting	 of	 nations	 via	 the	 mechanism	 of	 free	 trade	 and	 increased	 popular	




civilians	 under	 occupation.	 39	 	 In	 Europe,	 also	 in	 1963,	 Gustave	 Moynier	 and	 Henri	
Dunant	co-founded	the	International	Committee	for	Relief	to	the	Wounded	(renamed	





Only	 six	 years	 later,	 the	 1870	 Franco-Prussian	War	 led	 to	 violations	 of	 the	 Geneva	
Convention	 being	 alleged	 by	 both	 sides,	 including	 widespread	 misuse	 of	 Red	 Cross	
insignia.42	 	 	 Making	 the	 first	 serious	 proposal	 for	 an	 international	 tribunal	 to	 judge	
violations	of	 internationally	agreed	rules	on	the	conduct	of	war,43	Moynier	proposed	
that	 future	violations	be	discouraged	by	 the	establishment	by	 treaty	of	a	permanent	






















or	commissions	of	enquiry	and	the	strengthening	of	humanitarian	aid	agencies.45	 	 	 In	
1899	 and	 1907,	 the	 Hague	 Conventions	 expanded	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 and	
incorporated	Leiber’s	rules	of	war.	 	These	conventions	were	the	first	major	source	of	
international	humanitarian	law	in	a	treaty.		Linked	with	liberal-humanitarian	ideals	and	
theories	 about	 the	 natural	 evolution	 of	 European	 societies,	 they	 demonstrated	 a	
growing	 awareness	 in	 the	 ‘civilised’	 nations	 of	 those	 states’	 humanitarian	
responsibilities.46		
	
The	brutality	of	 the	First	World	War	 (WW1)	 led	 to	 calls	 for	an	 international	 criminal	








customs	 of	 war	 and	 the	 laws	 of	 humanity’.49	 	 It	 stated	 that	 not	 to	 punish	 those	

















conscience	 of	 civilized	 mankind.’50	 The	 Commission	 called	 for	 the	 tribunal	 to	 try	
individuals	from	Germany,	Austria,	Turkey	and	Bulgaria	for	alleged	violations	of	the	laws	





Allies	did	not	 follow	up	 this	 threat,	 a	 failure	which	apparently	was	not	unnoticed	by	
Hitler	when	he	pursued	his	genocidal	policies.53	
	
The	 Treaty	 of	 Versailles	 1919	 which	 formally	 ended	 WW1	 required	 Germany	 to	
surrender	 suspected	 war	 criminals	 for	 trial	 by	 Allied	Military	 Tribunals.54	 	 However,	
Germany	was	conscious	of	the	need	to	maintain	respect	for	its	sovereignty	by	retaining	
its	 national	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 and	 so	 persuaded	 the	 Allies	 to	 permit	 it	 to	 try	 the	




of	 the	 suspected	war	 criminals	managing	 to	 avoid	 prosecution	 and	 those	who	were	

















others	 received	 light	 sentences.	 	 The	 Kaiser,	 who	 under	 Art.	 227	 was	 to	 be	 tried	 for	 supreme	 offences	 against	





failure’58	 but	 their	 efforts	 did	 serve	 to	 stimulate	 interest	 in	 the	 development	 of	
international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 and	 specifically,	 in	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 forum	
‘competent	to	try	crimes	constituting	a	breach	of	international	public	order	or	against	
the	universal	law	of	nations.’59		The	atrocities	committed	during	wars	started	in	Europe	
and	 fought	 predominantly	 on	 the	 European	 continent	 became	 the	 catalyst	 for	 the	










European	belief	 in	the	superiority	of	 its	own	civilisation.	 	The	Enlightenment	thinkers	
argued	 the	 universality	 of	 their	 theories	 which	 provided	 justification	 for	 colonialist	
claims	that	their	activities	facilitated	the	spread	of	European	values	and	norms	to	the	
uncivilised	peoples	of	 the	world.	 	 The	distinction	between	 ‘civilised’	 and	 ‘uncivilised’	
peoples	had	become	so	embedded	in	the	legal,	political	and	intellectual	debate	from	
the	 end	 of	 the	 18th	 to	 the	 early	 20th	 century	 that	 it	was	 virtually	 unassailable60	 and	
indeed,	persisted	to	some	degree	until	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	(WW2).61	
	














As	 already	 mentioned,	 negotiations	 at	 the	 Paris	 Peace	 Conference	 in	 1919	 were	
dominated	by	three	big	Western	powers,	France,	Britain	and	the	US.		In	keeping	with	
Kant’s	 theory	 that	 greater	 communication	 between	 human	 beings	 promotes	 world	
peace,	the	Conference	agreed	to	the	foundation	of	a	League	of	Nations	(LoN).62		WW1	
had	interfered	with	European	global	exploitation	and	the	aim	now	was	to	ensure	the	
continuity	of	 pre-war	 forms	of	 rule	 and	 the	 avoidance	of	 open	 conflict	 between	 the	
major	powers.63		Article	14	of	the	Versailles	Treaty	had	envisaged	a	Permanent	Court	of	
International	 Justice	 and	 in	 1920,	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 LoN	 appointed	 an	 Advisory	






Assembly	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 premature	 since	 there	 was	 no	 defined	 notion	 of	
international	crimes	and	no	international	penal	law,	that	the	principle	nulla	poena	sine	



















necessary	 and	 desirable.’68	 	 Accordingly,	 several	 non-governmental	 organisations	
(NGOs)	met	in	the	1920s69	and	resolved	that	‘the	creation	of	an	International	Court	is	






had	begun	seriously	to	address	the	 issue	of	war	crimes	and	their	 investigation	 in	the	
early	1940s.		At	a	meeting	of	representatives	of	seventeen	of	the	Allied	nations73	on	20th	
October	 1943,	 the	 UN	 War	 Crimes	 Commission74	 was	 officially	 established	 with	 a	
mandate	 to	 collect,	 record	 and	 investigate	 evidence	 of	 war	 crimes	 and	 their	







































indictment	 of	 German	 perpetrators	 of	 crimes	 against	 German	 citizens.83	 The	 NIMT	
eventually	tried	22	accused	(of	whom	19	were	convicted)	for	crimes	against	peace,	war	
crimes	and	CAH.		Additionally,	in	occupied	Germany,	the	four	major	Allies	prosecuted	






















because	 they	 established	 new	 legal	 norms	 and	 standards	 of	 individual	 responsibility	
which	served	to	advance	the	international	rule	of	law	and	promote	ICJ.		However,	the	
dilemma	 faced	 by	 the	 Tribunals	 (i.e.	 whether	 a	 breach	 of	 strict	 legal	 positivism	 by	
permitting	 the	 retrospective	 extension	 of	 international	 criminal	 responsibility	 to	
perpetrators	of	crimes	under	the	Tribunals	charters	was	justifiable,	given	the	atrocities	
committed	by	 the	perpetrators)	was	 ‘resolved	by	moral	 […]	 rather	 than	 strictly	 legal	
arguments’.86	 	 For	 example,	 German	 defence	 counsels’	 objections	 that	 the	 Tribunal	
should	not	apply	ex	post	 facto	 law	was	countered	by	the	argument	that	 ‘substantive	


































material	 interests	 underpinning	 them	 were	 embedded	 in	 imperialism.93	 	 It	 is	 this	
argument	 that	 is	 at	 the	 core	 of	 Justice	 Pal’s	 dissenting	 opinion	 at	 the	 TIMT94	which	
‘provides	crucial	insights	into	the	nature	of	the	world	order	that	was	being	rearticulated	
by	the	post-war	international	tribunals.’95		Pal	asserted	that	global	politics	of	the	mid-
20th	 century	was	 still	 fundamentally	 defined	 by	 imperialism,	 as	 characterised	 by	 the	
violent	 acquisition	 of	 territories	 and	 thereafter	 by	 military,	 political	 and	 economic	
domination	of	much	of	the	world	by	Western	powers	by	the	late	19th	century.96		Pal’s	
dissenting	judgment	therefore	highlights	the	‘connections	between	the	development	of	






the	benefit	 of	 all’.98	 	 Kantian	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 LoN	and	 indeed	 the	 two	 IMTs,	
promulgated	 the	existence	of	an	 international	community	bound	 together	by	shared	
norms	which	 governed	 interactions	 between	 its	members,	 based	 on	 their	 ‘common	

























for	 the	 pre-war	 nature	 of	 international	 relations	 could	 exist	 given	 that	 they	 were	
grounded	in	violent	subjugation.103		He	argued	that	if	an	international	community	based	
on	 its	common	humanity	did	exist,	then	domination	of	one	nation	by	another	nation	










Falk	 has	 questioned	why,	 given	 the	 problems	 of	 retroactivity	 and	 of	 the	 Allies’	 own	
wartime	conduct,	they	validated	international	criminal	accountability	of	leaders	for	war	
crimes.		He	states	it	only	makes	sense	‘if	the	imposition	of	accountability	is	understood	
to	 be	 a	 particularly	 advantageous	 response	 to	 a	 given	 geopolitical	 challenge	 whose	
wider	implications	can	be	avoided’.107		It	is	suggested,	therefore,	that	equating	‘peace’	

















In	 the	 next	 section,	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 ILC,	 established	 by	 the	 UN	General	 Assembly	
(UNGA)	to	progress	the	codification	of	international	crimes	and	the	establishment	of	an	
international	 criminal	 court,	will	 be	discussed.	 	Unsurprisingly,	 Pal’s	 arguments	were	
pointedly	ignored	and	although	the	status	of	the	West	as	a	leader	of	the	‘civilised’	world	
was	damaged	by	the	atrocities	committed	by	the	West	during	WW2,109	it	will	be	seen	







grounded	 in	 Kant’s	 philosophy	 of	 global	 citizenship	which	 promotes	 the	 universalist	
ideals	of	the	Enlightenment	Age.		In	establishing	the	UN,	the	dominant	Western	powers	
aimed	 to	create	and	maintain	global	order	 through	peace,	 security	and	co-operation	
between	 states.	 	 In	 a	 repudiation	 of	 historical	 colonialism,	 this	 new	 global	 order	
recognised	the	right	of	self-determination	of	non-European	states	which	were	to	be	run	




In	 1947,	 the	 UNGA	 established	 the	 ILC112	 for	 the	 ‘promotion	 of	 the	 progressive	











from	 India,	 Syria,	 China,	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 USSR.	 	 The	 following	 year,	 the	 UNGA	
adopted	the	Convention	on	the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	the	Crime	of	Genocide.114	
The	 final	 wording	 of	 draft	 Article	 VII,	 adopting	 the	 principle	 of	 complementarity,	
required	that	persons	charged	should	be	tried	by	a	‘competent	tribunal	of	the	State	in	



















Rights	and	Duties	of	States121	and	 formulation	of	 the	Nuremberg	principles.122	 	 In	 its	
second	 report	 to	 the	 UNGA,	 the	 ILC	 outlined	 seven	 Nuremberg	 Principles,	 which	


















court	agenda	virtually	 impossible.’125	 It	was	not	until	December	1978	that	 the	UNGA	
returned	 to	 the	1954	draft	 code	and	 requested	 the	UN	Secretary	General	 (UNSG)	 to	
invite	Member	States	and	relevant	organisations	to	submit	their	comments.126				
	





State	 Party	 to	 the	 Convention	 […]	 or	 by	 an	 international	 penal	 tribunal	 having	
jurisdiction	 with	 respect	 to	 those	 States	 Parties	 which	 shall	 have	 accepted	 its	
jurisdiction.’128	The	1960s	and	1970s	also	saw	a	burgeoning	of	NGOs	such	as	Amnesty	




This	 period	 also	 saw	 developments	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 former	 colonial	 nations	
opposed	 to	 the	 regime	 and	 discourse	 of	 domination	 and	 subordination	 that	 had	
historically	characterised	international	law.		Referred	to	as	Third	World	Approaches	to	
International	Law	(TWAIL),	Matua	describes	the	TWAIL	movement	as	reactive	in	that	it	














with	 the	 decolonisation	movement	 that	 swept	 the	 globe	 after	WW2,	 its	 intellectual	
roots	originating	 in	the	Afro-Asian	anti-colonial	struggles	of	the	1940s	to	1960s.131	 	 It	




multi-national	 corporations	 and	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank,	 International	





The	emphasis	 on	big	powers	 as	 the	protectors	of	 rights	 internationally	 is	
increasingly	being	twinned	with	an	emphasis	on	big	powers	as	enforcers	of	
justice	 internationally.	 […]	 Its	 name	 notwithstanding,	 the	 ICC	 is	 rapidly	
turning	into	a	Western	court	to	try	African	crimes	against	humanity.		It	has	









The	attention	of	the	UNGA	again	turned	to	the	 issue	of	 international	 justice	 in	1981,	
when	 it	 invited	 the	 ILC	 to	 recommence	 its	 work	 on	 the	 draft	 code	which	would	 be	
																																																						
130	Mutua,	M.	(2000)	‘What	is	TWAIL’	94	American	Society	of	International	Law	pp30-38	at	p31	
131	Okafor,	O.C.	and	Ngwaba,	U.	 (2015)	 ‘The	 International	Criminal	Court	as	a	 ‘Transitional	 Justice’	Mechanism	 in	
Africa:	Some	Critical	Reflections’	9	IJTJ	pp90-108	at	p91;	see	also	Matua,	M.	(2000)	p31	stating	that	the	North-South	











Special	 Rapporteur.137	 	 By	 1982,	 ILC	membership	 had	 expanded	 to	 34,	 the	majority	
coming	from	Africa	(9),	Europe	(7)	and	South	America	(5).138		In	1989,		after	a	UN	special	
session	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 drug	 trafficking139	 during	 which	 Trinidad	 and	 Tobago	 had	
proposed	a	motion140	entitled	 ‘International	criminal	 responsibility	of	 individuals	and	
entities	engaged	in	illicit	trafficking	in	narcotic	drugs	across	national	frontiers	and	other	
transnational	criminal	activities;	establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	with	






details	 a	 general	 discussion	 on	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 the	 possible	
establishment	of	an	international	criminal	court	but	as	compared,	in	particular,	to	the	
system	of	universal	jurisdiction	based	on	prosecutions	by	national	tribunals	rather	than	
to	any	alternative	 (non-retributive)	means	of	accountability.143	 It	notes,	 for	example,	
comments	 that	 developments	 in	 international	 relations	 and	 international	 law	 had	
contributed	 to	 the	 feasibility	 of	 such	 a	 court144	 and	 that,	 whilst	 curtailing	 national	




































jurisdiction.149	 	 The	 group	 comprised	 representatives	 from	 Europe	 (4),	 Africa	 (3),	
Eastern-bloc	(2)	and	one	each	from	Australia,	USA,	South	America,	Asia,	the	Middle	East	
and	the	Caribbean.150		In	its	report	to	the	UNGA	of	its	work	during	the	session,	the	ILC	




















In	 1992,	 the	UNGA	 requested	 the	 ILC	 to	 start	work	 on	 a	 draft	 statute	 based	 on	 the	
Working	Group’s	report	‘as	a	matter	of	priority’.155	Mr	Thiam	prepared	a	draft	consisting	
of	 37	 articles	 divided	 into	 three	 parts:	 	 (1)	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 court,	 (2)	 its	













criminal	 court’.160	 It	 was	 then	 realised	 that	 the	 two	 should	 be	 co-ordinated	 and	
























how	fundamental	 its	efforts	were	to	the	success	of	the	project.	 	 It	was	seen	that	the	













international	 criminal	 court	 in	 the	 1990s	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 ‘geo-political	
convenience’.164	As	stated	in	the	Introduction	to	this	chapter,	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	
ushered	 in	 a	 period	 of	 co-operation	 between	 the	major	 powers.	 	 Falk	 goes	 further,	
arguing	 that	 it	 led	 also	 to	 a	 perception	 that	 allegations	 of	 criminality	 would	 not	
automatically	be	viewed	as	‘an	exercise	in	hostile	propaganda	that	dangerously	inflamed	
efforts	 to	 sustain	 […]	 “peaceful	 co-existence”,	which	was	 a	necessity	 given	 the	 large	
arsenals	of	nuclear	weapons	possessed	by	both	superpowers.’165	 	 	Rogue	states	were	
also	posing	security	threats	to	the	established	order,	as	mentioned	above	regarding	drug	






liberal	 democracies	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 doing	 something	 for	 the	 victims	 of	 genocidal	











































Tribunal	 for	Rwanda	1994	 (ICTR)173	was	based	 substantially	 on	 the	 ICTY	model,	with	




Following	 the	 creation	of	 the	 ICTY	 and	 ICTR,	 there	were	many	 calls	 for	 the	UNSC	 to	
establish	other	ad	hoc	tribunals175	but	the	UNSC	demurred	using	its	Chapter	VII	powers	
for	 this	purpose,176	possibly	due	to	 the	waning	of	 the	spirit	of	co-operation	 that	had	
accompanied	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 but	 also	 due	 to	 the	 political	 interests	 of	
permanent	members	of	the	UNSC	in	specific	international	situations.177		There	was	also	
considerable	‘tribunal	fatigue’	felt	by	the	UNSC	and	those	nations,	frustrated	with	the	
ever-increasing	 costs	 of	 the	 two	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals,	 who	 were	 contributing	 the	 most	
























with	 the	 increasing	 influence	 of	 the	 interconnected	 global	 economy	 necessitated	 a	








Certainly,	 as	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 settled	 into	 their	 roles,	 they	 gained	 international	
recognition	and	credibility	which	also	assisted	the	cause	of	a	permanent	international	




Preparatory	 Committee	 (PrepCom)	 to	 advance	 the	 proposed	 international	 criminal	
court	will	be	discussed.		It	was	argued	by	the	AHC	particularly	that	the	establishment	of	
a	 single	permanent	 court	would	obviate	 the	need	 for	ad	hoc	 tribunals	 for	 particular	
crimes	such	as	those	established	for	Yugoslavia	and	Rwanda,	thereby	ensuring	stability	













brought	 to	 justice.	This	alone	was	a	 substantial	development	 in	 the	 realm	of	 ICL.	 	 In	
addition,	 the	 tribunals	 acted	 as	 a	 guide	 as	 to	 what	 would	 and	 would	 not	 work,	
highlighting	 problems	 and	 successes	 and	 offering	 a	 mass	 of	 experience	 and	
jurisprudence	 as	 the	 work	 of	 the	 PrepCom	 continued.	 	 Representatives	 from	 both	
tribunals	regularly	attended	meetings	with	those	involved	in	the	negotiations	and	were	





Although	 some	 States	 supported	 the	 ILC’s	 recommendation	 of	 an	 international	
diplomatic	conference,	others	believed	it	was	premature	as	there	was	still	so	much	work	
outstanding,	 particularly	 on	 agreeing	 the	 various	 provisions.	 Therefore,	 rather	 than	
convening	a	conference,	the	UNGA	established	an	AHC	‘to	review	the	major	substantive	
and	administrative	issues	arising	out	of	the	draft	statute’	and	to	consider	arrangements	









amnesties	 was	 raised	 by	 some	 delegations192	 which	 no	 doubt	 reflects	 the	 reality	 of	
several	nations	having,	in	recent	years,	granted	amnesty	to	members	of	a	former	regime	











Salvador,	 Haiti	 and	 South	Africa),	 the	UN	had	 ‘pushed	 for,	 helped	 negotiate,	 and/or	
endorsed	 the	 granting	 of	 amnesty	 as	 a	 means	 of	 restoring	 peace	 and	 democratic	
government.’194	Concerned	delegations	suggested	that	the	statute	‘should	address	the	







calling	of	 an	 international	 conference	but	 ‘aware	of	 the	 interest	of	 the	 international	
community	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 international	 criminal	 court	 which	 would	 be	
widely	accepted,	the	committee	recommends	that	the	GA	take	up	the	organization	of	






























purpose	 of	 ‘finalizing	 and	 adopting	 a	 convention	 on	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	
international	criminal	court’.204	Rome	was	an	interesting	choice,	since	potential	criticism	





during	 discussions	 on	 the	 draft	 statute	 approved	 by	 the	 ILC	 in	 1994	 there	 was	 no	
mention	 of	 AJMs,	 particularly	 regarding	 complementarity	 and	 admissibility	 issues.207	
However,	 at	 a	 meeting	 of	 the	 Working	 Group	 on	 Complementarity	 and	 Trigger	
Mechanisms	 in	 August	 1997,	 national	 amnesties	 were	 mentioned	 and	 several	















































save	 time,	 it	was	decided	 to	establish	 informal	working	 groups,	 each	 simultaneously	
working	on	a	section	of	the	draft	statute.216	Unfortunately,	this	decision	disadvantaged	
smaller	 or	 non-English-speaking	 delegations	 which	 were	 unable	 to	 cover	 all	 of	 the	



















ICC	 and	 national	 AJMs	 coupled	 with	 amnesties	 was	 raised	 during	 the	 Rome	
Conference219	and	was	debated	at	length.220		The	delegation	from	South	Africa	regularly	
reminded	 conference	 that	 their	 country’s	much-acclaimed	 approach	 to	 post-conflict	










Even	 among	 those	 delegations	 most	 committed	 to	 prosecution	 of	 all	
international	crimes,	many	had	misgivings	about	laying	down	an	iron	rule	for	
all	 time	 mandating	 prosecution	 as	 the	 only	 acceptable	 response	 in	 all	
situations.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 creating	 an	 explicit	 exception	 allowing	


















Part	 of	 the	 problem	was	 delegates’	 recollection	 of	 the	 amnesties	 granted	 by	 South	
American	dictators	to	themselves	and	their	cohorts.226	 	The	main	difficulty,	however,	
even	if	there	had	been	a	general	consensus	on	the	acceptability	of	AJMs,	was	codifying	
guidelines	 that	would	enable	 the	Court	 to	use	 its	discretion	 in	 favour	of	 a	particular	
AJM.227	The	answer	at	the	Rome	Conference,	therefore,	was	to	adopt	provisions	that	
reflected	 ‘creative	 ambiguity’,	 228	 thus	enabling	 the	Prosecutor	 and	 the	Court	 to	use	
discretion	 and	 ‘to	 develop	 an	 appropriate	 approach	 when	 faced	 with	 concrete	




According	 to	Robinson,	 ‘it	 is	 at	 least	 conceivable	 that	 the	 ICC	 could	 conclude	 that	 it	
would	not	be	in	the	‘interests	of	justice’	to	interfere	with	a	democratically	adopted,	good	






Additional	 international	 and	 national	 efforts	 will	 be	 required	 to	 bring	 to	
justice	other	offenders	and	 to	promote	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	reconciliation	
through	traditional	and	other	mechanisms.		This	has	particular	significance	
…	where	…tribal	and	traditional	systems	exist	for	the	promotion	of	dispute	



















A	 brief	 examination	 of	 the	 medieval	 international	 legal	 order	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 assertion	 of	 euro-centricity	 is	 reflected	 in	 certain	 aspects	 of	
Western	historiography	and	evidenced	by	the	movement	away	from	the	unifying	ideals	
of	Christendom	with	its	adherence	to	natural	law,	towards	an	emphasis	on	the	States	

































In	1994,	 the	 ILC	membership	of	34	was	dominated	by	Africa	 (9)	with	Europe	 (6)	and	
South	America	(5)	also	well	represented.		Mr	Thiam,	a	Senegalese	diplomat,	politician	
and	 lawyer,	 in	 his	 role	 as	 Special	 Rapporteur	 worked	 tirelessly	 to	 assist	 the	 ILC	 to	
complete	the	draft	code	of	crimes	and	later,	on	the	topic	of	an	international	criminal	
jurisdiction,	 writing	 a	 total	 of	 13	 reports	 which	 substantially	 contributed	 to	 the	





style	 justice,	by	this	stage,	 the	work	towards	the	establishment	of	 the	 ICC	was	being	
driven	 forward	 predominantly	 by	 Africans.	 	 However,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 these	
Africans	were	drawn	from	the	educated	elite	in	their	societies	and	were	‘Europeanised’.		


















broad	 support	 for	 the	 ICC,	with	more	 than	800	African	NGOs	being	members	of	 the	
Coalition	 for	 the	 ICC,	 amounting	 to	 approximately	 one-third	 of	 its	 member	
organisations.238	 	 Furthermore,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 until	 it	 began	 investigating	
presidents,	 the	 ICC	was	 broadly	 supported	 by	 African	 governments,	 indeed	 the	 first	
three	situations	before	the	Court	were	self-referrals	from	African	nations.239			
	
It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 Africa’s	 initial	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 ICC	 was	 borne	 out	 of	




rational	method	of	 adjudication	but	 it	 has	been	 relevant	 to	 investigate	whether	 any	
other	options	for	ICJ	were	considered	during	the	crucial	period	when	practical	plans	for	



















transitional	 contexts,	 criminal	 prosecutions	 fail	 to	 satisfy	 the	 ICJ	 goals	 of	 ordinary	
citizens,	who	may	be	more	desirous	of	peace,	 reconciliation	and	 social	 stability	 than	



















into	 force	 on	 1st	 July	 2002.1	 The	 Preamble	 declares	 that	 in	 establishing	 the	 ICC	 and	
thereby	affirming	that	those	responsible	for	atrocities	will	be	prosecuted	and	punished,2	
the	 international	 community	 is	 determined	 to	 end	 impunity	 for	 the	 perpetrators	 of	
grave	crimes,3	contribute	to	the	prevention	of	such	crimes	in	the	future4	and	guarantee	
lasting	respect	for	and	the	enforcement	of	international	justice.5	The	Preamble	reveals,	
therefore,	 that	 the	 international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 aims	 of	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 are	
punishment,	deterrence	and	respect	for	and	enforcement	of	the	rule	of	law.		These	are	
what	Branch	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 ‘‘scaled-up’	 version	of	 liberal	 domestic	 law’6	 in	 that	 they	
reflect	 theories	 of	 justice,	 (namely	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 incapacitation	 and	
rehabilitation)	 that	 are	 conventionally	 applied	 in	 liberal	 western	 domestic	 criminal	
justice	systems,	for	which	reason	they	have	been	also	termed	the	‘domestic-criminal-














Contemporaneous	with	 the	discourse	about	 international	 justice	based	on	 the	 ideals	
drawn	from	Nuremberg	arose	the	‘revolutionary	international	aspirations	of	the	human	
rights	movement	in	the	new	world	order.’8	The	emergence	of	transitional	justice	(TJ)	as	
a	 multidisciplinary	 field	 of	 study	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s9	 led	 to	 justice	
becoming	 more	 victim-focussed,	 emphasising	 seeking	 redress	 for	 victims	 and	
recognition	of	 their	 dignity	 as	 citizens	 and	human	beings.10	 	 From	 the	 late	1980s,	 TJ	
increasingly	gained	a	foothold	in	international	law	with	decisions	imposing	obligations	
on	states	to	protect	human	rights.11	Equally	important	was	an	emerging	recognition	that	
justice	 in	 the	 international	 context	of	 ‘systematic	or	widespread	violations	of	human	




As	 part	 of	 this	 holistic	 approach,	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 dignity	 of	 individuals	 and	




• Establishing	 and	 restoring	 confidence	 in	 accountable	 institutions	 (such	 as	 the	
police,	judiciary,	military)	






















terms,	gradually	began	 to	 reflect	TJ	aims,	demonstrating	 the	extent	 to	which	human	
rights	issues	had	shifted	‘from	the	margins	of	policy	formation	to	assume	an	influential	
role	[…]	on	the	international	stage.’15		For	example,	when	Kofi	Annan,	the	UN	Secretary	
General	 (UNSG)	 reported	 to	 the	UN	Security	Council	 (UNSC)	 in	August	2004	 that	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 ICC	 was	 ‘the	 most	 significant	 recent	 development	 in	 the	
international	 community’s	 long	 struggle	 to	 advance	 the	 cause	 of	 justice	 and	 rule	 of	
law’,16	expectations	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	had	expanded	beyond	those	expressed	
in	the	RSt	Preamble	into	a	long	list	of	objectives	for	the	court	which	clearly	drew	on	TJ	



























framework.	 	 For	 consistency,	 the	 same	 framework	 will	 then	 be	 used	 to	 assess	 the	
capacity	 of	Mato	 Oput	 and	 the	 South	 African	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	
(SATRC)	to	achieve	those	goals,	in	chapters	five	and	six	respectively.			
	
In	the	following	sections,	each	of	the	seven	 ICJ	objectives	 for	the	 ICC	outlined	by	Mr	
Annan	in	his	2004	report	to	the	UNSC	will	be	discussed	individually	and	the	performance	
or	potential	of	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	to	satisfy	the	objective	will	be	assessed.		Since	
the	 Court’s	 primary	 objective	 of	 ‘bringing	 those	 responsible	 for	 serious	 violations	 of	
human	 rights	and	humanitarian	 law	 to	 justice’	emphasises	 the	previously-mentioned	






















In	 this	section,	 the	retributive	qualities	of	 trials	at	 the	 ICC	will	be	examined	since,	as	
previously	stated,	the	objective	of	bringing	those	responsible	to	justice	through	criminal	
prosecutions	 prioritises	 an	 objective	 of	 western-liberal	 domestic	 criminal	 justice.		
According	to	Kantian	deontology	of	criminal	punishment,	‘even	if	society	were	on	the	
verge	of	dissolution,	it	has	the	duty	to	punish	the	last	offender’.19	Drumbl	states	that	the	
deontological	 retributive	approach	 is	 ‘au	 courant	among	 international	 lawyers,	 [and]	
posits	that	trials	of	selected	individuals	(preferably	undertaken	at	the	international	level)	





prosecutions	 are	 the	 ‘most	 effective	 insurance	 against	 future	 repression’21	 and	may	
‘inspire	 societies	 that	 are	 re-examining	 their	 basic	 values	 to	 affirm	 fundamental	
principles	of	 respect	 for	 the	rule	of	 law	and	for	 the	 inherent	dignity	of	 individuals’.22	
Orentlicher’s	 argument	was	 criticised	 for	 taking	 no	 account	 of	 the	 varied	 and	 often	
difficult	realities	faced	by	successor	governments.23	However,	although	she	argued	that	














Other	 supporters	 of	 prosecutions,	 such	 as	 Cassese,	 emphasise	 their	 essential	 role	 in	
dissipating	calls	for	revenge,26	thereby	avoiding	what	Minow	describes	as	‘a	downward	
spiral	 of	 violence	 or	 an	 unquenchable	 desire	 that	 traps	 people	 in	 cycles	 of	 revenge,	
recrimination	and	escalation’.27		Minow	describes	retribution	as	‘vengeance	curbed	by	
the	intervention	of	someone	other	than	the	victim	and	by	principles	of	proportionality	
and	 individual	 rights’.28	 	 Aukerman	 agrees	 that	 trials	 serve	 ‘to	 channel	 vengeance,	
thereby	both	discouraging	less	controlled	forms	of	victims’	justice,	such	as	vigilantism	





despite	 high	 levels	 of	 discontent	 with	 the	 retributive	 justice	 achieved	 by	 the	
International	Criminal	Tribunal	 for	 the	Former	Yugoslavia	 (ICTY),	 it	was	 the	 tribunal’s	






























jeopardy,	 so	 a	 strategy	of	 ‘gradually	 building	upwards’	was	 initially	 envisaged	 33	 and	
subsequently	 implemented,34	 whereby	 mid-and	 high-level	 perpetrators	 will	 be	
investigated	and	prosecuted	in	the	hope	of	securing	evidence	sufficient	to	convict	those	
most	responsible.35		The	OTP	also	indicated	that	it	will	even	‘consider	prosecuting	lower	
level	 perpetrators	 where	 their	 conduct	 was	 particularly	 grave	 and	 has	 acquired	
extensive	notoriety’.36	
	
Some	 welcomed	 this	 policy	 adaptation	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 targeting	 the	 most	
responsible	 singles	 out	 those	 in	 elevated	 positions	 who	 plan	 and	 orchestrate	 the	
atrocities	rather	than	the	people	on	the	ground	who	execute	them.37		Certainly,	those	
in	 command	are	morally	 responsible38	but	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	 individuals	who	
enthusiastically	carry	out	their	orders	should	not	be	absolved	from	responsibility	simply	
because	they	are	lower	down	the	command-chain.		It	is	important	that	they	too	are	held	






















unattractive42	 but	 individualising	 guilt	 is	 contentious	 in	 situations	 of	 wide-scale	
participation	in	mass	killings	such	as	occurred	in	Rwanda	in	1994,	since	‘the	focus	on	
individual	crimes	has	been	used	by	many	to	claim	collective	innocence’.43		Fletcher	and	




of	 motivation	 or	 criminal	 intent,	 it	 lacks	 the	 capacity	 to	 address	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 many	 individual	 acts	 that	 characterize	 genocide	 or	
ethnic	cleansing	where	perpetrators	are	swept	up	in	the	group	violence.45		
	
They	 state	 that	 there	 is	 a	 communal	 engagement	 with	 mass	 violence	 which	 is	 not	
addressed	 by	 criminal	 trials,	 since	 individual	 autonomy	 is	 challenged	 in	 ‘group’	
situations,	with	membership	of	the	group	becoming	the	controlling	influence	and	norms	
of	behaviour	shifting	with	community	sanction.46	 	Thus	 individuals	who	participate	 in	





term	 the	 ‘bystander	 phenomenon’.48	 They	 argue	 that	 the	 influence	 of	 societal	 and	
























making	 their	 own	 judgments	 about	 the	 other	 ethnic	 groups’	 culpability.51	 	 Victims	
wanted	 much	 broader	 responsibility	 addressed,	 Clarke	 concluded	 and	 since,	 in	
situations	 of	 mass	 participation	 in	 violence,	 trials	 cannot	 be	 complete	 and	
comprehensive,	 this	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 assumption	 that	 individualising	 guilt	 is	
efficacious	and	that	trials	of	a	few	can	dispel	allegations	of	collective	guilt.52	
	
In	 this	 section,	 the	 ability	 of	 trials	 at	 the	 ICC	 to	 bring	 offenders	 to	 justice	 has	 been	
discussed	 and	 it	 has	 been	 seen	 that	 supporters	 of	 prosecutions	 uphold	 the	 Court’s	
retributive	qualities,	its	capacity	to	make	those	who	commit	great	crimes	‘face	truth,	be	
held	accountable,	and	serve	justice.’53		Clearly,	as	with	domestic	criminal	justice,	trials	
at	 the	 ICC	 fulfil	 the	 requirements	 of	 retribution	 by	 establishing	 guilt	 and	 imposing	
punishment	on	those	who	have	committed	heinous	crimes.		There	is	no	doubt	that	a	
head	of	state	or	warlord	would	wish	to	avoid	an	appearance	before	the	ICC	and	that	a	
conviction	 of	 any	 crime	 within	 the	 court’s	 jurisdiction	 would	 entail	 universal	
















This	 ICJ	objective	 relates	 to	 the	deterrent	 function	of	domestic	 criminal	 trials	which,	
according	to	David	Wippman,	for	many	is	the	most	important	justification	and	the	most	
important	goal	of	criminal	justice,	national	or	international.54		Payam	Akhavan	defines	




punished	 and	 second,	 that	 punishment	 will	 prevent	 a	 rational	 decision-maker	 from	
committing	the	crime.		Taking	a	utilitarian	approach	to	offending,	the	assumption	is	that	
the	potential	offender	will	make	a	‘risk-reward’	calculation	and	will	commit	a	crime	only	
when	the	potential	reward	outweighs	the	attendant	risk.	 	 It	 is	anticipated,	therefore,	
that	risk	in	the	form	of	probability	of	prosecution,	conviction	and	sentence	can	deter	
crime.		Deterrence	operates	on	two	levels:	it	is	directed	at	the	offender	who	has	already	
committed	 a	 crime	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 preventing	 future	 offending	 (‘specific	
deterrence’)	and	against	 society	at	 large	with	 the	 intention	of	discouraging	potential	
criminal	behaviour	(‘general	deterrence’).56		
	
It	 is	difficult	to	estimate	the	preventative	effect	of	 international	trials	 for,	as	Tallgren	




Kurds),	 former	 Yugoslavia	 or	 Rwanda.	 	 Indeed,	 as	 Judge	Richard	Goldstone,	 the	 first	










widely	 publicised	warnings	 of	 punishment	 of	 those	 committing	 atrocities	 during	 the	
second	World	War	and	the	UNSC	warnings	regarding	crimes	committed	in	the	former	
Yugoslavia	 ‘there	 is	 no	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 effective	 deterrence	 in	 either	 case’.59		
Although	it	perhaps	should	be	conceded	that	the	lack	of	pre-existing	forum	in	which	to	







effect	 in	 international	 situations	 is	 more	 questionable	 because	 the	 sheer	 scale	 and	
gravity	of	the	offending	behaviour	transcends	deviance	or	aberration	to	become	what	
Kant	 describes	 as	 ‘radical	 evil’.64	 	 Reisman	 argues	 international	 tribunals	 have	 a	 ‘fit’	
problem	because	‘in	liberal	societies,	the	criminal	law	model	pre-supposes	some	moral	
choice	or	moral	freedom’	on	the	offender’s	part	but	in	cases	of	atrocious	international	
crimes,	 many	 of	 those	 directly	 responsible	 ‘operate	 within	 a	 cultural	 universe	 that	










































ascertain	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 ICC	 or	 other	 international	 tribunals	 in	 either	 specific	 or	
general	deterrence,	so	it	is	difficult	to	establish	the	efficacy	of	the	ICC	in	this	regard.72		
The	Court	has	been	 functioning	 for	15	 years	 and	even	a	brief	 review	of	 current	 and	























overstated.	 	 Since	 2011,	 for	 example,	 the	UN	has	 regularly	 issued	 reports	 on	 Syria73	
detailing	 abuses	 amounting	 to	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 allegedly	 committed	 by	
government	 and	 rebel	 forces	 but	 neither	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 deterred	 from	
committing	further	atrocities	on	civilians	despite	the	risk	of	future	prosecutions	at	the	
ICC.74	 	 Also,	 in	 Mali,75	 although	 the	 Court	 is	 already	 investigating	 alleged	 crimes	
committed	since	January	2012,76	there	has	been	a	renewal	of	fighting	since	mid-2014	





CAR,	 South	 Sudan,	DRC,	Uganda,	 Sudan	 and	 Somalia	 to	mention	 just	 some	of	 those	
reported	on	the	continent	of	Africa	alone.78	 	Given	this	depressing	record,	one	could	
question	 whether	 a	 prosecution	 at	 the	 ICC	 has	 any	 deterrence	 capacity	 but	 it	 is	
impossible	to	know	the	answer.		The	ICC	cannot	be	expected	to	deter	every	perpetrator	
of	 international	 crimes	 but	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 potential	 offenders	 could	 have	 been	
deterred.79		
	













[Online]	 Available:	 https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/mali-lawlessness-abuses-imperil-population	 [Accessed	
20.03.17]	








atrocities	 in	 weak	 states	 because	 they	 have	 more	 opportunities	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 not	
because	 they	 have	 a	 greater	 inclination	 to	 commit	 such	 atrocities’,82	 an	 insight	 that	












































compel	 the	production	of	 evidence	or	 to	 enforce	 judgments.	 	 If	 states	 refuse	 to	 co-
operate,	the	Court	can	only	refer	the	matter	to	the	ICC	Assembly	of	State	Parties	(ASP)	










the	 ICC	 indicting	 sitting	 heads	 of	 state,	 including	 Kenyan	 President	 Kenyatta	 and	 his	






























peace	 and	 security101	 being	 greatly	 influenced	 by	 power	 politics	 and	 the	 national	
interests	of	the	permanent	five.102	For	example,	although	the	UNSC	co-operated	in	the	
referral	of	Sudan	in	2005	and	Libya	in	2011,	accountability	for	the	atrocities	committed	
in	 Syria	 since	 Spring	 2011	 remains	 unachievable	 despite	 concerted	 efforts	 by	 the	




by	 the	Nazis)	 arose	 not	 from	 criminal	 intent	 but	 from	 ideologies	 that	 strove	 for	 the	
																																																						

























their	 risk-reward	 analysis	 and	 possibly	 deter	 them	 from	 perpetrating	 human	 rights	
violations	and	mass	atrocities.		This	effect	was	noted	by	a	HRW		Congo	researcher,	for	
example,	 whom	 Laurnet	 Nkunda,	 once	 a	 high-profile	 leader	 of	 a	 vicious	 Rwandan-
backed	rebel	group	in	eastern	Congo,	regularly	called	in	2007	and	2008	to	discuss	his	
fears	that	he	might	be	targeted	by	the	ICC	because	of	abuses	committed	by	his	troops.106		










re-offending	 by	 removing	 them	 from	 society,	 usually	 by	 incarceration	 or	 in	 certain	
jurisdictions,	capital	punishment.		However,	since	punishment	is	founded	on	combating	














unpunishable	 and	 unforgivable,	 arguing	 that	 ‘these	 deeds	 def[y]	 the	 possibility	 of	
human	punishment’110	 and	 ‘explode	 the	 frame	of	our	 legal	 institutions.’111	 For	Nino,	
radical	 evil	 involves	 ‘offences	 against	 human	 dignity	 so	 widespread,	 persistent,	 and	





our	efforts	 to	punish	 it.’114	As	Arendt	points	out,	however,	 ‘this	 [cannot]	conceivably	
mean	 that	 he	 who	 ha[s]	 murdered	 millions	 should	 for	 this	 very	 reason	 escape	
punishment.’115	
	
The	 sentencing	 options	 available	 to	 the	 ICC	 immediately	 reveal	 just	 how	 rooted	 the	
Court	 is	 in	 the	domestic	 criminal	 law	of	 liberal	western	 justice	 systems.	 	 There	were	
heated	 debates	 at	 the	 Rome	 Conference	 on	 both	 capital	 punishment	 and	 life	
imprisonment;	the	debate	on	capital	punishment,	according	to	Schabas,	‘threatened	to	
undo	the	Rome	Conference.’116	Many	states	opposed	life	imprisonment	on	the	grounds	
that	 it	 ‘neglected	 rehabilitation’,	 was	 ‘cruel,	 inhuman	 and	 degrading’	 and	 was	
























the	 culpability’	 and	 ‘consider	 the	 circumstances’	 of	 the	 convicted	 person	 and	 the	
crime.123	Schabas	argues,	the	ICC’s	sentencing	options	fail:		
	
to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 essential	 and	 fundamental	 aggravating	
circumstance,	namely	that	the	offences	[…]	are	crimes	against	humanity	or	
war	crimes.	The	[ICC	has]	been	created	precisely	to	deal	with	crimes	that	are	
inherently	 more	 serious	 than	 the	 underlying	 common	 law	 offences	




Africa’125	 that	 in	 those	 regions,	 rather	 than	 ‘perpetrators	 operat[ing]	 in	 a	 culture	 of	
impunity	 …	 [they]	 routinely	 face	 sanctions	 which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 severe	 and	
certain’	than	any	imposed	by	the	ICC.126	For	perpetrators	of		international	crimes,	it	has	
























nature	 of	 this	 criminality’	 punishment	 is	 	 ‘disappointingly	 ordinary’128	 and	
‘uninspiring’129	as	it	‘overwhelmingly	takes	the	form	of	incarceration	in	accordance	with	
the	classic	penitentiary	model.’130	 	He	 laments	that	the	 ‘“enemy	of	all	humankind”	 is	
punished	no	differently	than	a	car	thief,	armed	robber	or	cop	killer’131	and	finds	it	absurd	







When	 reflecting	 on	 the	 sentencing	 of	 international	 crimes	 of	 ‘enormous	 moral,	
historical,	or	political	significance’,133	Koskenniemi	remarks	‘if	the	trial	has	significance,	
then	that	significance	must	lie	elsewhere	than	in	the	punishment	handed	out’.134		In	fact,	
there	 does	 exist	 some	 evidence	 that	 international	 justice	 can	 contribute	 to	
incapacitation	in	the	form	of	assisting	in	the	de-legitimatisation	of	politics.		For	example,	





















In	 this	 section,	 the	 discussion	 has	 highlighted	 the	 perceived	 inadequacy	 of	 the	














consideration	 when	 scaling	 up	 to	 international	 criminal	 trials.	 	 Rehabilitation	 of	 an	
offender	 focuses	 on	 their	 re-education	 and	 re-integration	 into	 society	 on	 the	





































which	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 repeated	upon	 the	 offender’s	 eventual	 release	 from	prison	





















Furthermore,	 the	 distance	 of	 the	 court	 from	 the	 victim’s	 home	 and	 location	 of	 the	
atrocities	suffered	could	lead	to	the	victim/witness	feeling	isolated,	especially	given	the	
‘length	 and	 slow	pace	of	 proceedings	 [which]	has	become	a	 feature	of	 international	
criminal	 justice.’147	 Notwithstanding	 the	 ‘familiarisation’	 process	 offered	 by	 court	
staff,148	the	strangeness	of	the	formal	procedure,	atmosphere	and	language	of	the	ICC	
could	 give	 rise	 to	 feelings	 of	 insecurity,	 intimidation	 and	mistrust.149	 	 These	 feelings	
could	then	be	compounded	by	the	trial	process	which	focusses	on	the	defendant	and	
his	 or	 her	 rights	 of	 due	 process	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 victim,	whose	 role	 is	 purely	 as	 a	
witness	 for	 the	 prosecution.	 	 The	 lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 the	 victim	 to	 narrate	 their	
experience	 in	 their	 own	words,	 to	 be	 constrained	 to	 yes	 or	 no	 answers	 by	 lawyers	
seeking	 to	 ensure	 the	 victim	 adheres	 to	 their	 script	 for	 proving	 or	 disproving	 the	
defendant’s	guilt	and	to	be	subject	to	evidential	rules	on	what	is	admissible	and	what	is	





















It	 is	 generally	 accepted	 that	 a	major	 contribution	 to	 peace	 and	 reconciliation	 is	 the	
establishment	of	a	full	and	comprehensive	historical	record	of	the	HR	violations	suffered	
by	victims	of	mass	atrocities.		Fletcher	and	Weinstein	confirm	that	‘transitional	justice	
scholars	 largely	 agree	 that	 a	 necessary	 foundation	 for	 healing	 a	 society	 that	 has	
experienced	mass	violence	is	learning	the	truth	about	what	happened’151	and	they	list	
the	salutary	effects	of	publicising	the	truth	as	‘includ[ing]	countering	and	condemning	
prior	 denials	 or	 partial	 disclosures	 of	 abuses	 and	 creating	 a	 new,	 authoritative	 and	
impartial	 record	 about	 the	 past	 that	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 a	 new	 national	
consensus.’152	Bassiouni	argues	that	‘central	truths	must	be	established	to	provide	an	




























full	 and	 comprehensive	 record	 lies	 in	 the	 obvious	 tension	 between	 the	 accurate	
recording	of	history	and	the	task	of	conducting	the	trial,	with	its	demands	of	due	process	
and	its	focus	on	the	defendant.		Arendt	is	clear	that	‘[t]he	purpose	of	a	trial	is	to	render	
justice	and	nothing	else’159	and	any	other	 task	 ‘can	only	detract	 from	the	 law’s	main	
business:	 to	 weigh	 the	 charges	 …	 to	 render	 judgment	 and	 to	 mete	 out	 due	
punishment.’160		
	
Aukerman	 considers	 a	 prosecution	 to	 be,	 at	 best,	 an	 imperfect	means	 to	 develop	 a	
complete	record	of	the	past.161	Clark	agrees	that	‘[t]rial	“truths”	can	be	partial	and	can	
get	lost	in	the	morass	of	juridical	and	evidentiary	detail’.162	Likewise,	Minow	warns	that	
‘[h]istory	 is	 never	 one	 story,	 and	 the	 telling	 of	 history	 involves	 a	 certain	 settling	 of	
accounts.’163	For	Koskenniemi,	there	is	a	‘difficulty	in	grappling	with	large	political	crises	
by	means	of	 individual	 responsibility	 [which]	 gives	 reasons	 to	question	 the	ability	of	




















trial	 of	 mass	 atrocities.167	 	 He	 concedes,	 however,	 that	 the	 history	 does	 not	 satisfy	











whether	 they	can	and	should	create	a	historical	 record	or	whether	 trial	 truths	…	are	
sufficiently	 comprehensive	 …	 [but]	 whether	 those	 truths	 are	 accepted	 and	
internalized.’172	She	adds,	‘[h]owever	thorough	and	meticulous	the	Tribunal’s	judgments	
are,	they	cannot	combat	the	problem	of	denial	unless	people	are	ready	to	accept	the	





















Thus,	 despite	Wilson’s	 assertion	 that	 the	 definition	 and	 application	 of	 international	
crimes	 ‘have	elevated	 the	place	of	history	and	context	 in	 the	decisions,	 reports,	and	
judgments	 of	 international	 courts’	 and	 ‘alter[ed]	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	
history’,176	it	appears	that	the	obstacle	for	the	ICC	in	creating	an	acceptable	and	accurate	
historical	record	is	that	‘judicial	truths’	established	during	a	trial	can	be	very	different	




predominantly	 relies	 on	 eye-witness	 testimony	 which	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 practical	




























solidarity	 embodied	 in	 the	 increasingly	 respectful	 way	 that	 citizens	 can	 come	 to	
acknowledge	 the	 differing	 views	 of	 their	 fellows’.183	 For	 Robinson,	 prosecutions	 can	
facilitate	reconciliation	and	nation-building	by	stigmatising	and	removing	perpetrators	
of	human	rights	violations	and	mass	atrocities	from	society	thus	providing	victims	with	






the	 most	 precarious	 purchase	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 its	 own	 past.186	 	 Reconciliation	 pre-
supposes	a	community’s	willingness	to	enquire	into	its	own	collective	responsibility	but	
it	 can	 take	 a	 long	 time	 for	 a	 society	 to	 recognise	 the	moral	 wrong	 committed	 and	
condemn	 its	 own	 involvement	 in	 it,	 if	 ever.187	 Ignatief	 argues	 ‘[t]he	 idea	 that	
reconciliation	depends	on	shared	truth	presumes	that	shared	truth	about	 the	past	 is	

























group	 identity	 and	 perception	 of	 victimhood,	 which	 holding	 particular	 individuals	
responsible	for	mass	HR	abuses	does	not	address.		For	Drumbl,	‘the	structural	simplicity	
avidly	pursued	by	the	prevailing	paradigm	of	prosecution	and	punishment	may	squeeze	
out	 the	 complexity	 and	 dissensus	 central	 to	 meaningful	 processes	 of	 justice	 and	
reconciliation.’193	Indeed,	the	underlying	issues	of	group	solidarities	and	group	conflicts	
may	even	 contribute	 to	 the	myth	of	 collective	 innocence	plus	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 an	
acquittal	might	easily	be	mistaken	for	innocence,	which	could	increase	tensions.194	As	




perpetrators,	especially	 the	 leaders	who	planned	and	 instigated	the	genocide,	would	
have	considerable	 impact	on	national	 reconciliation’196	but	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	
absence	of	‘viable	benchmarks’197	by	which	to	assess	the	court’s	performance,	makes	
this	 objective	 of	 ICJ	 ‘the	 most	 contentious	 […and]	 one	 of	 the	 least	 explored	
empirically.’198	 Reliance	 on	 the	 research	 conducted	 by	 Stover	 and	Weinstein	 in	 BiH	
would	tend	to	suggest	the	ICC	would	underachieve	in	this	role,	as	they	found	‘no	direct	
link	 between	 criminal	 trials	 (international,	 national,	 and	 local/traditional)	 and	





















in	 a	 society	 previously	 stricken	 by	 mass	 atrocities	 and	 gross	 HR	 abuses,	 as	 holding	
violators	accountable	 for	 their	misdeeds	makes	 clear	 to	 ‘all	members	of	 society	 that	
law’s	 authority	 is	 superior	 to	 that	 of	 individuals’	 and	 that	 no	 prerogatives	 attach	 to	
individuals	merely	 because	 of	 status	 or	 position.’200	 Expressivists	 argue	 that	 trials	 of	
offenders	 encourages	 public	 respect	 for	 the	 law201	 and	 their	 punishment	 sends	 a	
message	 of	 condemnation	 of	 their	 acts	 which	 instils	 important	 moral	 values	 into	
society.202	 Drumbl	 argues	 that	 although	 expressivist	 theory	 prioritises	 the	 message	
communicated	by	trials	and	convictions,	punishment	‘communicates	meaning	…	about	


























Our	 experience	 in	 the	 past	 decade	 has	 demonstrated	 clearly	 that	 the	
consolidation	of	peace	in	the	immediate	post-conflict	period,	as	well	as	the	
maintenance	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 long	 term,	 cannot	 be	 achieved	 unless	 the	
population	is	confident	that	redress	for	grievances	can	be	obtained	through	
legitimate	 structures	 for	 the	peaceful	 settlement	of	 disputes	 and	 the	 fair	
administration	of	justice.207	
	
However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ICC	must	 conform	 to	 powerful	 global	 and	 local	 political	
interests	adversely	affects	perceptions	that	the	ICC	can	facilitate	global	 justice	or	the	
rule	 of	 law.208	 	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States,	 despite	 not	 being	 a	 SP	 exercises	 a	
‘disproportionate	influence’	on	prosecutorial	policy	as	was	noted	when	the	ICC	delayed	
issuing	 indictments	 in	 the	 Libyan	 situation	until	 after	 the	2011	North	Atlantic	 Treaty	
Organization-led	military	operation	in	that	country.209		Likewise,	the	ICC’s	concentration	
on	one	side	of	a	conflict	only,	despite	both	being	responsible	for	international	crimes	(as	





































inequalities’,	 the	 ICC	 institutionalises	 conflict	 rather	 than	 global	 liberal	 peace.216	 For	
Branch,	 ‘the	 insistence	 that	 international	 criminal	 prosecutions	 will	 spread	 liberal,	















proceedings	 […]	 even	 before	 [conflicts]	 have	 ended’218	 far	 from	 contributing	 to	 the	
ending	of	an	ongoing	conflict,	can	prolong	hostilities	as	leaders	hold	on	to	power	and	








should	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 issues	 of	 peace	 and	 security	 is	 rather	 strange’,223	
because	requiring	the	Prosecutor	to	make	decisions	based	on	political	factors,	such	as	


























Global	 Peace	 Agreement	 following	 conversations	 between	 the	 OTP	 and	 the	 main	
negotiators	in	June	2008.227		Furthermore,	HRW	noted	that	the	prosecution	of	Lubanga	
led	to	the	demobilisation	of	child	soldiers	by	a	CAR	rebel	group228	and	in	the	DRC,	HRW	















between	 prosecuting	 those	 ‘most	 responsible’	 and	 acknowledging	 collective	





















proceedings	 which,	 for	 Stahn,	 reveals	 ‘a	 number	 of	 areas	 in	 which	 the	 institutional	
architecture	 of	 ICJ	 may	 be	 in	 need	 of	 procedural	 reform’.232	 	 Stahn	 disagrees	 with	
Drumbl’s	assertion	that	the	best	way	to	assess	the	performance	of	the	ICC	is	‘to	treat	
the	 institutions	 that	 enforce	 ICL	 as	 subjects	of	 study	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	domestic	
scholars	treat	domestic	courts’.233		Stahn	contends	that	the	assessment	of	pace	should	
not	 be	 measured	 against	 domestic	 proceedings	 but	 instead	 should	 ‘be	 placed	 in	
perspective	in	relation	to	the	distinct	goals	of	ICJ.’234		What	is	required	is	‘a	fuller	and	
more	nuanced	matrix,	which	identifies	appropriate	objects	of	comparison	and	relates	





been	burdened	with	 is	not	 to	suggest	 that	 the	Court	does	not	perform	an	 important	
function	in	the	field	of	transitional	justice	but	that,	because	it	has	not	prioritised	its	ICJ	





Finally,	 having	 identified	 the	 objectives	 of	 ICJ	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 assessing	 the	 ICC’s	
performance	 in	achieving	 these	goals,	 it	 is	useful	 to	clarify	 that	 the	complementarity	










and	 indirectly,	 by	 engaging	 with	 national	 authorities	 with	 a	 view	 to	 inducing	 and	
















Further	 and	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Seven,	 the	 RSt	 gives	 the	 ICC	 a	
monitoring	function	over	state	investigations	and	prosecutions,	requiring	the	state	
to	keep	the	Prosecutor	informed	of	progress,	under	threat	of	ICC	intervention	at	




Second,	 the	 ICC	 seeks	 to	 encourage	 the	 establishment	 of	 domestic	 accountability	







240	Moreno-Ocampo,	 L.	 (2003)	 Statement,	 Ceremony	 for	 the	 solemn	 undertaking	 of	 the	 Chief	 Prosecutor	 of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court,	16	June,	The	Peace	Palace,	The	Hague,	The	Netherlands	
241	Kleffner,	J.K.	(2004)	‘Complementarity	as	a	catalyst	for	compliance’	in	Complementary	Views	on	Complementarity:	








crimes	within	the	 ICC’s	 jurisdiction	so	as	to	avoid	the	risk	of	the	 ICC	disregarding	the	
amnesties	and	proceeding	with	its	own	investigation	and	prosecution.243		Likewise,	the	
RSt	 is	 silent	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 AJMs	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	 satisfy	 the	 complementarity	
criteria	set	out	in	Article	17.		From	the	perspective	of	AJMs,	therefore,	it	would	appear	
that	the	ICC’s	‘catalysing	effect’244	does	not	extend	to	the	encouragement	of	a	state	to	
deal	with	 its	 legacy	of	human	 rights	 violations	 and	breaches	of	humanitarian	 law	by	
means	of	an	AJM	coupled	with	amnesties.		However,	in	the	next	chapter	the	nature	of	
AJMs	generally	will	be	discussed	and	it	will	be	seen	that	they	can	be	capable	of	achieving	
































the	 processes	 of	 individual	 AJMs	 developed	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 as	many	 states	
began	to	emerge	from	their	violent	or	authoritarian	past	and	aspiring	a	more	peaceful	
democratic	future,	sought	responses	for	the	widespread	commission	of	heinous	crimes	
against	 their	citizens.	 	As	previously	discussed,	 transitional	 justice	was	emerging	as	a	
new	field	of	debate	at	this	time,2	examining	how	societies	move	from	conflict	to	peace	
or	 from	 authoritarian	 rule	 to	 democracy	 and	 addresses	 issues	 of	 justice	 and	 social	





















Spain	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Franco8	 and	 in	 Chile	 after	 the	 resignation	 of	 Pinochet.9		







successor	 governments	 that	 national	 prosecutions	 would	 endanger	 their	 fragile	
democracies	but	also	it	was	recognised	that	the	many	needs	of	victims	and	communities	
affected	 by	 the	 strife	 had	 to	 be	 addressed.	 	 In	 South	 America,	 for	 example,	 former	
military	juntas	had	granted	themselves	blanket	amnesties	before	relinquishing	power	
and	 the	 armed	 forces	 remained	 ever-alert	 to	 reassert	 their	 authority,	 Truth	
Commissions	 (TCs)	were	 adopted	 as	 the	 response	 to	 this	 transitional	 dilemma,	 as	 in	




prosecutions	 following	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 apartheid	 state,	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 Truth	 and	 Reconciliation	 Commission	 (TRC)	 with	 its	 policy	 of	
individualised	amnesty	for	full	disclosure	of	the	truth.		At	the	same	time,	in	other	post-





















due	 regard	 must	 be	 given	 to	 indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	




In	 this	 chapter,	 the	 ‘indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	 administering	 justice	 or	
settling	disputes’	referred	to	by	Kofi	Annan	will	be	considered	from	a	general	perspective	


























































of	 systems	 and	 processes	 that	 exist	 worldwide	 to	 deliver	 justice	 and	 governance,	










bureaucratic,	 de-centralised,	 relatively	 undifferentiated	 and	 non-professional;	 with	
substantive	and	procedural	rules	that	are	imprecise,	unwritten,	democratic,	flexible,	ad	
hoc	 and	 particularistic.19	 	 Whilst	 such	 processes	 can	 encompass	 justice	 rooted	 in	
religious	 authority,	 local	 administrative	 authorities,	 specially	 constituted	 state	
customary	 courts	 (such	 as	 those	 in	 South	 Africa)	 or	 community	 projects	 for	 conflict	
resolution	 (mediation,	 for	 example),	 this	 chapter	 concentrates	 on	 AJMs	 which	 are	
rooted	 in	 customary	 and	 tribal	 or	 clan	 social	 structures	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa.	 	 Two	
important	features	that	many	such	mechanisms	have	in	common	is	that	they	are	non-




healing	 of	 breaches,	 the	 redressing	 of	 imbalances,	 the	 restoration	 of	 broken	
relationships’.20	 	 Its	proponents	contend	that	restorative	justice	‘seeks	to	rehabilitate	
















emphasising	 reconciliation	 and	 restoration	 of	 social	 harmony,	 traditional	 arbitrators	
appointed	 from	 within	 the	 community	 overseeing	 a	 voluntary	 process	 with	 a	 high	
degree	of	public	participation	with	decisions	based	on	individual	circumstances	reached	






justice	 provision	 cannot	 reach.’25	 For	 Alie,	 however,	 the	 term	 ‘traditional’	 has	
Eurocentric	connotations	and	‘tends	to	suggest	the	existence	of	profoundly	internalized	
normative	structures,	patterns	followed	in	static	economic	and	social	circumstances’26	























influence	 which,	 in	 turn,	 can	 affect	 their	 ‘traditional’	 nature.31	 For	 example,	 the	
Rwandan	government	adapted	and	codified	the	traditional	gacaca	conflict	resolution	
mechanism	 into	 national	 law	 to	 deal	 with	 génocidaires.32	 Furthermore,	 the	 term	















field.’36	 	 Legal	 pluralism	 where	 ‘the	 transfer	 of	 whole	 legal	 systems	 across	 cultural	
boundaries’37	is	associated	with	the	emergence	of	colonialism	and	the	rapid	imposition	

























revealed	a	 ‘rich	variety	of	 social	 control,	 social	pressure,	 custom,	customary	 law	and	
judicial	procedure	within	small-scale	societies	that	encompassed	both	indigenous	and	
European	law’.44	Far	from	eradicating	these	alternative	 justice	processes,	the	policies	
adopted	 by	 the	 colonial	 powers	 for	 the	 governance	 of	 their	 vast	 territories	 often	
contributed	to	their	continued	survival.		Indeed,	according	to	PRI’s	2001	report,	‘[w]hen	
most	sub-Saharan	African	countries	became	independent	in	the	1960s,	the	majority	of	




























chief	 spokesman	 and	 judge	 in	 legal	 matters	 and	 as	 he	 gained	 experience,	 he	 could	
become	‘muthamaki	wa	chira’	(‘leader	in	law’)	presiding	over	a	wider	territorial	area.51		





























tribe	 enjoyed	 such	 popular	 participation	 in	 law	 changing,	 the	 law	 was	 a	 matter	 of	
popular	concern	and	not	the	privilege	of	the	few.	
	
In	 the	 late	 19th	 Century	 and	 early	 20th	 Century,	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 European	 colonial	
powers	and	the	swift	application	of	their	highly	organised	administrations	and	formal,	
rational	 legal	 systems	 reinforced	 by	 their	 military	 and	 police	 authorities	 could	 have	
threatened	the	continued	existence	of	African	traditional,	customary	law,	forged,	as	it	
was,	 ‘for	 industrial	 capitalism	 rather	 than	 agrarian	 or	 pastoral	 way	 of	 life	 [and]	
embod[ying]	very	different	principles	and	procedures’.56		However,	as	Vogler	points	out,	
‘[c]olonial	 authorities	 rarely	 possessed	 the	personnel	 or	 the	 resources	 to	 establish	 a	
network	 of	 courts	 throughout	 their	 territories	 and	 were	 obliged	 to	 tolerate	 the	
continuation	 of	 ‘native’	 forms	 of	 local	 adjudication	 and	 criminal	 justice	 in	 the	 rural	
areas’.57		Merry	states	that	in	Africa,	the	British	and	French	superimposed	their	law	on	








chiefs	 and	 elders	 to	 govern	 rural	 areas	 using	 their	 own	 local	 customs	 and	 tribal	
procedures,	 ‘would	 enable	 friendly	 chiefs	 to	 compel	 their	 followers	 to	 obey	 colonial	























Unfortunately,	 the	 co-opting	of	 traditional	 leaders	 into	 the	administration	under	 the	
system	of	indirect	rule	had	the	effect	of	undermining	the	checks	and	balances	that	had	
regulated	 traditional	 decision-making,	 as	 the	 chiefs	 were	 no	 longer	 reliant	 on	 the	
acceptance	or	 approval	 of	 their	 subjects.66	 	 Accordingly,	 some	 chiefs,	 endowed	with	
virtually	unchallenged	authority	and	backed	by	the	power	of	the	colonial	state,	did	not	





were	 well-designed	 to	 achieve	 justice.	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 decision	 of	 some	 colonial	
powers	 to	 administer	 their	 overseas	 territories	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 the	 so-called	
‘native	 authorities’	 may	 well	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 continued	 survival	 of	 the	
indigenous	processes	despite	their	‘dramatic	transformation	under	indirect	rule’.69	
	
Following	 independence,	post-colonial	 governments	 in	 sub-Saharan	Africa	 frequently	















groups	 whose	 law	 ha[d]	 been	 preserved	 in	 some	 fashion’71	 and	 the	 ‘local	 justice	
mechanisms	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 everyday	 practices	 of	 individuals	 and	 groups’72	 were	
rarely	displaced.73		To	demonstrate	this	point,	Maru	reflects	that	in	Sierra	Leone,	‘of	the	
two	 overlapping	 legal	 regimes,	 customary	 law	 has	 more	 practical	 relevance	 for	 the	
majority	 of	 Sierra	 Leoneans	 than	 the	 formal	 legal	 system’74	which	 perhaps	 tends	 to	











and	much	of	 human	behaviour	 is	 shaped	and	 influenced	by	 informal	 and	 customary	
normative	 frameworks.76	 	 In	 countries	 where	 the	 state	 and	 non-state	 systems	 have	





















traditional	 and	 religious	 processes	 have	 been	written	 into	 national	 law,	 as	 in	 Sierra	










outside	 the	 state	 regime.83	 In	 Sierra	 Leone,	 for	 example,	 approximately	 85%	 of	 the	
population	falls	under	the	jurisdiction	of	customary	law,84	defined	in	the	Constitution	as	
“the	rules	of	law	which,	by	custom,	are	applicable	to	particular	communities	in	Sierra	
Leone”.85	 	 In	Somalia,	 the	xeer	 traditional	 justice	systems	was	 in	use	well	before	 the	
colonial	era	and	is	still	widely	used	to	regulate	inter-clan	relationships.86		In	Nigeria,	it	is	
estimated	that	up	to	90%	of	cases	are	settled	by	customary	courts	87	and	likewise,	 in	
Malawi,	 between	 80-90%	 of	 all	 disputes	 are	 processed	 through	 customary	 justice	
forums.88		It	 is	estimated	also	that	up	to	80%	of	Burundians	in	the	first	or	sometimes	
only	 instance	 take	 their	 cases	 to	 the	 Bashingantahe	 institutions.89	 Furthermore,	
customary	land	tenure	accounts	for	75%	of	land	in	most	African	countries,	affecting	90%	




79	Odinkalu,	C.A.	 (2006)	 ‘Poor	 Justice	or	 Justice	 for	 the	Poor?	 	A	Policy	 Framework	 for	Reform	of	Customary	and	





























remote	 areas	 such	 as	 the	 Amazon	 area	 of	 Peru,	where	 AJMs	 flourish	 because	 state	
institutions	are	not	 there	 to	 interfere	with	 their	 activities.96	 	 Likewise,	 in	Bolivia,	 the	
Ayllus,	a	 peasant	 community	 living	 the	 high	 plateau	 region,	 have	 always	maintained	






















in	 rural	 areas,	 they	 reflect	 prevailing	 community	 norms	 and	 values99	 and	 deal	 with	
matters	 of	 concern	 to	 them,	 particularly	 issues	 relating	 to	 family	 and	 land.100	 It	 is	
contended	that	for	these	communities,	traditional	justice	is	culturally	relevant	since	it	
‘draws	upon	authentic	indigenous	identities	and	rituals	and	“taps	into	profound	spiritual	










formal	 procedures	 and	 atmosphere	 of	 the	 court	 together	 with	 an	 absence	 of	
understanding	 due	 to	 language	 issues	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 feelings	 of	 intimidation	 and	
mistrust.103	 	 The	 formal	 courts	may	also	 lack	 legitimacy,	especially	 if	 they	have	been	






This	 and	 the	 previous	 section	 discussed	 how	 and	 why	 AJMs,	 despite	 having	 been	




















































societies:	 families,	 lineages,	 clans,	 ethnic	 groups,	 living	 as	 a	 ‘closed	 circuit’.’113		
Therefore,	in	contrast	to	western	judicial	proceedings,	which	individualise	guilt:		
	
a	 law-breaking	 individual	 thus	 transforms	 his	 group	 into	 a	 law-breaking	
group,	 for	 in	his	dealings	with	others,	he	never	stands	alone.	 [Likewise]	a	



































For	 the	 majority	 of	 AJMs,	 the	 emphasis	 during	 the	 negotiation	 process	 is	 not	 on	
punishment	of	the	wrongdoer	but	on	reconciliation	and	the	restoration	of	peace	and	
social	harmony.118	Accordingly,	the	aim	is	not	only	to	compensate	the	victim	for	their	
loss	 and	 prevent	 the	 accused	 from	offending	 again	 but	 also	 to	 reintegrate	 both	 the	
victim	 and	 the	 offender	 back	 into	 the	 community.119	 	 The	 consensual	 process	 also	
ensures	that	the	decision	reached	is	enforced	through	social	pressure,	since	disobeying	





age,	 inherited	 status	 or	 influence	 within	 the	 community	 and	 they	 represent	 the	
community	in	expressing	the	consensus	on	shared	norms	and	values.121		Although	the	































community,	 thereby	 diminishing	 the	 ‘gap	 between	 legal	 truth	 and	 actual	 fact’.127		
However,	the	role	of	the	arbitrator	‘is	less	to	find	the	facts,	state	the	rules	of	law	and	
apply	them	to	the	facts	than	to	set	right	a	wrong	in	such	a	way	as	to	restore	harmony	




ritual	 experts	 who	 are	 called	 ‘men	 of	 the	 earth’.	 They	 have	 no	 forceful	
powers	of	coercion.		They	cannot	command	men	to	do	anything	and	expect	
them	to	obey;	but	they	are	political	as	well	as	ritual	functionaries.		If	a	fight	
breaks	 out,	 the	 ‘man	 of	 the	 earth’	 can	 restore	 peace	 …	 will	 negotiate	
between	 the	 two	 groups	 [in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 killing]	 and	 try	 to	 induce	 the	








Ordinarily,	 the	 AJM	 process	 is	 voluntary	 and	 parties	 confirm	 their	 consent	 to	 the	
















to	 be	 desired,	 since	 it	 involves	 the	 withdrawal	 of	 social	 contact	 and	 economic	 co-






A	 further	 common	 key	 feature	 is	 that	 the	AJM	process	 is	 usually	 swift,	 avoiding	 the	
lengthy	procedures	and	delays	that	can	be	so	prevalent	in	formal	judicial	procedures.		












Finally,	 it	 is	 a	 common	 feature	 of	 AJMs	 that	 once	 a	 decision	 has	 been	 reached	 by	












on	 reconciliation.141	 	 The	 whole	 community	 is	 involved	 thereby	 confirming	 “‘the	
communal	 element	 inherently	 present	 in	 any	 individual	 conflict”	 and	 […]	 their	
acceptance	of	the	offender	back	into	the	community’.142	In	Sierra	Leone,	for	example,	
rural	 communities	 use	 ceremonies	 based	 on	 practices	 that	 have	 been	 used	 for	








to	 healing	 or	 diminishing	 pain’,145	 instead,	 cleansing	 ceremonies	 are	 conducted	 by	

























largely	 unregulated	 and	 often	 lack	 procedural	 safeguards	 and	 accountability,	 which	
raises	 questions	 about	 their	 ability	 to	 achieve	 the	 standards	 and	 norms	 of	 criminal	
justice	demanded	both	locally	and	by	the	international	community.		In	this	section,	the	






cause	conflict.148	For	example,	 the	Mozambique	gamba	 spirit	 ceremony	 is	a	 regional	
experience	disliked	by	local	Christians,	who	often	refuse	to	co-operate	with	it149	and	Alie	
surmises	 that	 in	 Sierra	 Leone,	 the	Mende	practices	 for	 settling	 disputes	may	 not	 be	
suitable	 for	 settling	 disputes	 between	 Mende	 and	 non-Mende	 people	 within	 the	



































party	 is	 vulnerable	 to	 exploitation.160	 	 Flexible	 and	 uncertain	 rules	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
procedural	safeguards	can	add	to	the	particular	risks	facing	women,	young	people	and	
other	 vulnerable	 groups.161	 	 Also,	 the	 need	 for	 consensus	 can	 prevent	 effective	
resolution	and	‘the	language	of	consensus	when	not	reached	democratically	becomes	a	
means	 for	 suppressing	 dissent’.162	 Thus	 the	 ideal	 of	 consensus	 and	 social	 harmony	
frequently	translates	into	the	imposition	of	decisions	that	are	far	from	consensual.163		
While	public	participation	can	be	a	necessary	check	and	balance	to	the	administration	
























Two	 major	 concerns	 regarding	 AJMS	 are	 that	 they	 involve	 processes	 which	 are	
inconsistent	with	established	criminal	 justice	standards	and	human	rights	norms	and	
they	have	huge	potential	 for	discrimination.	 	Customary	norms	and	 justice	processes	
frequently	result	in	‘discriminatory	outcomes	and	can	reinforce	the	power	structure	that	
controls	and	administers	them.’168		Since	they	are	usually	dominated	by	local	male	elites	
or	 religious	 leaders,	 it	 is	often	the	case	that	women,	 the	poor,	 the	young	and	ethnic	
minorities	are	unable	to	gain	equal	access	or	fair	treatment.169	In	Burundi,	for	example,	






because	 they	 ‘are	 considered	 immature	 and	 not	 yet	 versed	 in	 the	 ways	 of	 the	
community’.173			
	
Furthermore,	 although	 participation	 in	 an	 AJM	 is	 voluntary,	 it	 may	 be	 virtually	





























principles	of	human	rights,	 for	example,	the	 imposition	of	cruel	or	 inhuman	forms	of	
punishment	such	as	flogging,	banishment	or	decisions	that	perpetuate	the	exploitation	
of	 children	 or	 subordination	 of	 women.180	 	 Some	 extremely	 harsh	 decisions	 and	
punishments	are	imposed	by	AJM	leaders	and	chiefs	on	women	and	girls	in	the	name	of	
culture	 and	 tradition.	 	 A	 recent	 example	 is	 an	order	 by	 a	 village	 council	 (or	 jirga)	 in	
Pakistan	that	a	16-year-old	girl	should	be	publicly	raped	as	punishment	for	her	brother	
having	raped	a	12-year-old	girl.181	In	Somalia,	a	woman	who	is	raped	is	often	forced	to	
marry	her	attacker	 ‘to	protect	her	honour’	and	serves	 to	ensure	 full	payment	of	her	
dowry	by	the	attacker’s	clan	to	the	victim’s	clan,	on	the	basis	that	marriage	solidifies	a	



















Clearly,	AJM	 leaders	and	chiefs	 can	be	unfamiliar	or	 culturally	disengaged	with	basic	








arbitrarily,	with	 few	 checks	 and	 balances	 on	 their	 administration	 and	 that	 they	 give	
‘power	 considerations	 precedence	 over	 equity,	 fairness	 and	 overall	 justice.’186	
Generally,	there	are	no	minimum	standards	that	have	to	be	met	in	AJMs	and	the	fairness	






power	 allied	 to	wealth,	 education	or	 status,	 particularly	where	not	 to	do	 so	may	be	
threat	to	their	own	position.188	They	may	also	be	susceptible	to	bribery	because	often	
they	receive	insufficient	or	no	remuneration	and	therefore	rely	on	gifts	and	bribes	for	













out	 that	 since	 the	 informal	 process	 is	 voluntary,	 traditional	 arbitrators	 cannot	 risk	




Once	 a	 decision	 has	 been	 reached,	 there	may	be	 no	 specific	means	 of	 enforcement	










and	where	 it	 is	 important	to	protect	the	rights	of	victim	and	offender.194	First,	critics	
insist,	 these	processes	 in	their	traditional	 form	were	not	designed	to	cope	with	huge	
numbers	of	returning	former	abductees	and	ex-combatants	who	have	committed	war	
crimes	 and	 crimes	 against	 humanity.195	 	 Second,	 victims	 often	 cannot	 identify	 the	
perpetrator	of	the	harm	done	to	them,	in	which	case	traditional	rituals	are	difficult	to	
perform.196		Even	if	the	victim	and	perpetrator	can	be	identified,	payment	of	reparation	
in	 order	 to	 restore	 the	 status	 quo,	 a	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 AJMs,	 will	 often	 be	




































that	the	AJM	must	have	an	accountability	dimension.	 	 It	has	been	established	 in	this	
chapter	that	many	AJMs	do	have	accountability	elements	and	the	offender	must	admit	














Traditional	 communal	 values	 inform	 practices	 that	 have	 been	 used	 for	 centuries	 to	
resolve	conflicts	and	heal	relationships.		Although	the	practices	differ	between	regions	





Western	 justice	 systems	 focus	 on	 accountability	 and	 to	 a	 much	 lesser	 extent	 on	
reparation	and	healing	and	critics	of	AJMs	point	to	their	inability	to	deal	adequately	with	
the	perpetrators	of	international	crimes,	due	to	their	common	aversion	to	retributive	
justice	 and	 emphasis	 on	 the	 restoration	 of	 social	 harmony.	 	 However,	 the	
restorative/retributive	 dichotomy	 is	 exaggerated	 as	 this	 chapter	 has	 demonstrated	
since	there	are	accountability	components	to	most	AJM	ceremonies	of	restitution	and	
reconciliation:	 the	 processes	 of	 Mozambique,	 Rwanda,	 Sierra	 Leone,	 Burundi	 and	
Uganda,	for	example,	all	tend	to	require	the	offender	to	openly	acknowledge	their	guilt	


















as	 they	 are	 difficult	 to	 categorise,	 can	 make	 reaching	 a	 clear	 verdict	 difficult,	 can	
misrepresent	a	situation	and	can	endanger	the	success	of	post-conflict	reconciliation.207			
In	contrast,	the	flexibility	of	AJM’s,	the	African	way	of	prolonging	discussions	and	the	





it	will	 be	 recalled	 that	 similar	 questions	 arose	 concerning	 the	 deterrent	 potential	 of	

































participation	 and	 civic	 engagement,	 the	 generation	 of	 social	 capital,	 and	 ultimately	
social	cohesion	[and]	reconciliation.’212		Since	they	are	based	in	established	local	values	






a	 credible	 instrument	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 even	 in	 context	 of	 dealing	 with	 crimes	

























has	 almost	 disappeared,	 particularly	 for	 abducted	 children	 and	 camps	 for	 displaced	




genocide	 have	 engendered	mutual	mistrust	 in	 small-scale	 communities	 which	 could	
affect	the	willingness	to	be	reconciled.223		These	factors	have	all	had	a	devastating	effect	











In	 this	 chapter,	 some	of	 the	 common	 strengths	 and	weaknesses	of	AJMs	have	been	

























Furthermore,	 although	 very	 few	 women	 preside	 over	 AJMs,	 women	 are	 under-






representation	 in	dispute	 settlement	 cases	and	 ‘some	 truth-seeking	mechanisms	are	
actually	headed	by	women’.228		In	Lesotho,	chiefs	have	been	delegating	their	authority	
to	 their	wives	 or	 sisters	 due	 to	male	 labour	migration	 and	 low	 pay	 and	 as	 a	 result,	
decisions	on	inheritance	issues	have	largely	favoured	women229		Unfortunately,	these	
progressive	 steps	 are	 so	 far	 not	 mirrored	 in	 Burundi	 where	 efforts	 to	 increase	 the	
participation	of	women	are	being	thwarted	by	the	conservative	attitudes	of	men.230	In	
Rwanda,	women	have	taken	up	an	important	role	in	the	reconstruction	efforts	although	


















the	 promotion	 of	 virtues	 of	 mutual	 respect,	 dignity,	 integrity	 and	 truth.233	 As	 their	
communities	begin	to	recover	from	the	effects	of	violent	conflict	or	repressive	rule,	if	






size-fits-all	 formulas	 and	 the	 importation	 of	 foreign	 models	 and	 instead,	 base	 our	
support	 on	 national	 assessments,	 national	 participation	 and	 national	 needs	 and	
aspirations.’235		Provided	that	an	AJM	is	the	democratic	choice	of	the	transitional	society,	
a	major	benefit	of	AJMs	is	their	proximity	to	victims	and	survivors	as,	in	contrast	to	trials	
at	The	Hague,	affected	communities	 can	be	 involved	 in	 their	process	of	 justice	being	















In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 to	 consider	 further	 the	 issues	 raised	 in	 this	 chapter	 from	 the	

























For	 30	 years,	 from	 1986	 when	 Yoweri	 Museveni,	 leader	 of	 the	 National	 Resistance	
Army/Movement	 (NRA/M)	became	President	 of	Uganda,	 the	population	of	 northern	
Uganda	has	suffered	from	the	effects	of	a	brutal	civil	war.		Indeed,	conflict	and	violence	
have	plagued	much	of	Uganda	since	independence	from	Britain	in	1962,	which	has	had	








to	act	as	 ‘wives’	and	sex	slaves,3	 the	displacement	of	more	 than	1.8	million	people,4	

























In	 December	 2003,	 Museveni	 referred	 ‘the	 situation	 regarding	 the	 LRA’	 to	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	and	warrants	for	the	arrest	of	five	top	leaders	of	the	
LRA	 were	 unsealed	 by	 the	 ICC	 in	 October	 2005.	 	 Many	 civil	 society	 organisations,	
traditional	and	 religious	 leaders,	politicians	and	 individuals	 in	northern	Uganda	were	
aghast	at	the	intervention	of	the	ICC,	pointing	out	that	Museveni’s	referral	was	contrary	
to	 the	provisions	of	 the	AA	and	would	endanger	peace	prospects.11	 	A	delegation	of	
Acholi	leaders	travelled	to	the	ICC	in	March	and	April	2005	to	appeal	to	the	Prosecutor	
of	the	ICC	to	allow	the	Acholi	to	deal	with	the	LRA	rebels	in	their	own,	traditional	way.12		















Paper	on	the	announcement	of	 formal	 investigations	of	 the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	by	the	Chief	Prosecutor	of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	and	its	implications	on	the	search	for	peaceful	solutions	to	the	war	in	northern	Uganda	
pp1-12;	Apuuli,	K.P.	(2006)	‘The	ICC	Arrest	Warrants	for	the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	Leaders	and	Peace	Prospects	for	














necessary	 (albeit	 unspecified)	modifications,	 as	 ‘a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 framework	 for	
accountability	 and	 reconciliation’	 following	 cessation	 of	 hostilities.15	 	 The	 LRA	 later	
refused	 to	 sign	 the	 Comprehensive	 Peace	 Agreement	whilst	 the	 ICC	 arrest	warrants	
remained	outstanding	but	the	Prosecutor	refused	to	accede	to	demands	to	withdraw	















The	question	 is	whether	 such	a	 challenge	 to	 the	admissibility	of	 a	 case	based	on	an	
alternative	 justice	mechanism	 (AJM)	 such	 as	Mato	Oput	 would	 have	 any	 chance	 of	














international	 criminal	 justice	 identified	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	 The	 issue	 could	 become	
particularly	pertinent	if,	for	example,	the	outstanding	ICC	arrest	warrants	for	the	LRA	




To	 conduct	 an	 evaluation	 of	 Mato	 Oput	 and	 its	 capacity	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	

































11,000	 square	miles,	 with	 Amuru	 and	 Kitgum	 bordering	 Sudan.22	 The	 origins	 of	 the	
Acholi	as	a	tribe	has	been	the	subject	of	considerable	debate,	some	arguing	that	their	
ethnic	 identity	 came	 about	 due	 to	 colonialism.23	 Finnström	 agrees	 that	 ‘colonial	
practices	were	powerful	instruments	in	the	making	of	more	rigid	ethnic	boundaries	and	
divides’,24	but	questions	the	premise	of	colonial	invention	on	the	grounds	that	‘historical	






60	 chiefdoms	 in	 Acholiland,	 each	 ruled	 by	 a	 chief	 or	 rwot	 (rwodi	 pl.)	 of	 aristocratic	
descent	(kal)	who	were	anointed	with	oil	from	the	shea	butter	tree	and	known	as	rwodi	























stereo-typing	 of	 the	 Acholi	 as	 a	warrior	 people	which,	 according	 to	 Finnström,	 ‘few	
scholars	 have	made	 any	 serious	 effort	 to	 question	 …	 and	 academic	 understandings	
continue	to	reinforce’.30	Latigo	contends	that	the	suggestion	of	the	British	viewing	the	
Acholi	as	a	warrior	people	and	recruiting	them	extensively	into	the	army	for	this	reason	
is	 an	 ‘unsubstantiated	 myth	 created	 by	 the	 British’	 which	 was	 ‘based	 entirely	 on	
prejudice	 and	 misrepresentation	 of	 facts	 and	 was	 used	 for	 political	 reasons.’31	













Although	the	 individual	practices	of	Acholi	clans	may	vary,	 there	 is	a	commonality	of	



























and	 afflictions	 often	 being	 attributed	 to	 a	 free	 jok.43	 	 The	 Acholi	 have	 strict	 taboos	
associated	with	death,	 killing	and	 the	 interaction	with	dead	bodies	which	 require	an	




the	 body	 and	 possibly	 even	 their	 family.45	 Since	 cen	 gather	 in	 places	 where	 death	
occurred	and	enter	passers-by,	any	person	passing	a	corpse	must	cover	it	with	leaves	of	





























properly	bury	 their	dead	and	 life	 in	 internally	displaced	person	 (IDP)	 camps	 severely	
restricting	 the	 freedom	and	 resources	 to	perform	 traditional	 ceremonies.	Baines	has	
noted,	for	example,	that	formerly-abducted	persons	(FAPs)	who	have	unsuccessfully	re-
integrated	into	their	communities	often	quote	possession	by	cen	and	their	inability	to	

















perpetrators	 of	 crimes	 against	 the	 Acholi	 and	 other	 tribes	 are	 dealt	with	 by	way	 of	
formal	 trials,	 for	many	 Acholi	 there	may	 still	 be	 a	 need	 at	 grass-roots	 level	 for	 the	









Mato	 Oput	 (‘drinking	 the	 bitter	 roots’	 to	 wash	 away	 bitterness)	 is	 the	 ceremony	
traditionally	used	in	cases	of	inter-clan	deliberate	or	accidental	killings.52		Acholi	people	
believe	 that	 life	 is	 sacred	and	the	killing	of	a	human	being	 is	 strictly	 forbidden.53	 If	a	
killing	does	occur,	Acholi	believe	the	anger	of	the	jogi	of	the	victim’s	clan	will	be	invoked	
against	the	offender’s	clan	and	this	will	create	a	supernatural	barrier	between	the	two	



















attached	 to	 him	 will	 pollute	 others.57	 	 Once	 the	 offender	 has	 freely	 confessed	 his	
wrongdoing	 to	 his	 village	 Elders,	 they	 report	 the	 offence	 to	 the	 clan	 Elders	 and	
responsibility	for	the	offence	now	lies	with	the	offender’s	whole	clan	which	can	have	no	
social	interaction	with	the	victim’s	clan	or	community.		‘Intermarriage,	trade	and	joint	







to	 decades.60	 An	 impartial	 mediator	 or	 a	 reconciliation	 committee	 (kal	 kwaro)	 will	




























be	 added	 to	 the	 calabash	 containing	 the	 oput	 and	 fruit	 juice	 mixture	 to	 form	 a	
‘reconciliation	drink’.		The	close	relatives	of	the	victim	and	the	offender	gather	around	
the	 calabash	 in	 a	 gesture	 signifying	 the	 end	 of	 hostilities	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	
reconciliation.		In	an	act	symbolizing	the	swallowing	of	all	bitterness	between	the	clans,	
















The	 feasting	may	 continue	 for	 a	 second	 day	 and	may	 require	 further	 animals	 to	 be	
slaughtered	to	feed	the	celebrants.	
	
It	 is	 clear	 from	 the	 description	 of	 the	Mato	 Oput	 outlined	 above	 that	 the	 process	
contains	elements	of	 truth	and	accountability,	 the	payment	of	 compensation	and	an	
agreement	between	the	parties	for	reconciliation.		Mato	Oput	is	therefore	an	important	
justice	mechanism	for	the	Acholi	but	how	appropriate	 it	 is,	 in	the	context	of	the	war	












In	 this	 section,	 the	historical	background	 to	 the	ethnic	and	other	divisions	 that	have	
beset	Uganda	since	colonial	times	will	be	outlined	to	contextualise	the	complex	conflict	
in	Northern	Uganda	and	further	afield.		In	support	of	the	argument	for	local	(or	Acholi)	








When	 Uganda	 became	 a	 British	 protectorate	 in	 1894,	 it	 comprised	 many	 diverse	
nationalities	 and	 ethnic	 groups.	 	 To	 better	 and	 profitably	manage	 this	 diversity,	 the	
British	 exploited	 pre-existing	 ethnic	 tensions	 thereby	 undermining	 any	 potential	 co-
ordinated	 resistance.67	 Opting	 for	 a	 policy	 of	 ‘divide	 and	 rule’,	 the	 British	 favoured	
different	ethnic	groups	and	regions	for	their	perceived	attributes.68	They	imposed,	for	
example,	a	division	of	labour	which	ran	along	regional	lines,	with	the	Nile	dividing	the	
country	 not	 only	 geographically	 but	 also	 politically.69	 	 Those	 from	 the	 south	 were	
preferred	 for	agriculture	and	the	civil	 service	and	those	 in	 the	north,	particularly	 the	
Acholi,	for	the	military.70		
	









churches,	 so	 that	 ‘by	 the	 time	of	 independence	 in	1962,	 the	organising	principles	of	












competitive	 retaliation	on	an	ethnic	basis’,74	 	 systematically	 removing	 the	pro-Obote	
Acholi	 and	 Langi	 contingent	 from	 the	 army	 by	 means	 of	 mass	 executions.75	 	 Amin	
replenished	his	depleted	national	army	by	recruiting	the	urban	poor	from	his	own	West	
Nile	region	(Kakwa)	as	well	as	Nubian	Ugandans	and	mercenaries	from	South	Sudan.76	






















fighting	 the	 UNLA	 was	 the	 southern-based	 National	 Resistance	 Army	 (NRA),	 led	 by	
Yoweri	Museveni.	 	The	UNLA	began	 to	 factionalise79	which	 resulted	 in	a	coup	 led	by	















concentrating	 control	 of	 all	 areas	of	 socio-economic,	 political	 and	military	 life	 in	 the	
south.	 	 The	 UNLA	 retreated	 north,	 robbing	 and	 plundering	 as	 they	 went,	 quickly	




of	 previous	 regimes,	 particularly	 from	within	 the	 armed	 forces’.83	 Here	 they	 formed	



























1985	 power-sharing	 agreement	 and	 they	 also	 feared	 that	 Museveni’s	 government	
would	marginalise	them	after	their	earlier	dominance	in	the	Ugandan	government	and	
national	army.90		They	were	suffering	brutal	NRA	reprisals	and	unfortunately,	the	UPDA	
proved	 incapable	 of	 addressing	 their	 problems	 and	 of	 protecting	 them	 from	 NRA	
violence.	 	 Furthermore,	 its	 manner	 of	 replenishing	 supplies	 and	 recruits	 became	
increasingly	 coercive	 as	 Acholi	 support	 for	 the	 rebel	 force	 began	 to	 dwindle.91	 The	
political	vacuum	caused	by	the	successes	of	the	NRA/M	and	the	corresponding	decline	
of	 the	UPDA	(which	signed	a	peace	agreement	with	 the	NRA/M	government	at	Pece	
















Joseph	 Kony	 had	 fought	 Museveni	 with	 the	 UPDA	 before	 he	 established	 his	 new	
movement,	absorbing	ex-fighters	from	the	UPDA	and	the	HSM	forces.94		Kony	initially	
focussed	his	attacks	on	the	NRA	but	 the	Acholi	were	tired	of	 living	 in	a	 ‘rebel	versus	
government’	conflict	and	failed	to	give	Kony	the	popular	support	he	craved.95		Claiming	






Violence	 against	 Acholi	 civilians	 by	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 conflict	 continued,	 each	 side	
blaming	 the	 Acholi	 for	 supporting	 and	 collaborating	 with	 the	 other.98	 	 The	 LRA	
retaliatory	violence	included	murder,	cutting	off	limbs,	ears,	noses	and	lips99	and	forcible	
abductions	of	men,	women	and	children	for	use	as	soldiers,	sex	slaves	and	porters.		The	
NRA	 killed	 and	 tortured	 suspected	 LRA	 collaborators	 whilst	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
government	attempted	to	explain	its	failure	to	defend	the	Acholi	from	LRA	atrocities	by	
insisting	that	the	LRA	conflict	was	not	a	matter	for	the	NRA,	it	was	an	Acholi	problem	for	
the	 Acholi	 to	 deal	 with.100	 To	 further	 support	 their	 viewpoint,	 the	 government	
constantly	referred	to	the	LRA	rebels	as	criminals	and	murderers	and	perpetuated	the	
stereo-type	of	Acholi	people	being	violent	and	warlike.	 	For	example,	 in	an	 interview	





















the	 whole	 Acholi	 population	 into	 IDP	 camps	 which	 they	 euphemistically	 called	
‘protected	 villages’.102	 	 By	 2006,	 the	 population	 in	 the	 251	 camps	 northern	 Uganda	
totalled	1.84	million,	approximately	90%	of	 the	Acholi	population.103	 	Ostensibly,	 the	
camps	were	established	to	protect	the	Acholi	from	the	LRA	but	according	to	Dolan,	they	
were	 ‘primary	 sites	 of	 Social	 Torture,	 as	 evidenced	 in	 widespread	 violation,	 dread,	






Kitgum	district,	 declared	 ‘one	 of	 the	worst	 humanitarian	 crises	 in	 the	world’.106	 The	
overcrowding,	severe	shortages	of	food,	water	and	medicine	and	deplorable	conditions	
of	hygiene	resulted	in	mortality	levels	in	the	camps	reaching	approximately	1000	people	

































































Ramsbotham	 and	Woodhouse	 term	 an	 ‘international-social	 conflict’(ISC),	 specifically	
‘neither	 inter-state	 nor	 contained	 within	 the	 resources	 of	 domestic	 conflict	
management	 [but]	between	the	two’.119	They	argue	that	 the	terms	 ‘internal	conflict’	
and	‘civil	war’	do	not	‘capture	the	further	twin	characteristics	of	ISCs’	which	are	‘rooted	
in	relations	between	communal	groups	[…	which	…break]	out	of	the	domestic	arena	and	
become	 a	 crisis	 for	 the	 state’,	 causing	 ‘massive	 human	 suffering	 and	 invit[ing]	
international	intervention.’120		This	appears	to	be	a	‘fit’	for	the	LRA	war	but	is	unlikely	to	
be	an	acceptable	definition	for	the	GoU	which,	in	the	past,	has	not	acknowledged	that	



















to	the	contrary.124	 	 In	 fact,	 the	LRA	has	published	at	 least	 three	manifestos	 (in	1996,	












the	 country	 since	 independence,	 every	 successive	 regime	 leader	 having	 applied	





























Whether	 the	 cessation	 of	 violence	 in	 northern	 Uganda	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
intervention	 of	 the	 ICC	 is	 a	 debatable	 point.	 	 It	 certainly	 has	 been	 credited	 with	
encouraging	the	LRA	leadership	to	the	negotiating	table	but	it	was	equally	responsible	
for	the	breakdown	of	the	Juba	Peace	negotiations	when	the	Prosecutor	refused	to	agree	










stage	 by	 projecting	 itself	 as	 a	 leader	 in	 international	 criminal	 justice	 (ICJ)	 fighting	 a	
criminal	organisation.		It	also	deflected	attention	from	the	human	rights	abuses	against	
the	Acholi	committed	by	government	forces,	as	the	OTP	was	unlikely	to	risk	antagonising	
the	 GoU,	 upon	 whose	 co-operation	 it	 relied,	 by	 investigating	 the	 UPDF.135	 	 The	
Prosecutor’s	decision	to	hold	a	joint	press	conference	with	Museveni	and	his	subsequent	
failure	to	charge	any	UPDF	members	certainly	fuelled	suspicions	that	the	ICC	was	being	













more	 persuasive,	 however,	 was	 the	 loss	 of	 Sudan’s	 support	 following	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 Comprehensive	 Peace	 Agreement	 between	 the	 GoS	 and	 the	
Sudan	 People’s	 Liberation	 Army	 (SPLA).138	 	 The	 newly-formed	Government	 of	 South	
Sudan	 (GOSS)	 denied	 the	 LRA	 territorial	 sanctuary	 and	 encouraged	 LRA	 leaders	 to	
negotiate	with	the	GoU	or	face	military	attack	by	the	SPLA.139			
	





humanitarian	 situation	 in	 northern	 Uganda	 was	 increasing,	 the	 option	 to	 attend	






















centred	 on	 the	 welfare	 of	 LRA	 abductees	 who,	 forced	 to	 become	 soldiers	 had	
themselves	perpetrated	crimes	against	northern	Ugandans,	as	it	was	feared	their	lives	
would	 be	 endangered	 by	 military	 attempts	 to	 execute	 the	 ICC	 arrest	 warrants.143			








western	 notion	 of	 justice.	 	 They	 criticised	 the	 ICC	 for	 its	 selective	 justice	 in	 that	 it		
focussed	on	 the	 LRA	 leadership	 and	 ignored	 the	 abuses	 perpetrated	by	 government	
forces	 and	 those	 lower	 down	 the	 command	 chain.145	 	 ICC	 justice,	 they	 also	 argued,	
ignored	the	socio-economic	causes	of	 the	conflict	and	 failed	 to	address	 the	need	 for	





























former	 combatants	 to	 encourage	 their	 return	 and	 reintegration,149	 and	 ‘borrowing	
largely	from	traditional	approaches	that	emphasise	‘forgiveness’.’150		Second,	the	GoU	
signed	the	AAR	with	the	LRA	on	29	June	2007	in	Juba.		The	AAR	aimed	to	strengthen	





by	 the	 conflict,	 shall	 be	 promoted,	 with	 necessary	 modifications,	 as	 the	
central	part	of	the	framework	for	accountability	and	reconciliation.151	
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 envisage	 how	 this	 provision	 could	 be	 effected,	 however,	 given	 the	
widespread	 crimes	 committed	 by	 LRA	 fighters	 against	 different	 tribes	 in	 northern	




of	 justice,	 it	 is	debatable	how	prevalent	 the	practice	actually	has	been	within	Acholi	
society,	especially	since	the	outset	of	the	LRA	conflict.153		The	war	and	particularly	the	













various	 traditional	 rituals	 and	 ceremonies,	 for	 example,	were	 severely	weakened	 by	
almost	 two	 decades	 of	 displacement.155	 	 No	 longer	 living	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 their	








the	youth	 raised	 in	 camps	who	had	never	experienced	 the	 role	and	duties	of	 village	
Elders.159	The	traditional	means	of	teaching	and	reinforcing	social	and	cultural	norms	
before	displacement	had	been	extended	families	sitting	around	the	communal	village	


























became	 ‘the	 first	 major	 articulation	 of	 a	 traditional	 reconciliation	 agenda	 for	 the	
Acholi.’169	Pain’s	report	outlined	the	‘traditional	authority	structure	of	the	Acholi’	and	
concluded	that	the	conflict	had	led	to	the	‘collapse	of	traditional	networking	and	values’	
where	 ‘the	 Elders	 have	 failed	 to	 take	 on	 the	 responsibility	 which	 they	 should	 have	
taken’.170	 	 Unfortunately,	 by	 blaming	 the	 conflict	 on	 the	 breakdown	 of	 traditional	
authority,	Pain	endorsed	the	view	that	the	war	was	an	 intra-Acholi	problem171	which	






























Research	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 Pain’s	 findings	 began	 in	 1999,	 funded	 by	 the	 Belgian	
government	and	administered	by	ACORD,	a	non-governmental	organisation	(NGO).178		
Unlike	 Pain,	 ACORD	 discovered	 ‘weak	 and	 fragmented’	 traditional	 structures,	 Elders	
unsure	how	to	perform	traditional	rituals	and	‘widespread	disagreement	over	who	the	
real	traditional	leaders	actually	were’.179	Assessing	Pain’s	report,	Dolan	concluded	it	is	




traditional	 leaders	promoting	 traditional	 reconciliation	began	to	garner	support	 from	






chiefs	 and	 Elders,	 which	 became	 recognised	 as	 the	 Acholi	 legal	 cultural	 institution.		
Baines’	 report	 for	 the	 Liu	 Institute,	 Roco	Wat,	 upheld	 the	 establishment	 of	 KKA	 as	




























roles	 and	 resented	 the	 emergent	 awareness	 of	 their	 rights	 among	 women	 and	 the	
young.188	 	 Elders	 criticised	 the	 expansion	 of	 these	 rights	 for	 preventing	 them	 from	










structure	without	 the	necessary	anchoring	 in	 the	deep	 traditional	beliefs,	
culture	and	norms	that	had	been	practised	hitherto.		Thus	both	the	status	




Efforts	were	 also	made	 to	 identify	 the	 true	descendants	of	 the	Rwodi	moo	 deposed	
during	the	colonial	period	and	in	2000,	traditional	Rwodi	were	formally	re-instated	in	52	






























performed	 before	 a	 community’s	 own	 sacred	 shrine199	 to	 welcome	 back	 to	 the	
homestead	those	who	have	been	away	for	an	extended	period	and	who	may	have	had	
experiences	which	have	made	them	unclean,	requiring	them	to	be	cleansed	before	they	
can	 re-enter	 the	 family	 homestead.200	 	 Since	 2003,	 in	 some	 big	 towns	 and	 in	 the	
presence	of	the	media,	communal	ceremonies	which	have	been	called	Mato	Oput,	have	
been	performed	by	the	paramount	chief	for	large	numbers	of	returning	fighters	living	in	
















he	 would	 really	 look	 into	 the	 faces	 of	 those	 he	 had	 harmed,	 request	
reconciliation	and	pay	compensation	for	what	he	had	done,	he	just	laughed,	











concern	 that	 the	 ceremony	 should	 not	 be	 communally	 performed	 in	 the	 towns	 but	
separately	at	the	individual’s	homestead.		Some	Elders	have	argued	that	the	ceremonies	











LRA	abductees	 in	2005,	none	had	performed	Mato	Oput	and	only	69	had	taken	part	 in	any	kind	of	 reconciliation	
ceremony	






Roco	 Wat	 offers	 a	 different	 viewpoint,	 however,	 stating	 that	 ‘communal	 cleansing	
ceremonies	were	started	within	camps	and	town	centres	as	a	means	of	addressing	the	
impact	of	the	conflict	and	forced	displacement	on	traditional	practices.’209	 	One	such	
ceremony	 held	 in	 Amuru	 involved	 800	 returnees	 and	 Roco	Wat	 comments	 that	 the	
ceremony	‘may	be	the	first	form	of	‘therapy’	for	them.’210	Returnees	‘often	felt	more	
accepted	 following	 a	 communal	 cleansing	 ceremony	 and	 they	 were	 better	 able	 to	
communicate	and	socialise	with	community	members’	and	the	majority	of	family	and	
neighbours	 of	 the	 returnees	 ‘were	 in	 favour	 of	 communal	 cleansing	 ceremonies’.211		
Roco	Wat	states	the	cleansing	ceremonies	are	also	an	important	communication	with	












that	 ‘researchers	 were	 partially	 able	 to	 record	 50	 cases	 of	Mato	 Oput	 taking	 place	
between	2000	and	2005’	and	details	one	in-depth	case	study	which	encompasses	‘the	
aspects	 of	 truth,	 compensation	 and	 ritual	 […]	 considered	 central	 elements	 of	 the	


























for	 the	dissatisfaction	and	disengagement	often	expressed.219	 	The	willingness	of	 the	
perpetrators	to	undergo	the	cleansing	ceremonies	does	not	necessarily	indicate	that	all	



























By	way	of	reminder,	the	aims	of	 ICJ	were	 identified	 in	Chapter	2	and	summarised	by	
former	 UNSG,	 Kofi	 Annan,	 in	 his	 2004	 report,	 as	 being	 to	 bring	 to	 justice	 those	












obligatio	 erga	 omnes)	 and	 grave	 breaches	 of	 the	 Geneva	 Conventions	 (which	 are	
accepted	as	customary	 international	 law),223	which	both	 impose	a	duty	to	prosecute,	
the	position	 is	 less	 clear	 for	 crimes	against	humanity	and	non-grave	breaches	of	 the	
Geneva	Conventions,	since	no	treaty	expressly	imposes	a	duty	to	prosecute	these	crimes	

































established	during	 the	negotiation	phase	 (which	 takes	place	prior	 to	 the	 ritual	being	
performed),	by	means	of	shuttle	diplomacy	between	the	clans	(which	can	take	months,	
if	 not	 years,	 to	 conclude),	 perhaps	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 ‘sufficiently	 prosecutorial	












As	 previously	mentioned,	Mato	Oput	 has	 always	 been	 used	 for	 inter-clan	 individual	
accidental	or	deliberate	killings,	not	for	the	type	of	grievous	atrocities	committed	during	
the	 LRA	conflict.	 	 There	are	questions,	 therefore,	over	how	 it	would	deal	with	other	













during	 the	 war.	 	 In	 a	 2010	 survey	 about	 peace,	 justice	 and	 social	 reconstruction	 in	
northern	Uganda,	of	2,498	adult	respondents,	84%	saw	accountability	as	important	and	





The	 potential	 for	 Mato	 Oput	 to	 end	 the	 commission	 of	 crimes	 and	 prevent	 their	
























and	 the	 ostracising	 of	 the	 offender	 and	 their	 clan	 until	 it	 is	 paid	 and	Mato	Oput	 is	
performed	 could	 also	 be	 a	 powerful	 tool	 of	 societal	 control	 and	 deterrence.		







itself	 a	 deterrent	 to	 many	 who	 would	 have	 contemplated	 committing	 similar	
offences’,233	 it	 is	difficult	 to	see	how	such	ceremonies	have	the	potential	 to	end	and	
prevent	the	commission	of	future	crimes	since	they	appear	not	to	be	widely	respected	
by	 either	 the	 perpetrators	 or	 the	 onlookers.	 	 It	 might	 be	 argued	 instead,	 that	 the	
combination	of	the	AA	and	the	performance	of	the	communal	cleansing	ceremonies	by	
local	cultural	 leaders	has	encouraged	former	LRA	fighters	to	return	from	the	bush	by	
















the	 justice	 and	 reconciliation	 process)	 may	 be	 unachievable	 due	 to	 the	 number	 of	
victims	to	be	compensated,	the	poverty	suffered	by	the	perpetrator’s	clan	and	the	fact	
that	they	may	have	been	FAPs	and	thus	are	also	victims.		Although	in	such	situations,	it	
could	 be	 possible	 to	 adapt	Mato	 Oput	 to	 hold	 ceremonies	 in	 the	 locations	 of	 the	
communities	 affected,	 where	 the	 truth	 can	 be	 told,	 forgiveness	 requested	 and	
compensation	paid	through	a	reparations	fund	established	by	the	government.			
	










from	 those	 of	men,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	Mato	Oput	 can	 satisfy	 their	 interests	 without	
















implementing	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 AA	 and	 the	 AAR,	 the	 ceremonies	 cannot	 be	
accurately	described	as	‘traditional’	in	the	manner	of	their	performance,	nor	as	a	‘unique	
system	of	Acholi	 justice’	as	 is	claimed	by	KKA	and	 its	adherents	but	more	as	a	public	
ceremony	of	re-integration	and	‘forgiveness’.240				
	
However,	 the	 adapted	 process	 can	 be	 less	 satisfactory	 for	 the	 families	 and	 clans	 of	










Participants	 are	 not	 required	 to	 face	 their	 victims,	 ask	 for	 forgiveness	 or	 to	 pay	
compensation,243	so	whilst	the	ceremonies	were	described	by	one	local	social	counsellor	
as	a	‘first	step	aimed	at	the	relieving	pain,	agony	and	traumatic	experiences	our	sons	












in	 2005	 found	 that	 65%	 of	 respondents	 supported	 the	 amnesty	 process	 for	 LRA	
returnees	but	only	4%	said	 the	amnesties	should	be	granted	unconditionally.245	 	The	
majority	 wanted	 some	 form	 of	 acknowledgement	 and/or	 retribution	 from	 all	 those	
granted	amnesty.246		
	












peace	 to	 the	 region	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 GoU	 (43%)	 or	 the	 international	 community	





by	 then,	 of	 the	 2,875	 interviewees,	 52%	 preferred	 forgiveness,	 reconciliation	 and	














with	 amnesty	 over	 peace	 with	 trials.256	 	 The	 apparent	 contradiction	 between	 the	
support	for	both	accountability	and	amnesties	can	perhaps	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	
the	Juba	peace	talks	were	in	progress	at	the	time	the	survey	was	conducted.		The	authors	
of	 the	 report	 surmise	 that	 the	 figures	may	 reflect	 respondents’	 fear	 that	 trials	 could	
hinder	the	peace	process.257	
	





























ceremonies	 over	 amnesty,	 truth-seeking	 or	 trials.260	 	 Nonetheless,	 53%	 viewed	





mechanism	 appears	 overstated	 by	 its	 supporters;	 not	 reflective	 of	 the	 demand	 for	
justice	expressed	by	many	Acholi	at	grass	roots	level.		As	Allen	states,	the	Acholi	are	not	







In	 Chapter	 3	 the	 value	 and	 importance	 of	 a	 full	 and	 comprehensive	 record	 of	 the	
atrocities	 suffered	by	 the	 citizens	of	 a	 state	 transitioning	 from	conflict	 to	peace	was	
discussed	and	in	northern	Uganda,	there	is	considerable	support	for	a	written	historical	
record.	 	 In	 the	 afore-mentioned	 2007	 survey,	 95%	 of	 respondents	 said	 a	 written	
historical	record	of	what	had	happened	during	the	war	in	northern	Uganda	should	be	
prepared	and	89%	indicated	they	were	willing	to	talk	openly	about	their	experiences	in	
a	 court	 or	 public	 hearing.264	 	 Likewise,	 in	 the	 2010	 population	 survey,	 93%	 of	
respondents	believed	it	was	important	for	future	generations	to	remember	what	had	
occurred	 in	 northern	Uganda.	 	 The	majority	 suggested	 that	 books	 be	written	 (42%),	













due	 to	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Liu	 Institute,	 many	 ceremonies	 and	 rituals	 have	 been	

















and	 should	 be	 prepared	 either	 through	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 GoU	 or	 some	 other	





It	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 how	Mato	 Oput	 can	 promote	 national	 reconciliation	 for	 three	











their	 traditional	 justice	to	deal	with	the	LRA.	 	Not	only	does	 it	serve	to	reinforce	the	
GoU’s	 insistence	that	the	war	was	an	Acholi	affair,	 it	 relieves	the	government	of	any	
responsibility	to	address	the	causes	of	the	conflict	from	a	national,	socio-economic	and	
political	 standpoint.270	 	 Furthermore,	 support	 for	 traditional	 justice	 protects	 the	
government	‘from	the	full	implications	of	public	trials	at	The	Hague	[where]	competent	
defence	 counsel	 for	 the	 accused	 could	 raise	 very	 embarrassing	 issues,	 including	
government	implication	in	atrocities.’271	
	
Second,	Mato	Oput	 is	a	ceremony	that	 is	culturally	specific	 to	the	Acholi,	although	 it	
does	 have	 some	 equivalence	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 practices	 of	 other	 ethnic	 groups	
affected	by	the	LRA	conflict.272	These	groups	have	their	own	ceremonies	of	forgiveness	







and	 therefore	 their	 ability	 to	 effect	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 may	 have	 been	
severely	diminished.	 	 Indeed,	Acholi	 communities	often	display	 little	evidence	of	 the	
forgiveness	which,	according	 to	Acholi	 Elders	and	Chefs	who	promote	Mato	Oput,	 is	
inherent	in	the	Acholi	psyche.273		For	example,	in	2005,	Roco	Wat	noted	worrying	signs	
that	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 had	 not	 been	 achieved	 successfully	 between	
community	members	in	camps	and	returnees,	referring	to	‘stigmatization,	resentment,	
																																																						








of	 ex-LRA	 and	 FAPs	may	 have	 been	 accepted,	 individually	 they	may	 not	 have	 been	
















these	 figures	 had	 risen	 to	 12.4%	 and	 52.8%	 respectively.279	 	 Again,	 in	 2012,	 62%	 of	
respondents	 ‘never’	witnessed	 stigmatisation	whereas	 in	 2015,	 this	 figure	 fell	 to	 0%	









































281	 Shabdita,	 S.	 and	 Odiya,	 O.	 (2015)	 p12	 citing	 ‘reintegration	 challenges	 and	 stigmatization	 faced	 by	 formerly-
abducted	 persons	 (FAPs),	 clashes	 between	 communities	 and	 government	 officials	 over	 the	 latter’s	 failure	 to	
adequately	represent	the	victim’s	demands	for	justice	and	reparation,	violent	community	disputes	over	boundaries	
and	resources,	or	changing	gender	relations	leading	to	sexual-	and	gender-based	violence,	among	several	others.’	



















regions	 also	 blame	 the	 Acholi	 for	 the	 war	 and	 suffering	 experienced,	 for	 example,	
‘eastern	regions	in	the	past	have	been	hostile	to	the	Acholi	as	the	LRA	high	command	is	
largely	Acholi.’290		Indisputably,	in	South	Uganda	there	has	long	been	the	misconception	
that	 the	 war	 in	 the	 north	 is	 the	 fault	 of	 Acholi	 and	 further	 afield,	 South	 Sudanese	






have	 been	 achieved	 by	 way	 of	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 within	 the	 Acholi	
community	 itself,	 let	alone	between	neighouring	 tribes	and	nationally.	 	Traditionally,	
reconciliation	between	tribes	was	achieved	by	the	performance	of	Gomo	Tong	(‘bending	
of	the	spear’),	a	‘profound	ritual	of	reconciliation’	which	‘evokes,	manifests	and	remakes	
greater	political	alliances	among	peoples	 in	northern	Uganda’.292	 	The	ceremony	 is	a	


















It	 has	 already	 been	 argued	 above	 that	 if	Mato	 Oput	 were	 accepted	 as	 the	 justice	









A	 further	 important	 question	 is	 whether	 the	 KKA,	 which	 was	 established	 with	 the	
support	of	the	GoU	and	foreign	donors	to	resurrect	and	promote	Acholi	culture	and	to	





the	 KKA	 and/or	 the	 traditional	 leaders.	 	 This,	 of	 course,	 could	 seriously	 impact	 the	
manner	in	which	these	rituals	operate.		Additionally,	Quinn	notes	that	the	government	
has	effectively	co-opted	the	KKA,	‘playing	a	significant	role’	and	‘far	from	being	arms-





















that	 ensure	 harmony	 and	 social	 order,301	 where	 traditional	 leaders	 would	 have	 the	
‘exclusive	 role	 of	 regulating	 Acholi	 society	 through	 their	 access	 to	 the	 spiritual	





The	 re-assertion	 of	 ‘patriarchal,	 gerontocratic	 power	 within	 clan	 and	 household	
structures’	may	not	be	universally	welcomed.304		Women	whose	‘economic,	social	and	
political	 authority	 and	 status’	 has	 risen	 due	 to	 opportunities	 made	 possible	 during	


















The	 traditional	 objective	 of	 an	 AJM	 is	 primarily	 to	 seek	 assistance	 from	 Elders	 to	

































a	 violent	 manifestation	 of	 the	 long-term	 grievances	 endured	 by	 the	 Acholi	 and	
northerners	 generally,	 arising	 out	 of	 their	 daily-lived	 experience	 of	 neglect,	
discrimination	 and	 mistrust.	 	 This	 calls	 into	 question	 the	 applicability	 of	 a	 local,	 or	




By	calling	 for	 traditional	 justice	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	Mato	Oput	 ritual	as	 the	means	of	
addressing	the	gross	violations	of	HR	committed	by	the	LRA,	it	could	be	suggested	that	
the	Acholi	Elders	and	their	supporters	are	 ignoring	the	wider	context	of	 this	conflict,	







goals	 because	 it	 is	 culture-specific	 and	 it	 fails	 to	 include	 abuses	 perpetrated	 by	
government	 forces.	 	 It	 has	 also	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 communal	 cleansing	
ceremonies	conducted	by	traditional	leaders	in	towns	and	camps	for	returning	ex-LRA	
and	FAPs	do	not	meet	the	aims	of	ICJ	and	cannot	accurately	be	described	as	a	justice	
mechanism.	 	 Although	 referred	 to	 as	 Mato	 Oput	 and	 intended	 to	 ‘help	 facilitate	
reintegration,	 and	 stimulate	 the	 process	 towards	 reconciliation	 […]	 they	 must	 be	








achieving	 justice	and	accountability	post-conflict,	which	could	potentially	 require	 the	
ICC	to	decide	whether	the	AJM	meets	the	complementarity	principle.	This	chapter	has	
argued,	however,	that	Mato	Oput	does	not	achieve	either	accountability	or	justice	for	
victims	 of	 the	 LRA	 conflict	 and	 concludes	 that,	 as	 an	 AJM	 to	 deal	 with	 ex-LRA	
combatants,	 it	 does	 not	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	 ICJ	 either	 in	 Acholiland	 or	 nationally.		


















how	 to	 address	 their	 recent	 history	 and	 the	 human	 rights	 (HR)	 abuses	 perpetrated	
against	their	people.		It	is	commonly	argued	that	enabling	an	emerging	nation	and	its	
society	 to	move	 forward	 in	 unity,	 peace	 and	 stability	 necessitates	 the	 rebuilding	 of	
shattered	 lives,	 effective	 reconciliation	 between	 former	 enemies	 and	 some	 form	 of	
acknowledgement	of	the	suffering	caused	in	order	to	ensure	that	similar	atrocities	do	
not	occur	in	the	future.1		The	alternative	of	not	addressing	these	issues,	it	is	argued,	risks	





















support	 of	 the	 minority	 white	 population,	 the	 NP	 had	 fought	 to	 protect	 its	 white	






The	 ANC,	 as	 the	 largest	 party	 within	 the	 SA	 national	 liberation	 movement,	 led	
negotiations	with	 the	NP	during	which	 long	process	both	sides	were	 forced	to	adapt	
their	 demands,	 particularly	 over	 the	 question	 of	 amnesty.8	 	 From	 the	 outset	 of	
negotiations,	 the	NP9	had	argued	strenuously	 that	 to	achieve	reconciliation,	 the	past	





violations.’11	 On	 18th	 November	 1992,	 however,	 the	 ANC	 leadership	 pragmatically	





























struck	so	 late	 in	the	negotiation	process	that	 it	had	to	be	 included	 in	a	“post-amble”	
tacked	on	to	the	end	of	the	Constitution	–	almost	as	an	after-thought’.14	Indeed,	Boraine	
talks	of	the	extraordinary	difficulty	the	negotiating	parties	had	in	agreeing	the	wording	







notion	of	 justice	within	the	broader	framework	of	 ‘reconciliation’’	but	ultimately	 ‘de-
emphasised	 justice	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 reconciliation	 and	 realism,	 both	 local	 and	
international.’16		While	this	may	be	true,	the	SA	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	











societies	 in	 transition’.	 	 The	 Centre	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Violence	 and	 Reconciliation	 [Online]	 Available:	
http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php/publications/1724-a-brief-evaluation-of-south-africas-truth-and-reconciliation-













and	 national	 amnesties,19	 the	 difficulties	 surrounding	 the	 issue	 of	 alternative	 justice	
mechanisms	 (AJMs)	 generally,	 were	 resolved	 by	 the	 adoption	 of	 provisions	 that	
reflected	‘creative	ambiguity’20	and	TCs	are	nowhere	mentioned	in	the	Rome	Statute	
(RSt).		Since	1998,	a	further	23	TCs	have	been	established,21	during	which	time	the	issue	
of	 whether	 they	 are	 an	 acceptable	 alternative	 to	 trials	 as	 a	 means	 of	 dealing	 with	
international	crimes,	has	been	strenuously	debated.22	The	two	systems	are,	of	course,	
distinct	 in	 that	 TCs	 emphasise	 restorative	 (truth-seeking)	 justice	with	 the	 procedure	
focusing	 on	 victims	 whereas	 trials	 emphasise	 retributive	 (criminal)	 justice,	 with	 the	
defendant	and	the	trial’s	rules	of	procedure	and	evidence	being	the	focus.			
	
The	 ICC	 has	 not	 yet	 investigated	 a	 situation	 where	 a	 TC	 has	 been	 adopted	 as	 the	
nationally-preferred	 justice	 mechanism23	 but	 given	 the	 evident	 popularity	 of	 TCs	 in	
transitional	 societies,	 it	 is	 foreseeable	 that	 the	Court	will	 be	 forced	 to	adjudicate	on	
whether	a	TC	satisfies	its	inadmissibility	criteria.		An	indication	of	the	Prosecutor’s	view	





















held	up	as	one	of	the	most	successful	 in	terms	of	 its	size	and	reach	and	because	it	 is	
credited	with	facilitating	a	peaceful	transition	from	an	abusive	regime	to	a	democracy.		
Assessment	of	 the	SATRC	and	highlighting	 its	 strengths	and	weaknesses	 from	the	 ICJ	
viewpoint	will	 also	 facilitate	 the	 formation	of	 a	 framework	 for	 future	TCs	wishing	 to	
challenge	admissibility	at	 the	 ICC.	 	Notwithstanding	 such	a	 framework,	however,	 the	
jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ICC	 in	 admissibility	 challenges	made	 to	 date25	 reveals	 that	 the	
provisions	relating	to	complementarity	are	interpreted	very	narrowly	by	the	Judges	and	
that,	as	it	currently	stands,	even	a	well-constituted	TC	would	be	unlikely	to	persuade	the	










AJM	such	as	a	TC	 is	viable.	 	 In	 the	second	section,	 the	emergence	 in	 ICL	of	 the	 legal	
concept	 of	 the	 ‘right	 to	 truth’	 will	 be	 discussed.	 	 The	 right	 to	 truth	 is	 a	 precept	
fundamental	to	the	creation	of	a	TC,	frequently	cited	by	advocates	of	TCs	to	support	
their	 pressure	 on	 governments	 to	 establish	 an	 effective	 TC.	 	 Section	 three,	 to	
contextualise	 SA’s	 decision	 to	 eschew	 trials	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 TRC,	 briefly	 outlines	 SA’s	
history	of	repression	and	resistance	under	the	apartheid	regime	and	the	negotiations	
that	brought	about	its	demise.		The	fourth	and	fifth	sections	discuss	the	establishment,	
structure	 and	 processes	 of	 the	 SATRC,	 highlighting	 the	 nationwide	 discussion	 and	
participation	these	involved.		In	the	sixth	section,	the	SATRC	will	be	assessed	against	the	














was	enforced	 in	SA	by	 the	governing	NP	 from	1948,	when	the	party	narrowly	won	a	
Parliamentary	majority,	until	it	was	abandoned	in	1990.		Under	the	apartheid	system,	
the	rights	of	the	black	majority	were	curtailed	and	the	rule	of	the	white	minority	was	
maintained	 with	 successive	 governments	 enacting	 national	 laws	 to	 legitimise	 their	
repressive	policies.		In	1948,	the	year	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	
was	adopted	by	the	UN,	the	NP	was	just	beginning	its	policy	of	legal	racial	discrimination,	




apartheid	 regime	and	after	1960,	 the	UN	Security	Council	 (UNSC)	 regularly	added	 its	
own	condemnation.		In	1965,	international	condemnation	of	apartheid	resulted	in	the	
International	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Racial	 Discrimination26	
which	 committed	 its	 signatories	 to	 eliminating	 racial	 discrimination	 and	 promoting	












and	56	of	 the	UN	Charter;	 it	 criminalised	 the	system.31	As	Article	V	of	 the	Apartheid	
Convention	provided	that	a	person	charged	may	be	tried	‘by	a	competent	tribunal	of	
any	 State	 Party	 […]	 or	 by	 an	 international	 penal	 tribunal’,	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 special	
international	court	to	try	individuals	for	the	crime	of	apartheid	was	considered	in	1980.32		
However,	it	was	decided	that	as	individual	states	could	enact	legislation	permitting	them	
to	 prosecute	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 universal	 jurisdiction	 if	 the	 accused	 was	 within	 their	
jurisdiction,	 such	 a	 court	was	 unnecessary.33	 In	 1998,	 the	 RSt	 included	 the	 crime	 of	
apartheid	as	a	CAH	within	its	jurisdiction.				
	
In	 fact,	no-one	has	ever	been	prosecuted	 for	 the	 crime	of	apartheid,	either	 in	 SA	or	
elsewhere.34	Apartheid	was	ended	in	SA	by	negotiations	between	the	government	and	



































has	 gained	 prominence	 as	 a	 legal	 concept	 in	 international	 law	 over	 the	 last	 three	
decades,	 alongside	 the	development	of	 transitional	 justice.	Closely	 connected	 to	 the	
ascendancy	of	the	international	HR	movement,	the	1980s	onwards	‘witnessed	renewed	
global	enthusiasm	for,	and	confidence	in,	the	idea	of	truth	as	the	basis	of	justice	and	
stability.’40	 It	 is	 discussed	 as	 a	 separate	 section	within	 this	 chapter	 to	 illustrate	 that	
investigating	and	making	public	the	truth	about	past	violations	has	been	established	as	
a	general	state	obligation	by	international	courts	and	re-affirmed	in	UN	policy	papers	




























the	 right	 of	 the	 families	 to	 know	 the	 fate	 of	 their	 relatives’,	 detailed	 a	 state	 party’s	





were	 ‘intended	 as	 guidelines	 to	 assist	 states	 in	 developing	 effective	 measures	 for	
combating	impunity.’48		Joinet’s	principles	covered	the	victims’	right	to	know,	right	to	
justice	and	 right	 to	 reparations	and	established	 state	 responsibility	 and	 the	 inherent	
right	of	redress	for	individual	victims	of	grave	HR	violations.	The	principles	also	identified	





















to	 guard	 against	 the	 perversions	 of	 history	 that	 go	 under	 the	 names	 of	
revisionism	or	 negationism;	 the	 knowledge	of	 the	oppression	 it	 has	 lived	




Orentlicher	 affirmed	 Joinet’s	 ‘right	 to	 know	 the	 truth’52	which	 ‘imprescriptible	 right’	
applied	 irrespective	 of	 any	 legal	 proceedings53	 and	 obliged	 states	 to	 ‘ensure	 the	
preservation	 of,	 and	 access	 to,	 archives	 concerning	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
humanitarian	 law.’54	 The	 UNCHR	 then	 adopted	 a	 resolution55	 recognising	 ‘the	
importance	 of	 respecting	 and	 ensuring	 the	 right	 to	 the	 truth	 so	 as	 to	 contribute	 to	
ending	impunity	and	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights’.56	The	resolution	requested	




and	numerous	 resolutions	of	 intergovernmental	bodies	at	 the	universal	and	 regional	
levels.’57	
	
Since	 the	 1990s,	 therefore,	 the	 UN	 HR	 policy	 body58	 has	 passed	 several	 resolutions	
reiterating	the	right	to	truth	and	all	the	reports,	resolutions	and	jurisprudence	indicate	
that	the	right	to	truth	has	become	a	generally	accepted	legal	concept.		Whilst	there	are	

















of	 accountability,	 the	 background	 and	 history	 of	 the	 apartheid	 system	 in	 SA	will	 be	





Colonial	rule	 in	SA,	 in	common	with	much	of	the	rest	of	Africa,	 involved	segregation,	
racial	 discrimination	 and	 repression	 in	 the	 form	 of	 dispossession,	 denial	 and	
subordination.	 	 Thus,	 by	 1948	when	 the	 Afrikaner	 NP	 led	 by	 Daniel	Malan	won	 the	





the	 increasingly	harsh	treatment	of	 the	blacks.63	However,	 the	government	 ‘violently	




























‘succeeded	 in	 ‘making	 the	 townships	 ungovernable’	 through	 rent	 boycotts,	 school	
boycotts,	 demonstrations,	 strikes	 and	 other	 means.’70	 	 The	 perceived	 threat	 to	 the	
government	of	then-President	P.W.	Botha,	became	so	severe	that	a	nationwide	state	of	
emergency	was	declared	on	12th	June	1986	and	the	security	forces	were	elevated	to	a	
new	 level	 of	 authority	 within	 the	 government.71	 	 Crimes	 committed	 by	 police	 and	
military	hit	squads,	allegedly	with	the	knowledge	of	the	leaders	of	the	apartheid	regime,	



























apartheid	movement	 had	 reached	 stalemate	 or	what	 Gump	 describes	 as	 ‘a	 state	 of	
violent	equilibrium’.77		Neither	could	overcome	the	other:		the	state	could	not	govern	
without	maintaining	a	state	of	emergency	and	the	black	majority	could	not	overthrow	








the	ANC,	 the	Pan-African	Congress	 (PAC),	 the	SA	Communist	Party	and	other	groups	
were	 unbanned	 and	 political	 prisoners	 (including	 Nelson	 Mandela)	 were	 to	 be	
released.80	 In	 June	 1990,	 De	 Klerk	 announced	 the	 lifting	 of	 the	 four-year	 state	 of	

























Accord	 was	 signed	 by	 the	 government,	 ANC	 and	 IFP.	 	 On	 20th	 December	 1991,	 a	
negotiating	 forum	 comprising	 delegations	 from	 18	 political	 organisations	 (the	
Convention	 for	 a	 Democratic	 SA	 (CODESA))	 assembled	 at	 the	 World	 Trade	 Centre	
outside	 Johannesburg	 to	begin	 ‘real’	 talks88	which	 the	NP	 intended	would	produce	a	




would	 entrench	 white	 ‘minority’	 rights,	 ensure	 an	 NP	 veto	 on	 the	
introduction	of	 key	 legislation,	 and	 thereby	 allow	whites	 to	 cling	 to	 their	
historical	 political	 privileges.	 	 Their	 strategy	 was	 to	 use	 negotiations	 to	





















forces	 of	 the	 ANC/UDF.	 He	 cites	 the	 TRC	 Report,	 vol.3	 p187:	 ‘Deploying	 black	 surrogates	 to	 strike	 back	 at	 black	
insurgents	held	several	advantages	in	the	minds	of	South	African	strategists.		In	addition	to	helping	defeat	or	at	least	
weaken	insurgents,	such	an	approach	held	great	potential	value	as	a	propaganda	tool.		As	factional	conflict	escalated	





During	all	 the	months	of	negotiations,	 the	 focus	had	been	 the	 shape	of	 the	political	
system	in	the	new	SA	and	its	economic	structure	because	the	question	of	how	to	deal	
with	 the	 HR	 abuses	 committed	 during	 the	 apartheid	 regime	 was	 so	 divisive	 and	
controversial,	it	had	effectively	been	pushed	down	the	list	of	priorities.93		Nor	did	there	









August	 1992	 that	 ‘the	 discussion	 of	 amnesty	 should	 be	 reserved	 for	 “an	 interim	




































to	 the	 Constitution	 entitled	 ‘National	 Unity	 and	 Reconciliation’	 which	 contained	 an	
amnesty	clause.102	The	interim	Constitution	with	postamble	was	ratified	by	Parliament	
in	December	1993	and	the	first	non-racial	elections	in	SA	were	held	on	27th	April	1994.		




































the	majority	 of	 the	 SA	 population),	whether	 dissent	was	 heeded	 and	 respected	 and	
whether	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 TRC	 can	 justifiably	 be	 termed	 the	 democratically-





















outset	to	 involve	as	much	of	society	as	possible	 in	the	framing	of	the	 legislation	that	
would	bring	the	TRC	into	effect.109.			
	
With	 the	 assistance	of	 SA	non-governmental	 organisations	 (NGOs)	 such	 as	 Justice	 in	
Transition	 (JIT),	 the	government	made	great	efforts	 to	ensure	 there	was	widespread	
participation	in	the	preparatory	steps	for	the	TRC.		It	circulated	the	proposed	legislation	








many	weeks	 sifting	 through	 and	 publicly	 debating	 the	many	 submissions	 and	 issues	
before	the	draft	Bill	was	ready	to	be	introduced	to	Parliament.	 	Wilson	describes	the	
intervention	of	victims’	families	when	‘it	seemed	congressional	deputies	would	balk	at	
‘naming	names’	 in	 the	 final	 report’,	which	 they	successfully	opposed	on	 the	grounds	
they	had	the	right	to	know	the	names	of	the	killers	of	their	kin.112		Another	controversial	
area	 where	 civil	 society	 influenced	 the	 Committee	 was	 over	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	


















save	 for	 the	 IFP	which	abstained,	unconvinced	 that	 ‘even-handedness	would	prevail’	
and	the	extreme	right-wing	Freedom	Front	which	voted	against	because	it	had	argued	





The	procedure	 for	 appointing	 the	 commissioners	 had	been	 equally	 participative	 and	
transparent,	as	the	committee	established	by	President	Mandela	to	draw	up	a	short	list	
from	which	he	would	make	the	appointments	publicly	invited	nominations	of	suitable	
persons	 to	 serve.119	 The	 committee	 received	 299	 nominations	 and	 following	 public	































treatment	of	any	person’	which	 limited	 the	 investigation	 to	acts	which	were	already	
crimes	under	the	apartheid	state.	The	restriction	to	gross	HR	violations	meant	that	the	
‘everyday,	mundane	bureaucratic	enforcement’125	of	the	abusive	but	‘legal’	practices	of	







UN	Resolutions	 passed	 annually	 between	 1952	 and	 1990	 condemning	 the	 apartheid	













Dugard	 suggests	 two	 explanations	 for	 the	 decision:	 first,	 ‘the	 desire	 to	 avoid	 the	
suggestion	of	 ‘victor’s	 justice’’	 by	addressing	 crimes	 committed	on	both	 sides	of	 the	
struggle	and	second,	to	demonstrate	a	commitment	to	legality	and	the	rule	of	law	by	
avoiding	 the	 invalidation	 of	 apartheid	 laws	 retrospectively.127	 He	 bases	 the	 latter	
explanation	on	the	argument	that	‘the	apartheid	order	was	a	legal	order’,	so	most	of	the	
injustices	 were	 committed	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 law,	 notwithstanding	 they	 breached	




PNURA	decreed	 that	 the	 granting	 of	 amnesties	was	 to	 be	 facilitated	 by	 an	Amnesty	
Committee	(AC),	which	was	established	after	the	main	commission,	independently	of	it	






Constitution	which	 provided	 that	 everyone	 should	 have	 the	 right	 to	 have	 justiciable	
disputes	settled	by	a	court	of	law.		Furthermore,	the	applicants	argued	‘the	State	was	




In	 his	 ‘beautifully	 scripted’	 judgment,	Mahomed	 DP	 held	 that	 the	 postamble	 to	 the	












first	 time	the	Constitutional	Court	had	been	asked	to	 interpret	 the	Constitution	such	
that	the	setting	aside	of	a	statute	enacted	by	a	democratically	elected	Parliament	would	
result.135	Asmal	comments	‘[d]issent,	however	much	in	the	minority,	should	always	be	
taken	 seriously	 particularly	 when	 it	 is	 expressed	 by	 victims	 against	 so	 traumatic	 a	




duty	 under	 customary	 international	 law	 to	 prosecute	 the	 gross	 HR	 violations	 of	 the	
previous	regime	or	the	compatibility	of	the	postamble	amnesty	with	both	conventional	
and	customary	international	law.138	To	reiterate	an	earlier	observation,	as	SA	was	not	a	
party	 to	 relevant	 treaties	 (e.g.	 the	 Apartheid	 and	 Torture	 Conventions)	 at	 the	 time	










appointment	 but	 a	 commission	 established	 by	 a	 democratically-elected	 Parliament	
which	encouraged	the	full	 involvement	of	civil	society.		This	is	a	positive	factor	which	
















The	 PNURA	 established	 a	 TRC	 comprising	 three	 committees:	 the	 Human	 Rights	
Violations	 Committee	 (HRVC),	 the	 AC	 and	 the	 Reparations	 and	 Rehabilitation	
Committee	(R&RC).140		Two	principal	differences	between	the	committees	were	that	the	
HRVC	and	R&RC	focussed	on	victims;	the	AC	on	perpetrators	and	the	ACs	decisions	were	







was	 supported	 by	 an	 Investigative	 Unit	 which	 collaborated	 with	 the	 Research	
Department,	 conducting	 enquiries	 to	 establish	 the	 identity	 of	 victims	 and	
perpetrators,144	 and	 a	 sophisticated	witness-protection	 programme.145	 	 The	 TRC	had	
four	large	offices	nationwide	and	a	budget	of	US$18	million	for	its	first	two	and	a	half	
years,	making	it	larger	than	any	previous	TC	in	terms	of	size	and	reach.146		PNURA	gave	
the	 TRC	 power	 to	 subpoena	 witnesses,	 search	 premises	 and	 seize	 evidence.147		
Unfortunately,	often	it	chose	not	to	use	these	powers,	even	in	the	face	of	deliberate	


























people’s	homes.	 	Clearly,	 time	constraints	prevented	all	statement-givers	 from	giving	
evidence	in	public	hearings	so	2000	were	selected	as	‘an	appropriately	representative	
sample	of	the	whole	–	but	only	symbolically,	not	statistically.’	152	Posel	states	this	was	





The	 AC	 considered	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 and	 SA	 was	 the	 only	 state	 to	 link	 the	





amnesty,	 perpetrators	were	 exempted	 from	 criminal	 prosecutions	 and	 civil	 suits	 for	
																																																						





















Of	 the	 7116	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 received	 by	 the	 AC,	 4500	 were	 refused	 after	
administrative	 review	 mainly	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 political	 motive.160	 	 Those	 requesting	
amnesty	 for	 gross	 HR	 violations	 (as	 opposed	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 politically	motivated	
crimes	e.g.	criminal	damage)	had	to	appear	at	a	public	hearing	to	answer	questions	from	
the	 AC	 and	 the	 victims,	 their	 families	 or	 their	 legal	 representatives.161	 Sarkin	 has	
analysed	the	statistics	and	notes	‘[p]ublic	hearings	were	heard	on	2548	incidents,	which	
took	place	on	1888	days	at	267	venues	around	the	country,	using	1538	interpreters	who	




violations	 where	 a	 public	 hearing	 was	 required,	 amnesty	 was	 granted	 in	 84.3%	 of	
cases.165		
	





































institutions172	 and	 individuals173	 and	 their	 response	 to	 or	 participation	 in	 abusive	
practices.174		Other	special	hearings	dealt	with	issues	such	as	the	use	of	chemical	and	
biological	 weapons	 against	 opponents	 of	 the	 apartheid	 government,	 compulsory	
military	service,	political	party	policies	and	how	youth	and	women	were	affected	by	the	




















giving	 evidence	 about	 abuses	 suffered	 by	 women.177	 	 Despite	 encouragement,	
therefore,	women	were	giving	‘scant	account	of	their	own	suffering	or	experiences	of	
violence,	 least	 of	 all	 of	 sexual	 violation.’178	 The	 TRC	was	 thus	 portraying	 women	 as	
grieving	wives	and	mothers,	not	as	sufferers	of	numerous	abuses	themselves.179		Active	
pressure	 from	women’s	 organisations	 to	 ‘create	 an	 empowering	 and	non-victimising	































The	 days	 before	 its	 final	 release	were	 filled	with	 controversy	 as,	 in	 accordance	with	

































Pikoli,	 stated	 that	 ‘‘political	 interference’	was	 the	 reason	 that	 investigations	 in	 cases	









intending	 to	 challenge	 the	 ICC.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 SATRC	 was	 well-financed	 and	
resourced	and	was	highly	accessible	to	the	public	in	terms	of	victims	giving	statements,	
public	hearings	taking	place	across	the	country	and	extensive	media	coverage.	Further,	
the	 process	 was	 flexible	 and	 adaptable	 enabling	 changes	 to	 be	 made	 as	 required.	
However,	 the	 SATRC’s	 failure	 often	 to	 use	 its	 substantial	 powers	 to	 obtain	 evidence	
which	was	 viewed	 by	 some	 as	 prioritising	 reconciliation	 over	 truth.	 The	 discrepancy	
between	AC	decisions	taking	effect	immediately	and	being	binding	on	the	government	
whereas	 decisions	 of	 the	 HRVC	 and	 R&RC	were	 recommendations	 only	 also	 caused	
widespread	 frustration.	 	 However,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 the	 government’s	 failure	 to	
implement	 R&RC	 recommendations,	 particularly	 regarding	 reparations	 caused	 the	



























justifiably	 be	 accused	 of	 denying	 justice	 by	 preventing	 victims	 from	 seeking	 justice	
through	civil	or	criminal	courts.		To	counter	this	accusation,	it	could	be	argued	that	given	
the	transitional	context	in	which	the	SATRC	was	established,	insisting	that	the	grant	of	
























TRC196	 and	 having	 someone	 listen	 to	 and	 acknowledge	 their	 pain	 may	 have	 been	
cathartic	for	many	of	the	thousands	who	did	so.197		Minow	states	that	telling	one’s	story	
and	 being	 heard	without	 interruption	 or	 scepticism	 is	 ‘nowhere	more	 vital	 than	 for	
survivors	 of	 trauma’198	 although	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 this	 view	 is	 based	 on	 a	
‘Eurocentric	discourse	about	‘post-traumatic	stress’’199	and	does	not	take	into	account	
‘[a]ll	 cultural	 traditions	 have	 their	 own	 systems	 of	 psychological	 thought	 and	
practice.’200		
	
Despite	 its	best	 intentions,	however,	 the	SATRC	may	not	have	 fulfilled	 its	 restorative	
justice	aims.	 	Many	perpetrators	who	could	have	applied	to	the	TRC	for	amnesty	 for	
their	 crimes	 failed	 to	do	 so,	possibly	 in	 the	belief	 that	 it	was	unlikely	 they	would	be	
prosecuted	in	any	event.201	As	Ash	states,	‘[w]ithout	that	stick,	the	carrot	of	amnesty	is	
useless.’202	The	TRC’s	report	notes	that	no	application	was	received	from	any	member	
of	 the	 former	 national	 intelligence	 service,	 for	 example.203	 	 The	 PNURA	 terms	 of	
reference	 provided	 the	 potential	 for	 including	 high-ranking	 intellectual	 authors	 of	
atrocities,	as	they	included	‘an	attempt,	conspiracy,	incitement,	instigation,	command	


























escape	 prosecution,	 the	 requirement	 of	 full	 and	 frank	 admissions	 required	 them	 to	
confirm	 important	 truths	 about	 the	 past	 and	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 new	 information	 was	





The	 concept	 of	 justice	 for	 victims	 was	 undoubtedly	 stretched	 when	 unrepentant	
perpetrators	were	 granted	 amnesty	without	 expressing	 remorse	 and	 in	 some	 cases,	
quoted	‘ideological	justifications	for	their	acts	with	little	self-reflection	and	analysis.’210	
Theissen	 argues	 that	 public	 acceptance	 of	 the	 TRC	 would	 have	 increased	 and	 its	
decisions	would	have	been	compatible	with	international	law	if	the	AC	could	have	taken	
into	account	genuine	 remorse,	not	as	a	pre-condition	 for	amnesty	but	as	 criteria	 for	

























basic	 needs	 satisfied.217	 However,	 findings	 cannot	 be	 generalised	 because	 survivors’	
perceptions	 of	 justice	 were	 influenced	 by	 numerous	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 extent	 of	
discrimination,	 deprivation	 of	 economic	 opportunity	 and	 the	 reality	 and	 treatment	
experienced	during	apartheid.218			
	
In	 Chapter	 Three,	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 criminal	 trials	 to	 deal	 with	 widespread,	






Criminal	 courts,	by	 themselves,	may	not	be	suited	 to	 reveal	 the	broadest	
spectrum	of	 crimes	 that	 took	place	during	a	period	of	 repression,	 in	part	








families	 by	 identifying	 the	 wider	 implications	 of	 apartheid,	 including	 collective	













particular,	 identifying	 those	 elements	 of	 society	 who	 gained	 from	 ‘corrupting	 the	
system,	who	were	able	to	turn	links	to	public	power	to	private	advantage’.221		The	special	
hearing	on	the	business	community,	for	example,	enabled	the	TRC	to	report	that	‘a	vast	
body	 of	 evidence	 points	 to	 a	 central	 role	 for	 business	 interests	 in	 the	 elaboration,	
adoption,	implementation	and	modifications	of	apartheid	policies	throughout	its	dismal	
















The	 abuses	 suffered	 by	 the	 black	 majority	 in	 SA	 stemmed	 from	 a	 political	 regime	
enforced	 and	 supported	 by	 the	white	minority	who	 believed	 in	 the	 rightness	 of	 the	
apartheid	system	for	SA.226	 	The	negotiated	political	agreement	ended	apartheid	and	
the	 abuses	 associated	with	 it,	 so	 the	 SATRC	was	 not	 tasked	with	 putting	 an	 end	 to	
























such	 as	 avoiding	 defeat,	 territorial	 control	 and	 survival	 can	 outweigh	 the	 threat	 of	
prosecution	regardless	of	its	certainty.230	These	factors	did	not	apply	in	SA	as	apartheid	
ended	 by	 negotiation	 but	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 SATRC	 was	 established,	 its	
functionality	and	independence	did	enhance	its	credibility	and	many	perpetrators	were	
reluctant	to	be	identified	precisely	because	evidence	of	their	criminality	could	result	in	
them	being	discredited,	publicly	 censored	and	deprived	of	power;	 a	potential	 future	
deterrent	factor.231	Furthermore,	it	was	argued	in	Chapter	Three	that	‘offenders	commit	
more	atrocities	in	weak	states	because	they	have	more	opportunities	to	do	so	and	not	
because	 they	have	 a	 greater	 inclination	 to	 commit	 such	 atrocities’.232	 	 By	 examining	
apartheid	institutions,	publicising	the	past	abuses	and	suggesting	reforms,	by	identifying	


























TRC	 report	 contained	 over	 40	 pages	 of	 such	 recommendations235	 including	 ‘legal,	
administrative	 and	 institutional	 measures	 designed	 to	 prevent	 the	 recurrences	 of	
human	 rights	 abuses’236	 and	 suggested	 that	 ‘services	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 [this]	




































other	 TC	 at	 that	 time	 in	 incorporating	 psychological	 support	 into	 its	 operational	
structures’,	by	hiring	four	mental	health	professionals,	training	statement-takers	how	to	
respond	 to	 signs	 of	 trauma	 and	 hiring	 ‘briefers’	 to	 give	 constant	 support	 to	 those	
testifying	at	public	hearings.246		
	
It	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 that	 testifying	 before	 a	 formal	 criminal	 court	would	 be	 less	
traumatic	than	before	a	TRC	especially	since	trials	require	victims	to	undergo	the	ordeal	
of	 potentially	 hostile	 cross-examination.	 	 Furthermore,	 victims	 are	witnesses	 for	 the	
prosecution,	rarely	permitted	to	narrate	their	story,	 instead	obliged	to	give	yes	or	no	
answers	 to	questions	designed	 to	establish	 the	 guilt	 or	 innocence	of	 the	 accused.247		




















De	Greiff	 agrees	 the	 contribution	of	 TCs	 to	 the	 restoration	of	 dignity	 and	 justice	 for	
victims	has	proved	 to	be	 significant	 in	many	of	 the	 countries	where	 they	have	been	
implemented.250	In	his	report,	he	notes	that:		
	
Giving	 a	 “voice”	 to	 and	 empowering	 victims	 […]	 to	 tell	 their	 stories	 […]	
thereby	giving	them	a	place	in	the	public	sphere	for	the	very	first	time	[…]	is	




Another	 factor	 when	 considering	 justice	 and	 dignity	 for	 victims	 is	 the	 role	 of	 the	
beneficiaries	 of	 apartheid	 and	 their	 collective	 responsibility.	 	 The	 extensive	 media	



















right	 to	 truth	 is	 concerned,	 the	 amnesty	 process	 allowed	 victims	 greater	 access	 to	
information	than,	for	example,	the	failed	prosecutions	of	Malan	and	his	cohorts.253	
	
One	 important	 element	of	 securing	 justice	 and	dignity	 for	 victims	 is	 the	payment	of	
reparations,	 the	 aim	 of	 which	 is	 ‘to	 empower	 individuals	 and	 communities	 to	 take	
control	 of	 their	 own	 lives.’254	 	 Reparations	 include	 not	 only	 monetary	 payments	 to	
victims	 but	 health	 and	 social	 services,	 memorials	 and	 other	 acts	 of	 symbolic	
commemoration.		The	ICC	can	order	a	convicted	person	to	pay	compensation	and	make	
other	reparation	to	victims255	and	a	Trust	Fund	has	been	established	for	cases	where	the	





In	 contrast,	 the	 SATRC’s	 report	 contained	 detailed	 and	 comprehensive	
recommendations	 for	a	 reparations	programme	specifically	 geared	 to	 the	needs	and	
aspirations	 of	 the	 whole	 victim	 community.	 	 In	 advance	 of	 its	 publication,	 the	
Commission	met	the	government	to	discuss	its	proposals	and	obtain	the	government’s	
commitment	 to	 implement	 them.258	 	 Having	 done	 so,	 the	 Commission	 publicised	
advance	information	about	their	recommendations.	
	
Unfortunately,	 this	 action	 backfired	 on	 the	 TRC	 when	 victims	 were	 left	 angry	 and	
frustrated	 by	 the	 government’s	 delay	 in	 implementing	 the	 reparation	 proposals,	
especially	 when	 they	 saw	 how	 swiftly	 successful	 applications	 for	 amnesty	 were	
granted.259	 Five	 years	 after	 the	 TRC’s	 first	 report,	 the	 government	 implemented	 a	
significantly	more	modest	reparations	programme,	blaming	a	depressed	economy	and	











rather	 than	 the	$21,000	 recommended	by	 the	 TRC	and	no	additional	 recommended	
services.260	Sarkin	states	that	the	issue	of	reparations	was	crucial	as	‘for	many	victims	
the	reparations	aspect	of	the	TRC’s	work	was	fundamental’	so	the	government’s	stance	










































































To	 this	 criticism	 can	 be	 added	 that	 of	 Mamdani	 who,	 because	 the	 TRC	 ‘ignor[ed]	
everything	that	was	distinctive	about	apartheid	and	its	machinery	of	violence’270	derides	
the	TRC’s	‘diminished	truth’	as	having	been	‘established	through	narrow	lenses,	crafted	







the	 report	 reads	 ‘less	as	a	history,	more	a	moral	narrative	about	 the	 fact	of	a	moral	
wrongdoing	 across	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 spawned	 by	 the	 overriding	 evil	 of	 the	
apartheid	 system’.273	 	 The	 difficulty	 for	 the	 TRC	 was	 that	 expectations	 for	 a	
comprehensive,	detailed	narrative	of	individual	and	community	histories	conflicted	with	
its	 goals	 of	 nation-building	 and	 of	 creating	 a	 shared	 national	 history	which	 required	
merely	a	sample	of	the	truth;	just	enough	to	demonstrate	past	violations	and	achieve	




Another	 difficulty	 was	 the	 TRC’s	 mandate	 to	 reveal	 truths	 in	 the	 interests	 of	
‘reconciliation’	 conflicted	 with	 the	 awareness	 that	 rather	 than	 forgiveness	 and	














Notwithstanding	 the	 criticisms,	 the	 five-volume	 report	 produced	 by	 the	 SATRC	 was	





met	 by	 TCs	 than	 prosecutions	 because	 TCs	 ‘widen	 the	 lenses,	 sifting	 varieties	 of	
evidentiary	materials	and	drafting	syntheses	of	factual	material	that	usually	does	not	


















identified	 ‘no	 direct	 link	 between	 criminal	 trials	 […]	 and	 reconciliation’	 because	























a	 collective	 conscience,	which	 is	 the	 repository	 of	 a	 collective	memory.’285	 A	 lack	 of	








signs	 and	 pamphlets	 at	 public	 meetings	 proclaiming	 ‘Truth,	 The	 Road	 to	














some	 hearings	 witnessed	 moving	 examples	 of	 forgiveness	 and	 reconciliation	 at	
individual	 and	 community	 level,	 particularly	 where	 perpetrators	 showed	 real	
remorse,291	after	the	TRC	concluded	 its	work,	the	general	 feeling	was	 it	had	failed	to	
achieve	widespread	 reconciliation,	national	or	 inter-personal.	 	 Indeed,	 long	before	 it	
delivered	its	final	report,	the	TRC	acknowledged	that	this	aim	had	been	unrealistic	and	

















would	 make	 no	 difference.296	 The	 researchers	 state	 these	 findings	 suggested	 ‘fairly	
widespread	scepticism’	about	the	effectiveness	of	 the	TRC's	attempts	to	assist	South	


























Including	 the	 word	 ‘reconciliation’	 in	 the	 TC’s	 title	 possibly	 created	 unrealistic	
expectations	that	reconciliation	would	be	achieved	solely	by	the	Commission’s	work.303	
Healing,	 national	 unity	 and	 reconciliation	 depend	 on	 a	 state’s	 political,	 social	 and	
economic	 future	and	are	processes	achieved	by	 the	whole	community,	possibly	over	
decades.304	 SA	 has	 experienced	 over	 20	 years	 of	 democracy,	 transitioning	 from	
apartheid	 with	 remarkably	 little	 bloodshed,	 a	 crucial	 factor	 being	 the	 TRC,	 which	
provided	 a	 framework	 within	 which	 steps	 for	 societal	 change	 could	 be	 taken.	 A	
comprehensive	 evaluation	 of	 the	 SATRC’s	 contribution	 towards	 reconciliation	would	
require	 assessment	 of	 a	 far	 wider	 range	 of	 activities	 and	 sources,	 305	 however,	 a	
fundamental	requirement	for	any	future	TC	should	be	that	it	is	framed	to	provide	the	



































criminalisation	 in	 society	 but	 would	 have	 linked	 HR	 to	 popular	




























SA’s	 transition	 from	 authoritarianism	 to	 democracy	 was	 different	 from	many	 states	
because	 although	 it	 had	 suffered	 extreme	 political	 violence,	 apartheid	 ended	 by	
negotiation.	 	 However,	 had	 a	 TRC	 not	 been	 agreed	 as	 the	 acceptable	 means	 of	
addressing	the	HR	violations	committed	under	apartheid,	peace	talks	may	have	failed	
and	the	risk	of	prolonged	violence	in	SA	would	have	heightened.		Once	apartheid	ended	
and	 the	 country	 had	 a	 democratically-elected	 president,	 the	 need	 for	 politically	
motivated	violence	ended.		It	would	be	fair,	therefore,	to	credit	some	of	the	success	of	
the	 transition	 to	 the	 establishment	 and	 operation	 of	 the	 TRC.	 	 Further,	 the	 reforms	





















political	 transitions,	 justice	 is	defined	by	 the	nature	of	 the	 injustices	 suffered	 in	 that	
State,	 so	 it	 is	 always	 contextual,	 a	 factor	 which	 the	 ICC	 must	 acknowledge.	 	 SA	
experienced	decades	of	oppression	and	violent	HR	abuses	which	left	its	society	deeply	








There	are	 features	of	 the	 SATRC	 that	 should	be	 improved,	 lessons	 to	be	 learned	 for	
future	TCs,	some	of	which	were	beyond	the	control	of	the	Commission.		The	failure	to	
deal	properly	with	the	issue	of	reparations,	for	example,	was	a	serious	mistake	of	the	













The	 impact	of	 testifying	differed	between	witnesses,	with	some	benefitting	 from	the	
acknowledgment	 and	 support	 the	 TRC	 gave	 them	 and	 others	 having	 a	 negative	 or	
detrimental	experience.		Whether	testifying	at	an	ICC	trial	would	be	less	traumatic	for	
the	 latter	 group	 is	 unlikely	 but	 certainly	 future	 TCs	 should	 offer	 improved	 support	
(including	follow-up	contact)	for	witnesses,	to	ensure	their	physical	and	psychological	
well-being.	 	Another	 area	 for	 improvement	 is	 the	 SATRC’s	 limited	gender	 sensitivity,	







by	 imposing	 a	 condition	 that	 once	 a	 criminal	 investigation	 has	 commenced,	 the	






















objective	 and	 ‘proportionality’.320	 	 He	 concludes	 that	 amnesty	 hearings	 achieved	





Notwithstanding	 these	 issues,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 SATRC	 demonstrated	 a	
willingness	to	explore	an	alternative	way	of	addressing	the	inequities	of	the	past	which	
was	 rooted	 in	 restorative	 rather	 than	 retributive	 justice	 and	 this	 was	




future	 TC	 would	 have	 to	 address	 these	 issues,	 to	 satisfy	 the	 ICC’s	 demands	 for	
accountability	and	justice.		Whether	the	existence	of	the	ICC	and	threat	of	international	







Commissions	 face	 greater	 challenges	 carrying	 out	 their	mandates	 in	 post-conflict	 as	
opposed	 to	 post-authoritarian	 societies’	 where	 the	 state	 has	 perpetuated	 abuses	
against	its	citizens.322		In	post-conflict	societies,	weak	institutions	combined	with	huge	











should	 acknowledge	 that	 transitional	 context	 can	 determine	 the	 transitional	 justice	
mechanism	chosen	by	the	state	to	deal	with	its	past.	
	
Accordingly,	 the	 ICC’s	 assessment	 should	 acknowledge	 national	 support,	 particularly	
from	victims,	for	a	state’s	proposal	that	a	TC	address	past	HR	violations.		It	should	ensure	

































would	 intervene.	 	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 situations	 like	 SA	 require	 flexibility	 of	



















Court	 should	 defer	 prosecutions.	 The	 outstanding	 questions	 now	 arising	 from	 this	
enquiry	are:	if	a	state	challenges	the	admissibility	of	a	case	based	on	an	AJM,	will	the	
Court	 assess	 the	 AJM’s	 potential	 to	 attain	 ICJ	 goals	 that	 are	 attributed	 to	 criminal	








jurisprudence	of	 the	Court	will	 be	 examined	 to	discover	 the	 factors	 ICC	 judges	have	
applied	to	date	when	considering	admissibility	challenges	and	to	gauge	the	likelihood	of	


























question	 of	 admissibility	 does	 not	 arise.	 	 The	 ICC’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crimes	 of	
genocide,	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	 war	 crimes4	 came	 into	 effect	 when	 the	 RSt	
entered	into	force	on	1st	July	2002,5	does	not	apply	retrospectively6	and	no	statute	of	
























reverse	wording	of	 the	article	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 all	 cases	are	admissible	 to	 the	 ICC	













consideration	 should	 also	 be	 given	 to	 the	 social	 alarm	 caused	 to	 the	
international	community	by	the	relevant	type	of	conduct)?	



































be	 considered	when	 assessing	 gravity	 in	 connection	with	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case	
rather	unclear.		Reference	to	the	travaux	préparatoires	provides	some	guidance	since	
during	 International	 Law	 Commission	 discussions	 in	 1994,	 it	was	 suggested	 that	 the	













might	 be	 swamped	 by	 peripheral	 complaints	 involving	 minor	 offenders,	 possibly	 in	
situations	where	the	major	offenders	were	going	free.’24	This	would	suggest	that	PTC1’s	
interpretation	 of	 the	 gravity	 provision	 is	 correct,	 although	 deGuzman	 states	 PTC1’s	
‘exceptionally	high	gravity	threshold	risked	detracting	from	the	Court’s	ability	to	fulfil	its	
most	important	objectives’.25		However,	given	that	all	crimes	within	the	jurisdiction	of	








































makes	 it	 grave.’33	 	PTC2	also	 relied	on	 the	aggravating	circumstance	 to	be	 taken	 into	












assist	 the	 state	 relying	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 complementarity	 to	 retain	 jurisdiction	 in	

























Article	17	confirms,	 therefore,	 that	 the	Court’s	 function	 is	 complementary	 to	 that	of	
national	jurisdictions,	which	means	it	is	a	state	with	jurisdiction	and	not	the	ICC	that	has	
the	first	and	overriding	right	and	responsibility	to	investigate	and	prosecute	a	case	and	
this	 right	 can	 only	 be	 overridden	 by	 the	 ICC	 if	 the	 state	 is	 inactive	 or	 if	 the	 Court	
determines	that	the	state	is	not	exercising	its	right	with	the	genuine	purpose	of	bringing	
the	 accused	 to	 justice.	 	 The	 Article	 17	 exception	 to	 the	 supremacy	 of	 national	
jurisdictions	 therefore	 states	 a	 case	 is	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC	 unless	 ‘the	 State	 is	
unwilling	or	unable	genuinely	to	carry	out	the	investigation	or	prosecution’.35	Likewise,	




The	 RSt	 provides	 guidance	 on	 what	 constitutes	 ‘unwillingness’	 and	 ‘inability’	 to	
investigate	or	prosecute	‘genuinely’.	 	Unwillingness	is	demonstrated	by	proceedings37	












of	 the	 national	 judicial	 system	 which	 prevents	 the	 state	 obtaining	 the	 accused	 or	
evidence	and	testimony	or	being	otherwise	unable	to	conduct	the	proceedings.39	
	
Crucially	 for	 a	 state	 wishing	 to	 mount	 a	 challenge,	 the	 ICC	 is	 the	 sole	 arbiter	 of	
jurisdictional	 and	 admissibility	 issues	 and	 the	 Court	 ‘shall	 satisfy	 itself	 that	 it	 has	
jurisdiction	in	any	case	brought	before	it’	and	‘may,	on	its	own	motion,	determine	the	
admissibility	of	a	 case’.40	This	 suggests	 that	 the	Court	may	 ‘use	 its	own	autonomous	
criteria	and	standards	to	assess’	whether	an	AJM	satisfies	the	requirements	of	ICJ	and	is	
compatible	with	the	RSt,	which	could	result	in	the	Court	deciding	that	the	state’s	AJM	is	


























accept	 any	 attempt	 by	 a	 state	 to	 avoid	 its	 duty	 to	 prosecute	 genocide	 and	 grave	
breaches	of	 the	Geneva	Conventions	by	means	of	an	AJM	but	there	has	been	a	shift	
from	 an	 international	 endorsement	 of	 blanket	 amnesties	 to	 a	 rejection	 of	 them	 for	
serious	 international	crimes.43	 	Furthermore,	 the	RSt’s	Preamble	recalls	 that	 ‘it	 is	 the	
duty	 of	 every	 state	 to	 exercise	 its	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 over	 those	 responsible	 for	







a	 general	 ‘situation’	 under	 consideration,	 to	 the	 ‘case’	 stage	where	 individuals	 have	
been	identified	for	prosecution.45		In	this	section,	it	has	been	seen	that	there	are	several	
factors	arising	from	both	treaty	 (including	the	RSt	 itself)	and	customary	 international	
law	which	the	ICC	will	have	to	consider	when	asked	to	adjudicate	on	whether	to	defer	



























None	 of	 these	 three	 trigger	 mechanisms	 automatically	 activates	 an	 investigation,	


























reconsider.53	 	 If,	 however,	 the	 Prosecutor’s	 decision	 is	 based	 on	 it	 not	 being	 in	 the	





If	 the	Prosecutor	decides	 that	 the	preliminary	examination	does	 reveal	 a	 reasonable	
basis	to	proceed	with	an	investigation,	she	does	not	need	to	inform	the	PTC	unless	she	
initially	acted	proprio	motu,	 in	which	case,	 she	must	obtain	 the	authority	of	 the	PTC	
before	commencing	the	investigation.56		The	PTC	must	agree	that	there	is	a	reasonable	
basis	 to	 proceed	with	 an	 investigation	 and	 that	 the	 case	 ‘appears	 to	 fall	 within	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Court’57	before	it	grants	authorisation,	which	is	‘without	prejudice	to	
subsequent	 determinations	 […]	with	 regard	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 of	 a	
case.’58		The	court	has	full	discretion	in	determining	whether	or	not	this	‘appearance’	
exists	and	will	exercise	its	discretion	by	examining	the	supporting	material59	provided	




SPs	 as	 well	 as	 those	 states	 who	 would	 normally	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crimes	
concerned	(i.e.	a	non-SP)	of	her	 intention	to	commence	an	 investigation	proper.	This	
notification	may	provide	only	limited	information	(to	protect	persons	and	evidence	or	































preparing	 its	 response	 but	 this	 will	 not	 extend	 the	 one-month	 time-limit	 so	 the	
Prosecutor	 is	 required	 to	 deal	 with	 any	 such	 request	 ‘on	 an	 expedited	 basis’.65	 The	
Prosecutor	also	is	entitled	to	request	further	information	from	the	state	relating	to	its	
investigation,	 if	 necessary.66	 At	 this	 stage,	 however	 it	 is	 the	 investigation	 being	
conducted	by	the	state	that	is	under	review,	not	the	outcome	of	the	investigation.			
	
When	 the	Prosecutor	 receives	 information	 from	the	 state	 that	 it	 is	 investigating	and	
requests	 the	 ICC	 to	 defer,	 it	 seems	 (although	 it	 is	 not	 explicit	 in	 the	 RSt)	 that	 her	
investigation	must	cease	immediately	in	deference	to	the	national	proceedings,	that	is,	
the	 case	 becomes	 inadmissible	 to	 the	 ICC.	 	 There	 is,	 however,	 provision	 for	 the	
Prosecutor	 to	 apply	 to	 the	 PTC	 for	 authorization	 to	 commence	 an	 investigation	

















the	preservation	or	obtaining	of	evidence	where	 there	 is	 a	 ‘significant	 risk	 that	 such	
evidence	 may	 not	 be	 subsequently	 available’.70	 The	 hearing	 by	 the	 PTC	 of	 this	
application	for	authority	is	held	ex	parte	and	in	camera	and	the	PTC’s	ruling	has	to	be	









or	 ability	 to	 carry	 out	 its	 investigation	 genuinely.73	 These	 provisions	 give	 the	 ICC	 a	
continuing	right	to	monitor	the	state’s	investigation	and	to	step	in	if	the	Court	considers	
the	 state	 is	 not	 acting	 genuinely.	 	 It	 also	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 assessment	 of	
















for	 the	 State	 to	 challenge	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 after	 the	 Prosecutor’s	
investigation,	where	a	‘case’	has	been	identified	against	specific	suspect(s)	for	specific	
conduct.	To	reflect	the	on-going	nature	of	the	principle	of	complementarity,	even	if	a	
State	 has	 unsuccessfully	 challenged	 the	 Court’s	 intervention	 under	 Article	 18,	 it	 is	


















as	 the	 Chamber	 is	 constituted”,	 see	 The	 Prosecutor	 v	 Germain	 Katanga	 and	Matthieu	 Ngudjolo	 Chui	 (Katanga)	
Reasons	for	the	Oral	Decision	on	the	Motion	Challenging	the	Admissibility	of	the	Case	(Article	19	of	the	Statute)	ICC-
01/04-01/07-1213-tENG	16	June	2009,	para.	49;	whereas	TCh1	in	Lubanga,	decided	that	“[…]	the	true	opening	of	the	





















would	 have	 to	 satisfy	 the	 Court	 of	 the	 genuineness	 of	 the	 AJM	 process	 and	 that	 it	
provided	 both	 accountability	 and	 justice	 for	 victims.	 	 Prior	 to	 confirmation	 of	 the	






any	other	proceedings	are	heard.81	Details	of	 the	challenge	must	be	provided	 to	 the	
Prosecutor	and	the	accused82	both	of	whom	may	submit	written	observations	within	a	
time-limit	imposed	by	the	Chamber.83		The	Prosecutor	can	only	request	a	review	of	a	
decision	 that	 a	 case	 is	 inadmissible	 if	 new	 facts	 arise	which	negate	 the	basis	of	 that	
decision84	 in	 which	 case,	 the	 state	 whose	 challenge	 to	 admissibility	 resulted	 in	 the	




























the	 ICC	 are	 made	 and	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 these	 differ	 depending	 on	 the	 stage	 the	













have	 significantly	 restricted	 the	potential	 for	 success	of	any	challenge	mounted	by	a	
state	ultimately	desiring	to	deal	with	offenders	who	have	committed	crimes	within	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	ICC	by	mean	of	AJMs.		Before	considering	these	challenges,	the	first	















unless	 the	 State	 is	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 genuinely	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 investigation	 or	
prosecution”91	 but	 the	 point	 has	 led	 to	 considerable	 academic	 debate,	 with	 some	











This	 was	 not,	 however,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 17	 put	 forward	 in	 the	 Informal	
expert	paper	prepared	at	the	request	of	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	in	2003.	The	
experts	advised	that	although	it	was	common	to	concentrate	on	the	‘unwilling	or	unable’	






































It	 is	 argued,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 17(1)(a)	 was	 a	 matter	 of	




































d’Ivoire	 also	 confirmed	 that	 it	 was	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 try	 Mrs	 Gbagbo	 for	 those	
offences.108	 	 On	 11th	 December	 2014,	 PTC1	 rejected	 Côte	 d’Ivoire’s	 challenge,	
concluding	that	Côte	d’Ivoire	was	not	taking	‘tangible,	concrete	and	progressive	steps’	

































In	 rejecting	 Côte	 d’Ivoire’s	 appeal,	 the	 ACh	 re-confirmed	 the	 two-step	 analysis	
requirement	 of	 Article	 17(1)(a)	 and	 further,	 that	 the	 expression	 ‘the	 case	 is	 being	
investigated’	requires	the	‘taking	of	steps’	directed	at	ascertaining	whether	the	person	
is	 responsible	 for	 the	 alleged	 conduct,	 for	 instance	 ‘by	 interviewing	 witnesses	 or	
suspects,	collecting	documentary	evidence,	or	carrying	out	forensic	analyses’.114	 	This	




The	 RSt	 offers	 no	 assistance	 on	 what	 constitutes	 ‘investigative	 steps’	 although,	
acknowledging	the	vagueness	of	information	provided	by	the	Prosecutor	to	a	state	at	
the	preliminary	examination	stage,	RPE	52(1)	provides	that	‘subject	to	the	limitations	
















Admissibility	 at	 the	 situation	 phase	 should	 be	 assessed	 against	 certain	
criteria	defining	a	‘potential	case’	such	as:	(i)	the	groups	of	persons	involved	
that	are	likely	to	be	the	focus	of	an	investigation	for	the	purpose	of	shaping	
















case.122	 This	 means,	 the	 ACh	 clarified,	 the	 state	 must	 demonstrate	 a	 conflict	 of	
jurisdiction	 i.e.	 show	 the	 same	 case	 is	 being	 investigated	by	both	 the	Court	 and	 the	
state.123		
	
In	 Lubanga,	PTC1	 held	 that	 ‘same	 case’	 requires	 the	 state	 to	 show	 that	 its	 national	
proceedings	‘encompass	both	the	person	and	the	conduct	which	is	the	subject	of	the	
case	before	the	Court’.124	The	ACh	tempered	this	requirement	slightly	by	ruling	that	the	























were	 ongoing	 at	 the	 time	 the	 admissibility	 challenge	was	 lodged	 at	 the	 ICC	 and	 are	
continuing,	 together	 with	 promises	 of	 reports	 to	 be	 provided	 to	 the	 Court	 as	 the	
investigations	progress.127		Furthermore,	the	Court	will	not	allow	a	state	to	amend	an	
admissibility	 challenge	 or	 to	 submit	 additional	 supporting	 evidence	 just	 because	 the	
state	made	 the	challenge	prematurely.128	The	ACh	noted	 that	despite	PTC2	having	a	













investigation	progresses,	 as	 to	 the	 steps	 it	 is	 taking	 to	 investigate	a	 case.		

























interpretation	 of	 the	 RSt	 relating	 to	 admissibility,	 have	 been	 prescriptive.	 At	 the	
preliminary	examination	stage,	 they	have	demanded	evidence	of	 ‘tangible,	 concrete,	
progressive	steps’	taken	by	states	to	investigate	the	situation	before	the	ICC	and	at	the	
case	 stage,	 information	 detailing	 the	 ‘specificity	 and	 probative	 value’	 of	 the	 state’s	
investigation	must	be	provided	to	confirm	to	the	Court’s	satisfaction	that	precisely	the	
same	person	is	being	investigated	for	substantially	the	same	conduct.		Furthermore,	by	











over	 the	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 the	 crimes	within	 the	 Court’s	 jurisdiction.		









show	 it	 is	 acting	 in	 relation	 to	 that	 same	 matter	 and	 easier	 for	 the	 ICC	 to	 assert	
admissibility.133	Additionally,	the	Court’s	refusal	to	permit	amendments	or	the	filing	of	

































challenged	 and	 the	 state	 was	 not	 required	 to	 demonstrate	 what	 investigatory	 or	
prosecution	steps	it	had	taken	regarding	the	suspect	and	the	conduct.139		When	the	same	
test	is	then	applied	to	compare	a	case	before	the	ICC	with	a	state’s	domestic	proceedings,	
she	 argues	 ‘the	 Court	 will	 come	 to	 wrong	 and	 even	 absurd	 results,	 potentially	



























expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 approach,	 arguing	 that	 it	 could	
preclude	 a	 state	 from	 focusing	 its	 investigations	 on	 a	 wider	 scope	 of	 activities,	 or	





Clearly,	 the	 Court’s	 assertive	 use	 of	 its	 judicial	 power	 risks	 antagonising	 states	 upon	
which	 it	 relies	 for	 co-operation,	 especially	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 its	 own	 enforcement	
methods,	as	has	already	been	seen	from	the	discontent	expressed	by	the	African	Union	




would	 give	 states	 ‘a	 margin	 of	 appreciation	 in	 selecting	 crimes’148	 and	 proposed	 a	
combination	 of	 a	 ‘comparative	 gravity-test’149	 and	 ‘comprehensive	 conduct-test’150	
































































a	 State	 that	 declares	 itself	willing	 and	able	 to	 conduct	 criminal	 proceedings,	 so	how	
much	 more	 robust	 would	 the	 Court	 be	 when	 faced	 with	 a	 challenge	 based	 on	 a	
transitioning	state’s	intention	to	rely	on	AJMs	rather	than	trials?		Once	the	ICC	becomes	
seised	of	a	case,	current	jurisprudence	shows	that	a	state	wishing	to	assert	its	judicial	
primacy	 is	 required	 to	 provide	 concrete,	 tangible	 proof	 of	 the	 steps	 it	 is	 taking	 to	
investigate	the	same	suspects	for	the	same	criminal	conduct	as	the	ICC.		Promises	and	
assurances	are	insufficient:	to	satisfy	the	Court,	states	are	required	to	provide	adequate	
evidence	 of	 degree	 of	 specificity	 and	 probative	 value.	 	 The	 RSt	 does	 not	 define	 the	
standard	of	proof	for	the	purposes	of	a	determination	on	the	admissibility	of	a	case,	so	
















take	 to	 AJMs	 that	 the	 RSt	 should	 include	 specific	 provisions	 for	 AJMs	 such	 as	 TRCs	
otherwise	an	omission	might	open	the	door	to	international	prosecution.162	
	




amnesties	 and	 reparations.	 	 How	 the	 Court	 addresses	 AJMs	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
complementarity	principle	is	yet	to	be	seen	but	given	their	global	rise	in	popularity	and	














The	 intention	 of	 this	 thesis	 has	 not	 been	 to	 question	 the	 role	 of	 the	 International	
Criminal	Court	(ICC)	as	a	protector	of	individual	human	rights	and	punisher	of	those	who	
violate	 them.	 	 It	 has,	 however,	 sought	 to	 discuss	 a	 new	perspective	 of	 international	
criminal	justice	(ICJ)	so	that	a	more	adaptable,	contextually-sensitive	approach	for	states	
transitioning	 from	 conflict	 or	 authoritarian	 rule	 to	 peace	 and	 democracy	 can	 be	




withdrawal	 from	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 in	 protest.1	 	 This	 thesis	 has	 suggested	 that	 to	
facilitate	co-operation	and	support	from	States	Parties	in	the	global	search	for	ICJ,	the	









both	 to	 domestic	 retributive	 justice	 theories	 and	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 transitional	 justice	













western	 notions	 of	 justice	 is	 that	 they	 fail	 to	 punish	 the	 perpetrators	 of	 heinous	
international	crimes.	 	For	proponents	of	retributive	 justice,	 this	 fact	alone	makes	the	
predominantly	 restorative	 justice	 focus	 of	 AJMs	 unsuitable	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	
perpetrators	of	human	rights	abuses.2	The	primacy	of	retributive	justice	can	be	seen	in	
the	Preamble	to	the	Rome	Statute	(RSt),	which	explicitly	states	that	it	is	the	duty	of	every	











of	 this	 thesis.8	 	 Chapter	 Three	 discussed	 the	 currency	 of	 the	 Kantian	 deontological	
retributive	approach	to	international	criminal	law9	and	it	is	argued	here	that	the	ICC	is	

















moral	 agency’.12	 Kant’s	 view	 of	 cosmopolitanism	 and	 world	 citizenship	 ‘involves	 a	
utopian	 anticipation	 of	 world	 peace	 to	 be	 attained	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 increased	
communication	among	human	beings’,13	through	which	communication,	‘a	violation	of	
rights	 in	 one	 place	 is	 felt	 throughout	 the	 world’.14	 	 Primarily,	 therefore,	 Kant’s	
cosmopolitan	citizenship	grants	rights	simply	by	virtue	of	being	human.15	 	For	Kant,	a	
just	world	is:	
one	 in	 which	 cosmopolitan	 principles	 of	 justice	 are	 realistically	
institutionalised,	and	this	will	be	a	world	in	which	boundaries	are	not	absent,	
but	also	one	in	which	there	are	further	institutional	structures	which	support	
international	 justice	 between	 states	 and	 cosmopolitan	 justice	 for	 people	
when	they	interact	across	borders.16		
	
In	 these	 terms	 both	 the	 ICC	 and	 the	United	Nations	 (UN)	 itself	 can	 be	 described	 as	
cosmopolitan	 institutions.	 	 The	 1948	Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (UDHR)	
evidences	the	evolution	of	this	global	civil	society,	transitioning	it	‘from	international	to	
cosmopolitan	norms	of	justice.’17		Since	1948,	the	UN	has	continued	to	promote	human	
rights	 (HR)18	 grounded	 in	 Kant’s	 philosophy	 of	 global	 citizenship.19	 However,	 the	
arguments	for	universality	based	on	the	homogeneity	of	human	beings	have	not	found	
‘universal’	approval.	Tibi,	 for	example,	comments,	 ‘[e]xisting	civilisations	and	cultures	




























as	 extensions	 of	 the	 Western	 rationalist	 project	 which,	 through	 promulgating	
universality,	 ignore	 the	 diversity	 of	mankind	 and	 the	 culturally	 contingent	 nature	 of	
law.23	Allen	and	MacDonald	comment	that:	
	
Today,	despite	a	more	moderate	 relativist	position	 that	 tells	us	 there	are	
overlapping	values	from	which	we	might	be	able	to	identify	a	common	core	
of	human	rights	principles,	there	does	remain	concern	that	human	rights	law	




In	 Africa,	 for	 example,	 vigorous	 debate	 has	 focussed	 on	 whether	 human	 rights	 are	
individual	 or	 collective	 and	 whether	 socio-economic	 rights	 have	 priority	 over	 the	
individual	 civil-political	 freedoms	 which	 are	 emphasised	 in	 the	West.25	 	 The	 African	
(Banjul)	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	produced	by	African	political	leaders26	
reflects	African	assertions	that	in	their	societies,	‘peoples’	not	individuals,	have	rights	






















from	 gaining	 cross-cultural	 legitimacy’30	 and	 the	 right	 of	 one	 culture	 to	 ‘define	 and	
impose	on	others	what	it	deems	good	for	humanity’	will	only	serve	to	abrogate	the	very	











Matua	 suggests	 that	 states’	 ratification	 could	 mean	 they	 ‘are	 bowing	 to	 a	 false	
international	consensus	because	 in	some	sense	their	statehood	and	belonging	to	the	



























This	 universalism	 versus	 relativism	 dichotomy	 epitomises	 the	 problematic	 issue	 that	
criminal	prosecutions	are	the	only	justice	systems	which	have	been	conditioned	by	Post-
Enlightenment	ideas	about	HR	and	there	is	a	clear	conflict	between	the	ICC	as	a	Kantian	
concept	 of	 justice	 and	 ‘traditional’	 variants	which	 still	 flourish	 in	many	 areas	 of	 the	
world.	 	Whatever	 our	 views	 about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 community-based	models	 of	
justice,	the	problem	which	must	be	addressed	is	that	it	now	seems	impossible	(and	many	




due	 regard	 must	 be	 given	 to	 indigenous	 and	 informal	 traditions	 for	







(and	unfair)	 to	 assess	AJMs	 to	 these	 standards.38	 	 Certainly,	 there	are	 concerns	 that	












international	 standards	 will	 effectively	 eradicate	 the	 very	 qualities	 that	 make	 them	
distinctive	 as	 local	 and	 culturally	 relevant.39	 	 In	 Chapter	 Five,	 for	 example,	 the	






Supporters	 of	 restorative	 justice	 and	 specifically	 of	 AJMs	 argue	 that	 adherence	 to	 a	
blueprint	for	international	criminal	justice	(ICJ)	demonstrates	disregard	for	non-Western	
cultural	 and	 historical	 tradition40	 	 and	 this	 thesis	 has	 argued	 that	 respect	 should	 be	
accorded	 to	 demands	 for	 justice	 mechanisms	 that	 function	 at	 local	 rather	 than	
international	 level.	 	This	will	require	the	ICC	to	be	far	more	flexible	in	its	 interactions	




be	 an	 acceptance	 by	 proponents	 of	 AJMs	 that	 accommodations	 should	 be	made	 to	
eradicate	‘persistent	ethnic,	religious,	generational	and	gender	hierarchies	and	divisions	
that	 complicate	and	 limit	 the	effectiveness	of	 traditional	practice	 from	a	 transitional	
justice	perspective.’41		Chapter	Four’s	general	discussion	of	AJMs	and	their	domination	
by	elderly	males	highlighted	the	hierarchical	character	of	African	social	accountability	
and	 the	 routine	 suppression	 of	 certain	 groups,	 particularly	 women	 and	 youth.42		


















roles	 than	 simply	 spectating	 and	 they	 could	 require	 from	 the	 returnees	 a	 voluntary	




that	 although	 Mato	 Oput	 is	 culturally	 specific	 to	 the	 Acholi,	 it	 does	 have	 some	
equivalence	 to	 conflict	 resolution	 practices	 of	 other	 groups	 affected	 by	 the	 Lord’s	
Resistance	Army	violence.44	This	suggests	that	the	various	ethnic	groups	in	Uganda	could	
devise	 an	 acceptable	 ceremony	 based	 on	 their	 communal	 traditional	 values	 to	 be	





Lomé	 Peace	 Agreement	 made	 the	 ‘regrettable’	 decision	 not	 to	 rely	 on	 traditional	
‘established	 cultural	 practices’	 but	 provided	 for	 establishment	 of	 a	 Truth	 and	
Reconciliation	Commission	(TRC)	largely	modelled	on	the	South	African	TRC	(SATRC).46	
Unfortunately,	the	SLTRC	was	criticised	not	only	for	failing	to	reach	remote	areas	but	
also	 for	 being	 ‘too	 Western,	 too	 ‘official’	 and	 fail[ing]	 to	 elicit	 apologies	 from	
perpetrators’.47	 	 These	 failings	 led	 to	 the	 development	 of	 Fambul	 Tok	 in	 2008.48	
Nationwide	consultations	over	15	months	 involving	 ‘victims,	ex-combatants,	women,	
youth,	religious	leaders,	elders,	cultural	leaders	and	local	officials’	in	all	districts	assessed	















this	 grass-roots	 collaborative	 effort	 to	 establish	 a	 nationally-acceptable	 means	 of	
achieving	accountability	and	reconciliation	could	be	successfully	replicated	in	Uganda.		
Such	an	AJM	could	potentially	resolve	the	issues	which	make	Mato	Oput	unsuitable	as	





was	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 that	 despite	 its	 identified	 shortcomings,	 there	was	much	
about	 the	 SATRC	 that	 has	 great	 potential	 to	 satisfy	 the	 aims	 of	 ICJ	 and	 far	 more	






its	 ‘carefully	 balanced	 powers’52	 and	 ‘extensive	 investigatory	 reach’53	 were	
unprecedented	at	the	time	(albeit	they	were	under-utilised)	and	its	flexibility	enabled	it	
to	adapt	its	processes	as	issues,	such	as	gender-focus,	arose.		To	improve	the	range	of	
accountability	 still	 further,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 future	 generic	 TC	 models	 should	
incorporate	 institutional	 and	 special	 hearings	 into	 their	 process	 from	 the	 outset,	 to	
enable	 the	 identification	of	 the	 extent	 of	 culpability	 not	 readily-apparent	 in	 criminal	














this	 form	 of	 AJM	must	 address	 if	 the	 ICC	 is	 to	 be	 persuaded	 to	 defer	 in	 its	 favour.		
Concerning	 the	 important	 issue	 of	 amnesties,	 for	 example,	 to	 forestall	 the	





and	 by	 ensuring	 that	 those	 who	 fail	 to	 apply	 remain	 at	 real	 risk	 of	 future	 criminal	
prosecution.	This	is	important	because	a	study	conducted	in	2010	concluded	that	TCs	
alone	‘tend	to	have	a	negative	impact	on	HR’	whereas,	when	used	together	with	trials	




of	 facts	 relating	 to	amnesty	applications,	 to	ensure	 the	veracity	of	admissions	made,	
before	amnesty	is	granted.		It	should	provide	for	equal	legal	representation	to	improve	
victim	participation	in	the	amnesty	process	and	ideally,	it	should	co-ordinate	decisions	
regarding	amnesty	with	decisions	 regarding	 reparations	 to	avoid	 the	perception	 that	
perpetrators	receive	better	treatment	than	victims.		As	suggested	by	Theissen,	it	could,	








Opinion	 (Paper	 presented	 at	 the	Workshop	 on	 ‘Legal	 Institutions	 and	 Collective	Memories’	 at	 the	 International	
Institute	for	the	Sociology	of	Law,	Oñati,	Spain,	22-24	September)	p51	
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Having	 acknowledged	 in	 Chapter	 Six	 that	 an	 AJM	 can	 successfully	 attain	 ICJ	 goals,	
Chapter	 Seven	 investigated	 the	 likelihood	 of	 ICC	 judges	 utilising	 the	 RSt’s	 ‘creative	
ambiguity’56	to	allow	an	AJM	to	fulfil	its	complementarity	criteria.		In	the	absence	of	an	






The	 Rome	 Conference	 was	 generally	 unfavourable	 towards	 the	 concept	 of	 judges’	
creativity,	however,	the	constructive	ambiguity	of	the	RSt	has	allowed	judges	to	display	








of	the	drafters	of	the	RSt.58	 	Thus,	even	 if	 the	Prosecutor	 is	prepared	to	exercise	her	
powers	in	the	interests	of	justice	in	the	state’s	favour,	the	judges	may	seek	to	overturn	
this	decision.59		Zappalà	argues	that	the	judges’	activist	attitude	may	be	the	only	way	to	








It	 is	 suggested	that	 these	steps	could	be	 incorporated	 into	an	AJM	process	 relatively	





culpability	of	 individuals	which,	 it	was	argued,	 is	 incompatible	with	the	nature	of	the	
international	crimes.		In	contrast,	AJMs	employ	a	wider	lens	and	can	focus	on	collective	



























Similar	 empirical	 research	 is	 required	 to	 establish	 how	 other	 AJMs	 that	 states	 may	
regard	as	preferential	to	criminal	prosecutions	in	the	context	of	their	own	transitions	
from	 conflict	 or	 tyrannical	 rule,	 can	 achieve	 ICJ	 goals.	 	 The	 thesis	 has	 proposed	 a	
framework	by	which	the	ICC	can	assess	an	AJM	for	the	purposes	of	its	complementarity	
provisions.		Further	research	is	necessary	to	fully	develop	and	analyse	this	framework	to	







needs	 to	be	done	 to	make	 them	operational	 in	 this	 context.	 	 Its	 findings	have	wider	
implications	for	the	architecture	of	ICJ	and	justice	practice	more	generally	than	simply	
an	acceptance	of	 the	 impossibilities	created	by	cultural	 relativity.	 	 It	has	argued	 that	
justice	for	victims	is	often	more	than	the	retributive	justice	offered	by	criminal	trials,	
thus	it	must	be	recognised	that	in	some	transitional	contexts,	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	
may	 not	 be	 the	 best	 option.	 	 Therefore,	 when	 deciding	 on	 the	 mechanism	 of	
accountability,	the	social	and	political	realities	of	a	specific	situation	must	be	taken	into	
account.		The	thesis	has	suggested	that	even	if	prosecutions	at	the	ICC	are	justified	and	
practicable,	 an	AJM	potentially	 could	be	more	effective	 in	achieving	many	of	 the	 ICJ	
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objectives	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 Three.	 	 It	 is	 proposed	 that	 if,	 at	 the	 preliminary	







many	contexts	 the	two	are	 intertwined	and	 it	 requires	a	reformulation	of	 the	 justice	
paradigm	to	reflect	this.		As	a	means	of	healing	the	wounds	of	the	past	and	coping	with	




social	movements	 that	underlie	conflicts	 (e.g.	 the	Arab	Spring),	which	again	makes	 it	
essential	that	links	between	TJ	and	development	frameworks	(rather	than	focussing	only	
on	human	rights	violations)	be	established.		The	reformulation	proposed	by	this	thesis	






















David	Crane,	 former	Prosecutor	 at	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	 commented	 in	
2005,	“Our	perspectives	are	off	kilter	…	we	consider	our	justice	as	the	only	justice	…	we	





judicial,	 retributive	 and	 non-retributive	 elements,	 then	 AJMs	 which	 focus	 on	 the	
restoration	of	relationships	through	dialogue	and	inclusiveness,	to	uphold	principles	of	


















































interdisciplinary	 research	 as	 amateurish	 dabbling	 with	 theories	 and	 methods	 the	














Doctrinal	 research	 regards	 the	 legal	 system	 as	 autonomous	 (or	 at	 least	 as	 relatively	
autonomous)	in	that	it	assumes	it	can	legitimately	be	described	by	reference	to	its	own	














that	 the	doctrinal	 researcher’s	 ‘underlying	 views	 are	often	not	 articulated’6	 thus	 the	
theoretical	stance	often	lies	unstated	but	she	does	acknowledge	Westerman’s	argument	




to	 clarify	 and	 analyse	what	 the	 law	 is	 and	 how	 it	 applies,	 which	 for	 this	 thesis	was	
essential	to	fully	comprehend	the	function	and	processes	of	the	ICC	in	its	capacity	as	the	






jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Court	 reflects	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 drafters	 so	 far	 as	 issues	 of	
admissibility	 are	 concerned	 or	 whether	 the	 judges	 are	 going	 beyond	 the	 original	
intentions	of	the	drafters	to	the	extent	that	they	could	accused	of	being	reactionary.	
	
In	 further	 considering	 this	 question,	 existing	 literature	on	 the	 topic	was	 located	 and	
critically	 analysed	 for,	 as	 Richard	 Posner	 observed,	 ‘the	messy	 work	 product	 of	 the	
judges	 and	 legislators	 requires	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 tidying	 up,	 analysis,	 restatement	 and	



























[…]	 less	 compelling	 or	 respected	 than	 the	 research	 methods	 used	 by	 those	 in	 the	
sciences	or	social	sciences.’13		Richard	Cotterell,	for	example,	has	argued	that	true	legal	
scholarship	 also	entails	 a	 sociological	 understanding	of	 the	 law,	 that	 is,	 law	must	be	
































This	 inquiry	 can	 reveal,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 law	 itself	 is	 problematic	 because	 it	
contributes	to	or	even	causes	social	problems	and	that	other	solutions	may	be	more	
beneficial,20	an	 issue	which	 is	especially	pertinent	 in	the	peace	versus	 justice	debate.	
The	law	in	context	approach	gives	an	additional	dimension	to	legal	studies,	broadening	






It	 is	 this	variety	of	different	approaches	 that	 leads	 to	a	 lack	of	consensus	as	 to	what	
precisely	 constitutes	 socio-legal	 research	 although	 for	 Cownie	 and	 Bradney,	 it	 is	 an	
‘‘approach	to	the	study	of	 law	and	legal	processes’	which	‘covers	the	theoretical	and	






























on	 evidence-based	methods	whereas	 the	 assessment	of	 the	AJMs	 and	evaluation	of	
their	capacity	to	satisfy	the	requirements	of	ICJ	is	empirical	because	it	does.		
	
No	 interviews	 or	 surveys	 were	 undertaken	 specifically	 for	 this	 thesis	 as	 it	 was	
unfortunately	not	possible,	 for	 a	 variety	of	 personal	 reasons,	 to	 travel	 to	Uganda	or	
South	Africa	during	the	period	of	the	research	and	it	was	decided	not	to	conduct,	for	
example,	interviews	via	Skype	because	of	the	very	limited	knowledge	of	and	access	to	














the	 internet	 and	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	 chapters	 on	Mato	 Oput	 and	 the	 SATRC	 added	
strength	and	depth	to	the	arguments	formulated	in	these	chapters.		
		







moderated	 important	 elements	 of	 legal	 research	 dominated	 by	 both	 internal	 and	
external	 approaches,	 creating	 opportunities	 for	 closer	 working	 across	 these	
boundaries’.24			The	inter-disciplinary	approach	has	facilitated	research	for	this	thesis	in	




what	 is	 distinctive	 about	 law	 as	 a	 social	 construction	 as	well	 as	 examining	 its	 inter-




















the	 recognition	 of	 human	 rights,	 democracy	 and	 peaceful	 co-existence	 and	
development	 opportunities	 for	 all	 South	 Africans,	 irrespective	 of	 colour,	 race,	 class,	
belief	or	sex.	
	
The	 pursuit	 of	 national	 unity,	 the	well-being	 of	 all	 South	 African	 citizens	 and	 peace	
require	 reconciliation	between	 the	people	 of	 South	Africa	 and	 the	 reconstruction	of	
society.	
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